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XENOPHANES AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

The lines, quoted by Athenaeus, X, 413 f. (fr. 2, Diehl), in which Xenophanes attacks the rewards given to victors in the Olympic Games, stand almost alone in the records of Greek thought about athletics. It is true that Euripides echoes their sentiments in a famous fragment of his *Autolycus*¹ and that Isocrates begins his *Panegyricus*² with a complaint that while athletes are rewarded, those who have toiled for the public good are not. But these complaints belong to a later age when athletes were often professional, and in any case both Euripides and Isocrates may be suspected of repeating what Xenophanes had said before them. His criticism is all the more impressive because it provides the opposite side of the picture to the praise of athletes found in Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides, and comes from a time when, we assume, athletic prowess was universally honoured in Greece. That Xenophanes should counter what seems to have been a common opinion is naturally taken as another sign of his independence from accepted beliefs. The man who attacked Homer and rejected old tales about the gods might be expected to attack the honoured institution of the Olympic Games and to say that his own σοφίη was more worthy of reward than was success in any of their various events. It is, therefore, not surprising to find modern scholars treating these opinions of Xenophanes as part of his philosophical system and typical of his outspoken criticism. Recently this view has received new strength from W. Jaeger,³ who, though he says that Xenophanes was "no original thinker," says also that he shows "the inevitable collision between the old aristocratic upbringing

¹ Fr. 282, Nauck.

² Or. IV, I.

³ *Paideia*, pp. 230-4.

and the new philosophic man," and bases much of his case on this fragment. His argument contains two main points: first, that by attacking athletic renown Xenophanes was opposing the aristocratic tradition which believed in "the absolute supremacy of the ideal of the games," and secondly, that in its place he recommended his own σοφίη, which Jaeger takes to mean "spiritual education" and explains as "the strength of the spirit which creates right and law, correct order and well-being." If Jaeger is right in his interpretation, Xenophanes was certainly no less original in his criticism of institutions than of theology. But on closer examination doubts suggest themselves, and the lines seem to have a different meaning and to have been prompted by other motives.

The lines were probably written before 520 B. C. For in that year the Race in Armour was introduced into the Olympic Games,⁴ and since Xenophanes mentions all the main events which existed before that date and says nothing about this, we may presume that it did not exist when he wrote. Xenophanes was born about 570 B. C., and so the lines may be dated between 550 B. C., when, we may presume, he began to write, and 520 B. C., when the Race in Armour became a regular event. The date is of some relevance to the problem, since it shows that this fragment is earlier evidence for Greek views of athletics than anything in Pindar or Bacchylides and probably earlier than the few fragments of Simonides' Epinicians. It is at least possible that the athletic ideal, which dominated the Greek aristocracies in the fifth century, was not so dominant in the sixth century, and that Xenophanes was not so revolutionary in his attack as might seem from a comparison with Pindar. In any case the lines should first be considered with reference to the language and ideas of their time, and when that has been done, their social origin and significance can better be estimated.

Xenophanes says clearly that he regards his own σοφίη as superior to physical strength:

⁴ After the first foundation events were added in the following order: two stade race in 724, long distance race in 720, pentathlon in 708, horse-race and pankration in 648, wrestling in 632, boxing in 616; the four-horsed chariot race was probably substituted for the two-horsed chariot race in 648. Cf. E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World*, p. 35.

ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων
 ἀνδρῶν ἢ δ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη.
 ἀλλ' εἰκῇ μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον
 προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης (fr. 2, 11-14)

The interpretation of these lines depends on the meaning given to *σοφίη*. Opinions vary between referring it to the poet's skill and to his philosophy or wisdom. Either is possible in the sixth century.⁵ The first meaning of "craft" or "skill" in any art or handicraft is as old as the *Iliad*,⁶ where it is applied to ship-building, while Margites is said to be in no way *σοφός* because he lacked every *τέχνη*.⁷ Anacreon applied *σοφίη* to embroidery,⁸ and Attic potters used it of their craft.⁹ Among other forms of craft was song, and excellence in this was also *σοφίη*, so that it was the word for what we call the poet's "art." Hesiod calls Linus *παντοίης σοφίης δεδαγκότα*,¹⁰ and the word is used by Solon¹¹ and "Theognis"¹² for poetry. The same sense is used at a later date by Simonides¹³ and abundantly by Pindar. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that Xenophanes used the word *σοφίη* to mean "art" and that we can accept such translations as "our art" (J. Burnet) and "the poet's skill" (J. M. Edmonds). If so, Xenophanes simply complained that his poetry was not rewarded as the victories of athletes were. On the other hand it is also at least possible that Xenophanes used *σοφίη* to mean "knowledge" with special reference to what he taught, and so Diels took it when he translated "unsere Weisheit." That *σοφίη* could have such a meaning in the sixth century is not absolutely certain, since none of the early philosophers or physicists seem to have used the word in this sense. But with Heraclitus it came, if it had not already come, to have a meaning like this. The best evidence comes from his attack on Pythagoras, who *ἐποιήσατο ἑωυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην*,¹⁴—"claimed as his own a wisdom which was but a learning of

⁵ Cf. B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Berlin 1924), pp. 1 to 19.

⁶ O 412.

⁷ Fr. 2, Kinkel.

¹¹ Fr. 1, 52, Diehl.

⁸ Fr. 108, Diehl.

¹² 770, 790, 942, 995.

⁹ Epigr. 1100, Kaibel.

¹³ Fr. 56, Diehl.

¹⁰ Fr. 193, Rzach.

¹⁴ Fr. 17, Bywater (fr. 129, Diels).

many things and an art of mischief" (Burnet). Since Heraclitus is speaking of Pythagoras' *ιστορίη*, which he practised "beyond all other men," this shows that for him there was a *σοφίη* in inquiry as in any other *τέχνη*, although in the case of Pythagoras he thought the *σοφίη* mischievous. So Heraclitus also uses the neuter adjective *σοφόν* to qualify what is appropriate to his own special activity, such as listening to the Word¹⁵ or knowing the thought by which all things are steered.¹⁶ And finally, as a seeker after truth, he said that *σοφίη* consists, at least partly, in speaking the truth.¹⁷ The word *σοφίη*, then, had for Heraclitus a special meaning, and from this it must have developed its later sophistic meaning of philosophical or scientific knowledge, such as we find in Anaxagoras¹⁸ or in the epigram on Thrasymachus,¹⁹—*ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφίη*. In the case of Heraclitus we can see how the word came to mean what it did for him. His business, like that of Pythagoras, was *ιστορίη*, itself a *τέχνη*, and being proficient in it he claimed for it the name of *σοφίη*.

These two views of the meaning of *σοφίη* are not absolutely incompatible, though neither quite covers its full meaning. *σοφίη* was proficiency in any *τέχνη* and Aristotle reflected the view of an older generation when he said that *σοφία* was *ἀρετὴ τέχνης*.²⁰ It is simply skill in any craft. This helps to fix what Xenophanes meant by his own *σοφίη*. Since he was writing a special kind of poetry, it must be to his excellence in this that he refers, and we are wrong to assume that he meant either poetry as such or knowledge as such. He meant simply the philosophical and didactic poetry which he himself wrote and which he believed to be worthy of better rewards than it got. Jaeger, then, gives too precise and too philosophical a meaning to *σοφίη* when he translates it by "spiritual education." No doubt Xenophanes regarded himself seriously as a teacher, but it is not directly to teaching that his words refer. Nor can such a meaning be extracted from his description of his art as *ἀγαθή*. He means simply that it is "good" in the same sense as he calls the boxer "good" in the next line. Each is successful in

¹⁵ Fr. 1.¹⁶ Fr. 19 (fr. 41, Diels).¹⁷ Fr. 107 (fr. 112, Diels).¹⁸ Fr. 21 b, Diels.¹⁹ Athen., X, 454 f.²⁰ *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7, 1, 1141 a 12.

its own way as an example of *τέχνη*. "Good" is so ambiguous a word in English that it is hard not to find some ethical connotation in the Greek word *ἀγαθός*, but it may be doubted whether it had any such connotation in the sixth century,²¹ and it is unlikely that, even if it had, it would be found in connection with such a word as *σοφίη*. Nor is there any need to alter *τῆς ἀγαθῆς* in 14 with J. M. Edmonds to *ἡγαθέης*. Greek poets seem to have felt little objection to repeating the same word within the space of a few lines, and *ἡγάθεος* is applied only to places.

There seems, then, no convincing reason why we should accept Jaeger's interpretation of *σοφίη* in this poem or deduce from it that Xenophanes illustrates the inevitable collision between philosophers and aristocrats. But it would still be possible to assume with Jaeger that Xenophanes' attack on the games was part of an anti-aristocratic outlook, that as a rebel or a misfit he attacked an institution dear to the established class of nobles. The question of Xenophanes' social status is of some interest and needs consideration. The champions of his comparatively humble origin might claim that his dislike of athletic renown was part of a revolutionary or democratic or at least of a dissatisfied outlook. The basis of such views is the belief that Xenophanes was a professional rhapsode who earned pay for reciting poetry and that he shows that fact here. The evidence for this is the statement of Diogenes Laertius²² that Xenophanes *αὐτὸς ἐρραψώδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*. K. Reinhardt accepts this literally and explains these lines as the complaint of a professional poet who introduces himself to his audience as someone more worthy of their money and honours than the athletes whom they have been watching.²³ But, as Burnet pointed out, "nothing is said anywhere about his reciting Homer, and the word *ῥαψώδειν* is used quite loosely for 'to recite.'"²⁴ Indeed it seems impossible that a man who made his living as a reciter of Homer should have been called *Ὀμηροπάτης* by Timon of Phlius²⁵ or have said what Xenophanes said about Homer. To judge by fr. 1, 21-4, he thought it wrong to tell such stories as Homer

²¹ Cf. Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

²² IX, 18.

²³ *Parmenides*, p. 134.

²⁴ *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 127, n. 2.

²⁵ Fr. 60, Diels.

told, and after saying that, he would have found it difficult to recite such passages as the *Διὸς ἀπατή* or the *Θεομαχία*. It is in fact unlikely that Xenophanes was a rhapsode in the proper sense of the word or that he endured the feelings of resentment or inferiority which professional poets may sometimes have suffered. On the contrary Fr. 1 shows that he mixed in good company as an equal who was allowed to say what he thought and to dictate his instructions to the other guests in a rich house. It may, moreover, be doubted whether elegiac verses at this date were composed by professional poets. There is no evidence that Tyrtaeus or Archilochus or Mimnermus or Solon or Theognis sang for anything but their own satisfaction, and it is reasonable to assume that Xenophanes was like them.

It is, of course, perfectly true that Xenophanes complains that honours and rewards given to athletes would more suitably be given to him. But this does not mean that he was normally paid for his services. In fact it implies the contrary: he complains because he is not rewarded. Nor does it even mean that he would like to receive money for his poetry. What he wants is not so much money as respect and honour such as are given to athletes. Money was doubtless one way of rewarding athletes, but it was not the only way, and for Xenophanes it is simply a symbol of the honour which he feels to be his due. Nor does it seem likely that in his time poets were paid for a song as they were in the fifth century. So far as lyric poets were concerned, payment seems first to have been made to Simonides,²⁶ and Pindar certainly regarded such payment as a comparatively recent institution when, speaking of earlier times than his own, he said:

*ἃ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδὴς πω τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργατὶς.*²⁷

Rhapsodes were certainly in a different position and may well have derived their living from pay received for recitations, but there is no evidence that other poets were like them in this respect. What Xenophanes wants is honour, and we can see what his conception of the poet's true position was from the words which Homer makes Odysseus speak to Euryalus in Phaeacia:

²⁶ Schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 695.

²⁷ *Isthm.* II, 6; Cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 387.

ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ εἶδος ἀκιδνότερος πέλει ἀνὴρ,
 ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεισι στέφει· οἱ δέ τ' ἐς αὐτὸν
 τερπόμενοι λεύσσουσιν, ὃ δ' ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύει
 αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισιν·
 ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστῳ θεὸν ὥς εἰσορόωσιν.²⁸

Xenophanes feels that the man of words should be honoured by his fellow-citizens, and in saying what he does, he advances no new idea. He wishes rather to return to the old honour in which a poet was held before athletes superseded him in popularity and renown. He expects, in fact, to receive the kind of reward that was given to Pindar for his Dithyramb for Athens when he was presented with the right of *προξενία* and a sum of money which is variously given as 1,000²⁹ and 10,000 drachmae.³⁰

Jaeger's argument, then, is inconclusive about either the political views or the social position of Xenophanes. But the argument from his attack on athletic rewards looks stronger. In the fifth century victory in the Games was highly prized by the noble families of Greece, and Pindar erected round it a whole metaphysic of aristocracy, seeing in athletic success the manifestation in *ἀρετά* of those noble inborn qualities which the fortunate few inherited from divine ancestors. To a lesser degree his views were shared by Bacchylides who believed strongly in the importance of success in the games. For these poets important patronage came from nobles like those of Aegina and from Thessalian and Sicilian princes. But it is not certain that in earlier centuries athletic renown was so universally prized by aristocrats. In Sparta of the seventh century Tyrtaeus was careful to say that *ἀρετή* in running or wrestling was not nearly so important as *ἀρετή* on the battlefield:

οὗτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὗτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείην
 οὔτε ποδῶν ἀρετῆς οὔτε παλαισμοσύνης,
 οὗτ' εἰ Κυκλώπων μὲν ἔχοι μέγεθός τε βίην τε,
 νικῶν δὲ θεῶν Ὀρήκιον Βορέην.³¹

and he justified his preference by the usefulness of good fighters to the city. It is true that Sparta was never quite the same as

²⁸ *Od.* VIII, 169-173.

²⁹ *Isocr.*, XV, 166.

³⁰ *Eustath.*, *Vit. Pind.* 28.

³¹ *Fr.* 9, 1-4.

other Greek cities and that the seventh century was not the sixth. But the fact remains that it was possible for a Greek of the seventh and sixth centuries to be far from being a democrat or rebel and yet to disapprove of undue rewards being given to athletes. Indeed Solon seems to have had some doubts on the subject. For, when he arranged for the city to pay five hundred drachmae to an Olympian victor,³² it looks as if he were trying to regularize and control an existing practise which had got out of control. For, as Diogenes Laertius says,³³ he thought that "it was in bad taste to increase the rewards of these victors and to ignore the exclusive claims of those who had fallen in battle." A similar doubt seems to have been felt by Pythagoras, who was certainly no democrat. He advised men to compete, but not to win, at Olympia; for he thought that victors were not *εὐαγείς* and liable to *φθόνος* because of their success.³⁴ Something of the same temper may be seen in his famous comparison of life to the Olympic Games. For in that the class of men who correspond to the athletes are those whom *ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἕμερος, φιλονεικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν*.³⁵ There was in fact a small current of opinion which was hostile to the excessive honours paid to athletes, and Xenophanes shared it. But this does not mean that he was seriously criticising the aristocratic way of life or really finding himself in conflict with it. The aristocratic society was tolerant of diversity of opinions on this as on other points.

We may perhaps come to a more just appreciation of what Xenophanes said and meant if we consider the position which the great Games held in his time. The sixth century both inherited a tradition of athletics and itself added considerably to it. It seems to have maintained the attitude towards athletics which Homer ascribes to Alcinous:

οὐ μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον κλέος ἀνέρος ὄφρα κεν ᾗσιν,
ἢ ὅ τι ποσσὶν τε ῥέξῃ καὶ χερσὶν ἐῷσιν.³⁶

and to have felt, as Tyrtaeus knew that men of his time felt, that success in them was an *ἀπερά* as good in its way as any

³² Plut., *Sol.* 23.

³³ I, 55, Trs. R. D. Hicks.

³⁴ Porph., *Vit. Pyth.* 15.

³⁵ Iamblich., *Vit. Pyth.* 58.

³⁶ *Od.* VIII, 147-8.

other. It displayed its belief by the foundation of three new festivals, the Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean, which, if they did not quite equal the Olympian in prestige, were certainly regarded as next in importance to it. The great majority of Greeks enjoyed the Games and admired men who succeeded in them, and when Xenophanes attacked the honours paid to athletes, he attacked a wide and popular belief, which was not confined to a single class but held by most men of his time. So if we would understand the reasons for his attack and the arguments which he used, we must first understand the extraordinary prestige which athletic success had for Greeks of all kinds and places.

The plain fact seems to be that in many parts of Greece the athletic victor was regarded not so much as a superior man but as someone who was almost above man.³⁷ It is significant that Tyrtaeus compares him not to other men or even to heroes but to the Cyclops and the North Wind,³⁸ while "Theognis" compares him also to the North Wind and to the Harpies.³⁹ There is of course some natural exaggeration in these comparisons, but they indicate that those who admired athletic success saw in it something more than mortal. And this admiration found its expression in the honours paid to athletes, in songs composed for their home-coming and in statues erected in their honour. The great development of the Epinician in the sixth century and the number of archaic statues of athletes made in it show the degree of success which attended the victor. In Southern Italy and Sicily respect for athletic success seems to have reached its highest point; and, if Xenophanes was in the West when he wrote these lines, he may well have been moved by the extraordinary honours which the Western Greeks seem to have paid to victors. For in the West the victor seems literally to have become a hero. Philippus of Croton, who accompanied Dorieus to Sicily and died fighting against Segesta, was heroized after his death and honoured with sacrifices "because of his beauty."⁴⁰ But we may suspect that, since he was an Ὀλυμπιονίκης, his athletic prowess had something to do with the establishment of his cult. Another man of the West, Euthymus of Epizephyrian

³⁷ Cf. F. M. Cornford in J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, pp. 212-259.

³⁸ Fr. 9, 3-4.

³⁹ 715-6.

⁴⁰ Hdt., V, 47.

Locri, also an Olympic victor, is said to have received similar honours in his own lifetime.⁴¹ No less significant is the story that the famous athlete, Milon of Croton, led his country against Sybaris dressed as Heracles with club and lion-skin.⁴² Heracles was the true type of the *καλλίνικος*, as Euripides shows in several passages of his *Hercules Furens*⁴³ and as Pindar shows by the many myths about Heracles which he inserted in his Epini-cian Odes. His intimate connection with athletic success may best be seen in the song attributed to Archilochus⁴⁴ which was sung by the victor and his friends after the victory, with its words:

τήνελλα
ὦ καλλίνικε χαῖρ' ἄναξ Ἡράκλεες.

Milon must surely have indicated by dressing himself as Heracles that he was in some sense like Heracles, a man more than human because of his physical strength and prowess. He too was a *καλλίνικος*, like the alleged patron and founder of the Olympic Games. In beliefs of this kind we may see the first stages of the remarkable honours paid to athletes which later led to such a demonstration as that given to Exaenetus, who won in 416 and 412 B. C. He entered his city in a four-horsed chariot, attended by three hundred other chariots drawn by pairs of horses.⁴⁵

Nor were such demonstrations confined to the West. In other parts of Greece the athletic victor was certainly regarded as more than ordinary man. This may be seen clearly in the lines which Simonides wrote for the boxer, Glaucus of Carystus:

οὐδὲ Πολυδεύκεος βία
χείρας ἀντείνειτ' ἂν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ
οὐδὲ σιδάρεον Ἀλκμήνας τέκος.⁴⁶

These have been explained away, but it is clear from Lucian, who quotes them,⁴⁷ that Simonides put Glaucus above Heracles and Polydeuces. Nor was his choice of heroes accidental. Hera-

⁴¹ Plin., *N. H.* VII, 47.

⁴² Diod., XII, 9.

⁴³ 582, 681, 789, 961.

⁴⁴ Fr. 120, Diehl.

⁴⁵ Diod., XIII, 82.

⁴⁶ Fr. 28, Diehl; cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 325.

⁴⁷ *Pro. Imag.* 19.

cles and Polydeuces were patrons of the Games, and to be compared with them in this way meant that Glaucus also was in some sense more than human. More mysterious is the case of Cleomedes of Astypalea, who was disqualified for killing his opponent but on the instruction of the Delphic Oracle was worshipped as "the last of the heroes."⁴⁸ It looks as if the Astypaleans were determined to make the most of their local athlete, even if he had been disqualified. Even statues of athletes were credited with miraculous powers. That of Theagenes of Thasos fell on an enemy; and, when it was thrown into the sea, Thasos was visited with a failure of crops.⁴⁹ So it was fished up, and in Lucian's time it was said to cure fevers. Similar powers were attributed to the statue of Polydamas of Scotussa at Olympia.⁵⁰ These cases show that the belief in the supernatural qualities of athletic victors was widely spread and that it took the form of comparing them to real heroes.

The idolization of athletic victors was not confined to religious rites and beliefs in miraculous powers. There was also a social and political side to it. Success in the Games was an excellent means to winning popularity and power, and it is significant that tyrants and would-be tyrants competed and won. In the Olympic Games the facts speak for themselves. Myron, successor of Orthagoras at Sicyon, won the chariot-race in 648 B. C. Pheidon of Argos, whom Aristotle regarded as a tyrant,⁵¹ seems to have tried to control the Games and certainly interfered with them.⁵² Cylon, would-be tyrant of Athens, was an Ὀλυμπιονίκης.⁵³ In the sixth century Cleisthenes of Sicyon won the chariot-race,⁵⁴ and among other successful competitors were Peisistratus of Athens⁵⁵ and the elder Miltiades.⁵⁶ And on the negative side the evidence is no less illuminating. From Sparta, where any attempt to establish tyranny was regarded with hostile suspicion, no king competed until the rebellious Demaratus won the chariot-race.⁵⁷ In Athens such victories, common in the days of the tyrants, were viewed with increasing distrust as the fifth century advanced. In the collection of Pindar's *Epini-*

⁴⁸ Paus., VI, 9, 6.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, VI, 11.

⁵⁰ Lucian, *Deor. Conc.* 12.

⁵¹ *Pol.* V, 8, 1310 b 26.

⁵² *Hdt.*, VI, 127.

⁵³ *Id.*, VI, 71.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, VI, 126.

⁵⁵ *Hdt.*, VI, 103.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, VI, 36.

⁵⁷ *Id.*, VI, 70.

cian Odes only two were written for Athenians, *Pythian* VII in 486 B. C. for the ostracised Megacles, and *Nemean* II about the same time for Timodemus of Acharnae, and the absence of later examples shows what public opinion felt on the matter.⁵⁸ The distrust felt at Athens about such victories may be seen from the way in which Thucydides makes Alcibiades defend his own sensational entries in the chariot-race at Olympia and admit candidly that such λαμπρότης as his naturally excited φθόνος among his fellow-citizens.⁵⁹ Something of the same hostile spirit may be seen in the lines on the great Rhodian athlete Dorieus,⁶⁰ who won three times in the Olympic and eight times in the Isthmian Games,⁶¹ but took a leading part in anti-Athenian politics and was exiled from Athens and Rhodes and condemned in absence to death.⁶² The epigram may be dated soon after 424/3 B. C. and says of him:

πρὶν φυγεῖν γε πατρίδα
δεινὰ γε χειρὶ πολλὰ ῥέξας ἔργα καὶ βίαια.

No doubt his politics were oligarchic, as his father's seem to have been before him,⁶³ and he was regarded as a dangerous member of society. The connection of games with politics was particularly clear in the West, as the early years of the fifth century show, when Astylus of Croton, Anaxilas of Rhegium, Theron and Xenocrates of Acragas, Gelon and Hieron of Syracuse all won important events. Nor was this interest simply a development of the military tyrannies which flourished after 500 B. C. For at some date between 530 and 520 B. C. Pantares of Gela, the father of the future tyrants Cleandrus and Hippocrates, won the chariot-race,⁶⁴ and recorded the fact with a dedication.⁶⁵ In the West, as elsewhere, the prestige which belonged to any successful athlete was eagerly sought by those who wished to win political power for themselves and their families.

Xenophanes, then, living in Sicily in the sixth century, would

⁵⁸ Bacchylides, *Ode* X is also for an Athenian, but his name and its date are not known.

⁵⁹ Thuc., VI, 16, 3.

⁶⁰ *Anth. Pal.* XIII, 11.

⁶¹ Paus., VI, 7, 4.

⁶² Xen., *Hell.* I, 5, 19.

⁶³ Cf. Pind., *Ol.* VII, 17, 90 ff.

⁶⁴ Hdt., VII, 154.

⁶⁵ Geffcken, No. 20.

have had good reasons for deploring the respect paid to athletes both on moral and on political grounds. In fact both objections might be reduced in Greek language to the same, that such success made a man think too highly of himself and believe that he was not as other men. It was liable to encourage ὕβρις, and that Xenophanes disapproved of ὕβρις may be seen clearly from his attack on the old inhabitants of Colophon who flaunted their wealth before the crowd and were punished for it,⁶⁶—a sentiment which agrees with some lines of Theognis where the conquest of Colophon is regarded as a classic case of the punishment of ὕβρις.⁶⁷ The undue respect for athletic success, of which he speaks, seems to have been curbed to some extent in the fifth century, and Pindar at least was careful not to praise athletes too highly. But his very moderation, his insistence on not wanting too much, are in themselves evidence for a widely spread idolatry of athletes. Pindar was in his own way conscious both of the religious and political aspects of this worship. He never once says that a successful athlete is really more than man,⁶⁸ and at times he warns his patrons against thinking that they are. The clearest case are his words to Phylacides of Aegina in *Isthmian* V, 14-16:

μὴ μάτενε Ζεὺς γενέσθαι· πάντ' ἔχεις,
εἴ σε τούτων μοῖρ' ἐφίκοιτο καλῶν.
θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει.

but a similar message may be seen for the father of Hippocleas

⁶⁶ Fr. 3, Diehl.

⁶⁷ 1103-4.

⁶⁸ Certain passages of Pindar have been taken to convey that the victor is more than man, but all may be satisfactorily explained otherwise. They are:

a) *Ol.* VI, 8-9 ἴστω γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πεδῖλψ δαιμόνιον πόδ' ἔχων Σωστράτου
νίος

where δαιμόνιον means "by the help of the gods."

b) *Ol.* IX, 28 ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρος ἐγένοντ'

where κατὰ δαίμονα does not mean "like a god" but "by god's will" which makes men brave and wise.

c) *Ol.* IX, 110 τονδ' ἀνέρα δαιμονίᾳ γεγάμεν εὐχειρα κτλ.

where δαιμονίᾳ again means "by god's will."

d) *Nem.* I, 9 κέλνου σὺν ἀνδρὸς δαιμονίαις ἀπειταῖς

where the δαιμονίαι ἀπειταῖς are simply the successes which the victor wins through the help of the gods.

of Thessaly, who has the great joy of seeing his son a Pythian victor, but must remember the limits set to human happiness (*Pyth.* X, 27):

ὁ χάλκεος οὐρανὸς οὐ ποτ' ἀμβατὸς αὐτῷ

while Aristophanes of Aegina is reminded that (*Nem.* III, 21)

Οὐκέτι πρόσω

ἀβάταν ἄλα κίονων ὑπερ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὐμαρές.

Nor was Pindar unaware of the political implications of athletic success. He approves of Diagoras of Rhodes because he

ὑβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδὸν

εὐθυπορεῖ

(*Ol.* VII, 91)

and in his praise of Hieron he is careful to point out that being a king he must look for no more than that:

μήκετι πάπταινε πόρσιον

(*Ol.* I, 114)

while his myth of Tantalus is a solemn warning against any attempt to escape from the mortal state. A similar warning may be seen at the end of *Pythian* I, where Hieron is told that he may choose between being like the good king Croesus or the evil tyrant Phalaris, and we cannot doubt that Pindar was fully conscious of the pride which athletic renown might breed in a man.

Pindar shows that the attitude which Xenophanes seems to attack still existed in his time and needed careful correction. His attitude is based on a moral conviction of the wickedness of ὑβρις, and like him Xenophanes approaches the question in an ethical spirit. He states his objections briefly and uses the language of his time. His first point made at 13 is that it is not δίκαιον to prefer strength to his own good σοφίη. The word δίκαιος has as many meanings as the English "right," and we cannot expect Xenophanes to have decided very exactly what he meant by it. In general δίκαιος seems to mean that which belongs to the established order of things and is for that reason to be approved. Its opposite, ἄδικος, is applied to whatever breaks this order and is associated with κόρος and ὑβρις. This way of thinking is to be seen in Solon's analysis of the political

situation in his time and it takes on a more tendencious air with Theognis. Xenophanes seems to mean that the preference for athletes is not "right" because it is against the established order of things. He could, no doubt, have added that it encouraged ὕβρις in those who were so honoured. He looks back to a past when words were more honoured than athletic success, and his language, though not specifically political, belongs to an aristocratic order of society in which any far-reaching change which seemed to promote the unworthy was regarded as ἄδικον.

Xenophanes' second objection is given in 15-19, where he denies that if men win in the Games,

τοῦνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἴη.

The word εὐνομία was often associated with δίκη and is closely connected with it. Hesiod made Εὐνομία, Δίκη, and Εἰρήνη daughters of Themis,⁶⁹ and Δυσνομία and Ἀάτη daughters of Eris.⁷⁰ This ancient view was accepted by Bacchylides, who at XV, 54-55 calls Δίκη

ἀγνᾶς

Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτᾶς Θέμιτος,

and echoed by Pindar at *Olympian* XIII, 6-9:

ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασιγνηταί τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,
Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνη, τάμ' ἀνδράσι πλούτον,
χρύσειαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος.

In the fifth century Εὐνομία and Δίκα had come to be catch-words of oligarchic and aristocratic societies, as we see from Pindar *Ol.* XIII, 6 of Corinth, IX, 16 of Opus, *Pyth.* V, 67 of Cyrene, and Bacchylides, XIII, 186 of Aegina. In the sixth century it does not seem to have developed so exact a meaning, but stood for the abstract quality of good government. In this sense Solon uses it in an important passage,⁷¹ in which he adopts an idea from Hesiod and contrasts Εὐνομία with Δυσνομία. He says that Δυσνομία brings all evils to a city, but Εὐνομία puts things right and stops ὕβρις and ἄτη. Solon is developing in his own way the doctrine expounded by Hesiod of the different results of good and bad government, and his chief development

⁶⁹ *Theog.* 902.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 230.

⁷¹ *Fr.* 3, 30-39.

lies in his application of the old idea to individual citizens who may produce good or ill according as they act rightly or wrongly. For him *Εὐνομία* is practically a state of mind, or at least a political condition produced by a state of mind. And it is something like this to which Xenophanes must refer when he says that athletic success does not put a city *μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ*. He means that so far from creating that modest frame of mind which is the essence of social stability, the honours paid to athletes will encourage *ὑβρις*.⁷²

Finally, Xenophanes closes with a third point in the words:

σμικρὸν δ' ἂν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ,
εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῶ Πίσαςο παρ' ὄχθας·
οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλιος.

This might be taken to mean that the rich prizes given to victors were a waste of public money and a useless expense. And of course it does mean this. But it also means something more. The phrase is not simply an ironical understatement. It appeals to a general principle, that it is the duty of citizens to enrich their city and that those who govern it should aim at securing such enrichment. The idea is implicit in the passage already quoted from *Olympian XIII* where Peace, the companion of *Εὐνομία* and *Δίκη* is called *τάμι' ἀνδράσι πλούτου*. A more obvious connection may be seen in a vivid document of the aristocratic life, *Homeric Hymn XXX*, where at 11-12 *εὐνομία* is definitely connected with wealth:

αὐτοὶ δ' εὐνομίῃσι πόλιν κάτα καλλιγύναικα
κοιρανέουσ', ὄλβος δὲ πολὺς καὶ πλούτος ὀπηδεῖ.

This emphasis on the importance of wealth belongs to the aristocratic age, and may be seen most clearly in the *Theognidea*. The situation is nicely summed up in the couplet, 885-6:

εἰρήνη καὶ πλούτος ἔχοι πόλιν, ὄφρα μετ' ἄλλων
κωμάζοιμι· κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔραμαι πολέμου.

But Xenophanes is probably using an older idea even than

⁷² The contrast between *εὐνομία* and *ὑβρις* had been made by Homer, *Od.* XVII, 487, about the gods

ἀνθρώπων ὑβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

this,—the notion of Hesiod that just government makes a land rich and is rewarded by the prosperity of the people:

θάλλονσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές· οὐδ' ἐπὶ νηῶν
νίσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα. (*Op.* 236-7)

If he had this, or a similar passage, in mind, Xenophanes' meaning is clear. He criticises the rewards given to athletes, because they do not enrich the city, that is, they have not the true sign of a just government in making the country prosperous, and are in fact *ἄδικα*.

Xenophanes then seems to attack these rewards and honours on traditional and conventional grounds which are in origin as old as Hesiod and were current in the aristocratic society of his own day. So far from advancing a revolutionary argument, he appeals to deep-seated convictions which were too familiar to need elaboration. A similar traditionalism may be seen in the three types of reward which he chooses to make his meaning clear. All three are privileges or possessions which belonged by traditional right either to the hereditary ruling class or to a few distinguished men who had done some benefit to the city. Xenophanes does not distinguish between the two classes of beneficiaries because his point is that athletes are neither but get rewards which they do not deserve and to which they are not properly entitled. The first appears in 7:

καὶ κε προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἄγωσιν ἄρουτο.

The privilege of *προεδρία*, of sitting in the front seats at games and festivals, was an ancient and prized honour. In the main it was given to persons of high rank or to families and even to cities as a reward for benefits rendered. So the Spartans traditionally allowed it to their kings⁷³ and gave it to the Deceleans because of help given long ago to the Tyndarids.⁷⁴ The Delphians gave it to their great benefactor Croesus,⁷⁵ and in Mandrocles' picture of Darius at the Bosphorus the king was depicted as sitting *ἐν προεδρίῃ*.⁷⁶ In the fifth century, at least in Athens, it was granted more freely, and Aristophanes, who was a stickler for old customs, complains of the common demand for it among Athenian generals:

⁷³ Hdt., VI, 57.

⁷⁵ *Id.*, I, 54.

⁷⁴ *Id.*, IX, 73.

⁷⁶ *Id.*, IV, 88.

νῦν δ' ἐὰν μὴ προεδρίαν φέρωσι καὶ τὰ σιτία,
οὐ μαχεῖσθαι φασιν.⁷⁷

Xenophanes would have agreed with Aristophanes that it was a special privilege which should be given only to a select few.

The second privilege which Xenophanes mentions is that of being fed at the public expense. This might possibly refer to the feasting of Olympic victors in the *πρυτανεῖον* at Olympia, to which Pausanias refers,⁷⁸ but more probably it refers to the free feasting granted to victorious athletes on their home-coming in their own *πρυτανεῖον*. That such honours were given in the fifth century is proved by an Attic inscription of B. C. c. 431-422⁷⁹ and by Socrates' words to his judges that if he must fix his own sentence, it would be ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι,⁸⁰ which he claimed to deserve more than any Olympian victor. Such honours were also granted at Carthaea in Ceos⁸¹ and in Paros.⁸² Xenophanes shows that they existed at least in the sixth century, and he complains about them. His reasons for complaint may be seen. Originally the privilege of feasting in the Prytaneum seems to have been rather exclusive. The Prytaneum was regarded as the common hearth of the city,⁸³ and the custom of giving free meals in it was derived from the entertainment dispensed by kings to distinguished guests.⁸⁴ So King Celeus, the founder of Demeter's cult at Eleusis, asked important men to his table, and this was called *πρυτανεῖον*.⁸⁵ In the sixth century the right of eating in the Prytaneum seems to have belonged to hereditary aristocrats or to the benefactors of the city and their descendants. At Athens it was where aristocrats met and sang *σκόλια*,⁸⁶ while the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had the right to feast in it.⁸⁷ The antiquity of the privilege may be seen from the fact that this right was also awarded to the descendants of the Delphian Cleomantis, who was said to have helped Athens in the time of King Codrus.⁸⁸ In Mytilene

⁷⁷ *Equ.* 575-6.

⁷⁸ V, 15, 8.

⁷⁹ *I. G.* I (ed. min.), 77. Cf. H. T. Wade-Gery in *B. S. A.*, XXXIII, pp. 123-127.

⁸⁰ *Apol.* 36 d.

⁸⁵ *Plut., Symp. Prob.* IV, 4, 1.

⁸¹ *I. G.* XII, 5, 1060.

⁸⁶ *Schol. Plat. Gorg.* 415 e.

⁸² *Ibid.* 274, 281, 289.

⁸⁷ *I. G.* I (ed. min.), 77.

⁸³ *Schol. Thuc.*, II, 15.

⁸⁸ *Lycurg., In Leocr.* 87.

⁸⁴ J. Burnet, *Plato's Apology*, p. 155.

Sappho's brother, Larichus, served wine in the Prytaneum because he was εὐγενής,⁸⁹ and one of Alcaeus' objections to Pittacus seems to have been that he, a man of low origin, held carouses in it.⁹⁰ Even in the fifth century at Tenedos Pindar's *Nemean* XI, with its invocation of

Παῖ Πέας, ᾧ τε πρυτανεῖα λέλογχας, Ἑστία,

shows that it was still an exclusive place and that the admission of the young Aristagoras to it was perhaps due to his being descended from Orestes.⁹¹ An inscription of the sixth century from Cyzicus grants ἀτελείην καὶ πρυτανεῖον to the descendants of two men who may be presumed to have been benefactors of the city.⁹² So when Xenophanes objects to this privilege being given to athletes, he again shows that in his view it was appropriate only to those who held it by ancient right or had really done something for the city.

In objecting to the extension of the right of σίτησις Xenophanes again recalls Solon. Two passages show that Solon tried to control the practise and to regularise it. Plutarch (*Sol.* 24) says of him: τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔᾶ σιτεῖσθαι πολλάκις· ἐὰν δὲ ᾧ καθήκη μὴ βούληται, κολάζει· τὸ μὲν ἡγείται πλεονεξίαν, τὸ δὲ ὑπεροψίαν τῶν κοινῶν; and this makes it clear that, like Xenophanes, he objected to the appearance of some men at the σίτησις as an exhibition of πλεονεξία, while the penalty attached to the non-appearance of the rightful participants was an attempt to summon the nobles to a proper sense of their duty. Secondly, Athenaeus (IV, 137 e) says that he ordered τοῖς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτουμένοις μᾶζαν παρέχειν in distinction from those who fed ταῖς ἐορταῖς and were to be given ἄρτον. The explanation of this distinction is to be found in a quotation from the *Πτωχοί* of Chionides made by Athenaeus on the point. It seems that a feast was sometimes given to the Dioscouri in the Prytaneum; they received

τυρὸν καὶ φυστὴν δρυπεπεῖς τ' ἐλάας καὶ πράσα

which were given by the Athenians ὑπόμνησιν ποιουμένους τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀγωγῆς. The distinction which Solon made shows that

⁸⁹ Schol. *Il.* XX, 234.

⁹⁰ Cf. *Greek Lyric Poetry*, p. 157.

⁹¹ *Nem.* XI, 33-5.

⁹² *G. D. I.* 5522.

he wished to keep the ancient character of *σίτῃσι* in the Prytaneum and did not wish the custom to become simply a social event. It is not clear that he appreciated the religious aspect of it or regarded this as of primary importance. To judge by Plutarch's words he saw the question as one that concerned the city and the attitude of her citizens towards her customs. In this he resembled Xenophanes.

The attitude of Solon and Xenophanes in regarding *σίτῃσι* as a primarily civic right proper to good citizens was a protest against another view which may have been equally ancient. If the Dioscuri were regarded as being present at such a *θεοξένια* we can better understand why athletes were given the privilege of eating in the Prytaneum. For the Dioscuri were essentially patrons of the Games. That is no doubt why Theron asked Pindar to sing his *Olympian* III at a *θεοξένια* at which the Dioscuri and Helen were thought to be present. So too in Sparta *σίτῃσι* was held in the presence of the same divine participants.⁹³ The victorious athlete was regarded as a proper guest for such an occasion in that he had been specially favoured by the Dioscuri. Pindar makes them the source of his glory,⁹⁴ but perhaps in earlier days he was regarded as being somehow more important than this, and himself half divine. Xenophanes protests against too great attention being paid to the athlete, and his reason is not religious but social or ethical. The undue honours are disruptive of good order and against ancient practise.

The third reward is given in the words at 9

καὶ δῶρον ὃ οἱ κειμήλιον εἶη

and since the language recalls the words in which Homer describes the gift offered by Telemachus to Athene⁹⁵ or the cup given by Achilles to Nestor,⁹⁶ it may be assumed to be something valuable, money or the like. Such rewards seem not to have been common in early days, but it is significant that early evidence for them comes from Sicily. Staters of Metapontum, minted about B. C. 500 with the inscription Ἀχελῷον ἄεθλον seem to be prize-money,⁹⁷ and Evans well explains the Syra-

⁹³ *G. D. I.* 4440-4442.

⁹⁴ *Ol.* III, 39.

⁹⁵ *Od.* I, 312.

⁹⁶ *Il.* XXIII, 618.

⁹⁷ Head, *Hist. Numm.*, p. 63.

cusan decadrachms inscribed ἀθλα as rewards for a victory of B. C. 412.⁹⁸ Before either of these the custom of giving money to Olympian victors is proved in Athens by Solon's limitation of the reward to five hundred drachmae. Xenophanes complains that the athlete does not deserve such a reward:

ταῦτά κε πάντα λάχοι
οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ. (10-11)

and implies that while some men, like himself, deserve money, others do not. In this he recalls both Solon and Theognis. Solon made a distinction between just and unjust gain. His unjust gain is sought in ὕβρις, comes οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, and is soon followed by ἄτη.⁹⁹ In general his position may be seen from the line:¹⁰⁰

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται

which implies that money should belong not to κακοί but to ἀγαθοί, and since in his time the words had a largely political meaning, he suggests that money on the whole should belong to those who have a right, by inheritance or "just gain," to it. Theognis takes the point further when he complains that owing to loss of their wealth the ἐσθλοὶ are now κακοί¹⁰¹ or that men of good birth marry women of bad birth for their money and πλοῦτος ἔμειξε γένος.¹⁰² He believes that the ἀγαθοὶ ought to be rich and the κακοί poor, and any deviation from this he considers wrong. Xenophanes seems to have agreed with him to the extent of thinking that some men deserved money while others did not.

Xenophanes, then, uses arguments and makes points which would appeal to Greek aristocrats of the sixth century like Solon or Theognis, and the basis of his case against the rewards given to athletes is that they are wrong because they upset the existing order and confer honour on those who do not deserve what should properly be given to the city's benefactors. Among these benefactors he classes himself, and so he claims for himself a position which may strike us as unusual for a Greek poet. Rich rewards do not seem commonly to have fallen to poets,

⁹⁸ *Num. Chron.*, 1891, p. 333.

⁹⁹ Fr. 1, 9-13.

¹⁰⁰ Fr. 4, 9.

¹⁰¹ 53 ff.

¹⁰² 183-192.

though Arion's trip to the West shows that in the right circumstances they could make money.¹⁰³ But Xenophanes' claim is not so much that he wants money as that he deserves it, and he deserves it because his art does good to the city as the athlete's success does not. He is in fact reasserting an old idea that there was an *ἀρετή* of words just as there was of physical strength or birth or martial prowess. The claim was as old as Homer who made Odysseus contrast the ugly and eloquent man with the beautiful and speechless.¹⁰⁴ But it was developed by the elegiac poets and seems to have been almost a traditional subject for them. One poet would praise this type of *ἀρετή*, and another that. So Tyrtaeus in Fr. 9 dismisses the *ἀρεταί* of the athlete, the beautiful, the royal and the eloquent in favour of the soldier who dies for his country. So too "Theognis," 699-718, cynically prefers the *ἀρετή* of wealth to the *ἀρετή* of moderation, wits, eloquence, and speed. These two poems show that among other *ἀρεταί* those of words and wisdom had a place, and no doubt Xenophanes felt that he was qualified to compete under both headings. To suit this traditional type of comparison he used the elegiac, as Tyrtaeus and "Theognis" used it, but he came to a different conclusion from either of them. The presence of poetry, or at least of eloquence, in the other lists shows that it was regarded as a possible claimant to having the best type of *ἀρετή*, and Xenophanes may not have shocked or surprised his audience when he entered a plea for it.

By saying that athletic success does no good to the city and claiming that his own art is better than it, Xenophanes hints that he somehow benefits the city. So he makes a claim which was more than a century later to be elaborated by Aristophanes in his *Frogs*. There at 1009-1010 even Euripides is allowed to say that poets make "men better in cities" and Aeschylus claims that his *Persians* made men fight better (1026-7), that the great poets of the past had all been teachers, (1030-36), that poets do for grown men what school teachers do for boys (1054-5). Xenophanes can hardly be regarded as teaching *τάξεις*, *ἀρετάς*, *ὀπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν* with Homer, but he certainly thought that he was a teacher, and it must be for this that he claimed a reward. The teaching which he claimed for his own

¹⁰³ Hdt., I, 24.¹⁰⁴ *Od.* VIII, 169-175.

must have been the remarkable physical and theological speculations whose remains are to be seen in his Hexameters, and this elegiac poem is a personal appeal to men to look more seriously at his more serious works. Just as Heraclitus tells men to listen to his λόγος,¹⁰⁵ or Solon prefaces his political warning with the words

ταῦτα διδάξαι θῦμος Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει,¹⁰⁶

so Xenophanes claims to be heard because he has something to say that will benefit the city. Nor, if we may judge by a later age, was Xenophanes alone in claiming civic rewards for a poet. For Aristophanes complained of the public neglect of old Cratinus

ὄν χρὴν διὰ τὰς προτέρας νίκας πίνειν ἐν τῷ πρῳτανείῳ.

(*Knights* 535)

and makes a very similar point not for himself but for someone whose poetry he admired.

In conclusion, then, we may say that this poem affords no evidence that Xenophanes was a revolutionary in any political sense. It shows that he attached a high importance to his own work, that he disapproved of honours given to men whom he thought unworthy, that, like Tyrtaeus and Solon, he judged the worth of an activity by its use to the city. He presents his case in traditional language and appeals to the deep distrust which the Greeks felt for ὕβρις or disturbance of the existing order. In his moral judgments he was certainly more sensitive and severe than many men of his time, but he was not so destructive or so revolutionary in them as he was in his theology. He was a high-minded member of a society which was conscious of its social and moral obligations. In the sixth century Greek aristocrats were neither all so reactionary as Alcaeus nor so homogeneous in their opinions as some social historians have thought, and the intellectual vigour and range of a class which produced Pythagoras and Heraclitus found a characteristic voice in Xenophanes.

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¹⁰⁵ Fr. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Fr. 3, 30.

MAENIANUM AND BASILICA.

The admirable work achieved by scholars of the 19th century, who had to handle and combine an enormous mass of written and steadily increasing monumental sources, has established fairly well the general outlines of the topography and history of ancient Rome. But, as a matter of course, the very authoritative character of the work by Platner, Bunsen, Jordan, Lanciani, Huelsen, and others often prevented further criticism. The need of getting as much information as possible out of the existing sources for the compilation of comprehensive works has sometimes led to a rather unmethodical solution of single problems; and the results, in turn, have been accepted by modern scholars without further inquiries. One such case involves the traditions about the Maeniana in the Roman Forum; and since very important aspects are involved, both of the appearance of the Roman Forum in an early period and of the general history of ancient architecture, it seems worth while to review the evidence.

Let us begin with a resumé of current opinion as it is expressed in most of the outstanding works on Roman topography as well as in more specialized discussions of our subject.¹ Re-

¹ Niebuhr, *Roemische Geschichte*, III, p. 167; Bunsen-Platner, *Beschreibung der Stadt Rom*, II, 1, pp. 43 ff.; Becker, *Handbuch der roemischen Altertümer*, I, 1843, p. 296, note 500; p. 300, note 19; Ossan, *Commentatio de Columna Maenia*, 1844; Reber, *Mitteilungen der K. K. Zentralkommission*, Vienna, XIV (1869), pp. 35 ff.; Lange, *Haus und Halle*, 1885, pp. 153 ff.; Jordan, *Topographie*, I, 2, p. 345, note 43; Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII (1893), pp. 84 ff.; Gilbert, *Geschichte und Topographie der Stadt Rom*, III, 1890, pp. 165, 206, 212 ff.; Richter, *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, 2nd ed., 1901, pp. 85, 98; *idem*, in Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, III, p. 1462; Lafaye, in Daremberg-Saglio, *s. v.* "Maenianum," p. 149; Thédenat, *Le Forum romain*, 1904, pp. 69; 98, note 5; 137; 139; 110; O'Connor, *The Graecostasis of the Roman Forum and its Vicinity* (*Bull. Univ. Wisconsin*, 99), 1904, pp. 188 ff.; *Real-Enc.*, XIV, p. 245 (Ebert); pp. 248 ff. (Muenzer); suppl. IV, p. 489 (Vierkandt); Stuart Jones, *Companion to Roman History*, 1912, pp. 100, 132, 136; Leroux, *Les origines de l'édifice hypostyle*, 1913, pp. 269 ff., 276 ff.; Marchetti, *Bull. Com.*, 1914, p. 106; Huelsen, *Forum and Palatine*, 1928, p. 10; Platner-Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary*, 1929, *s. v.* "Columna Maenia," pp. 131 ff.; *ibid.*, *s. v.* "Basilica Porcia," p. 82; *s. v.* "Tabernae," p. 505; Müfid, *Stockwerkbau der Griechen und Roemer*, 1932, p. 76; Boëthius, *Opuscula Arch.*, I (1935), pp. 170, 183 ff., 189 ff.

duced to a few words, the modern conception is the following: the Maeniana, upper balconies or galleries from which spectators could look down at the games in the Forum, were first erected in the year 318 B. C. by the censor C. Maenius over porticoes in front of tabernae. After the battle of Antium this famous man had been honored with a column (in the Forum close to the Comitium) which later stood in front of the Basilica Porcia, erected by the censor Cato in the year 184 B. C. Thus, in the early second century B. C. there had been a column in the neighborhood of a house which its owner, another Maenius, had sold to Cato for the erection of the Basilica. The younger Maenius reserved for himself and his descendants the right to erect a tribune in order to have a privileged seat during the games in the Forum. This tribune was somehow connected with the Columna Maenia, i. e. the honorary monument of his ancestor.²

This whole theory is, as we shall see, highly improbable. It is based on an attempt to conciliate some obvious contradictions in the various sources, which in themselves offer no evidence for the existence of porticoes in the Roman Forum in the Republican age.³ Furthermore the original Maeniana are no-

² This theory is seldom to be found exactly in the way in which it has been summarized here. In most cases the modern writers have scattered their remarks in different places in dealing with the various features concerned. These have been combined here. Some varieties will be discussed later.

³ This is true in spite of the theories of Reber, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff., and most other references to the subject. The tradition of the existence of porticoes in the age of the kings (Dionys. Hal., 3, 67, 4; Liv., 1, 35, 10) is of course legendary. It may have been based on a misinterpretation of traditions about the first column-porches connected with temples in the Forum. Nowhere are porticoes mentioned for republican times. I see no reason for the assumption that the games represented in the fresco of the Tomba delle Bighe from the early 5th century B. C. take place in a Forum. There, truncated columns are supporting low tribunals on which the masters are seated, while slaves are making love beneath them. They are not to be confounded with architectural porticoes (Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 ff.), but have to be compared with the supporting truncated column so common on south Italian vases, especially with those supporting the low pulpita of the Phlyakes, an interesting feature of Italian woodwork. Besides, such an interpretation of a fresco of such an early period would conflict with all the existing traditions about the origin of the Maeniana in Rome.

where in our sources connected with the Tabernae, and besides, the tradition about an honorary column of C. Maenius, the victor of Antium, is at best uncertain. On the other hand, very reliable and early traditions give a picture which differs widely from the modern theory.

The key sources are the following:

A. "Maenius, cum domum suam venderet Catoni et Flacco censoribus, ut ibi basilica aedificaretur, exceperat sibi *ius unius columnae, supra quam tectum proiceret* ex provolantibus tabulatis, unde ipse et posteri eius spectare munus gladiatorium possent, quod etiam tum in foro dabatur. *Ex illo igitur columna Maenia vocitata est: † causis eiusmodi soliti*" (Pseudo-Ascon. ad. Cic., *Div. in Caec.*, p. 201 [Stangl]: Lemma "ad columnam Maeniam").⁴

B. "Hic fertur domo sua, quam ad Forum spectantem habuerat, divendita unam columnam sibi excepsisse, unde gladiatores spectaret; quae ex eo Maenia columna nominabatur. Cuius et Lucilius sic meminit: (Maenius) columnam cum peteret" (Porphyrus ad Hor., *Serm.*, I, 3, 21: Lemma "Maenius absentem Novium cum carperet"; compare Lucil., *Frag.* 1203 [Marx]).

C. "Maeniana appellata sunt a Maenio censore, qui primus in foro *ultra columnas tigna proiecit, quo ampliarentur superiora spectacula*" (Festus, p. 120 [Lindsay]). Compare Paul. Diac. (p. 121 [Lindsay]), "Maeniana aedificia a Maenio sunt appellata. Is enim primus ultra columnas extendit tigna, quo ampliarentur superiora."

D. "Maenius collega Crassi in foro *proiecit materias, ut essent loca, in quibus spectantes insisterent*, quae ex nomine eius Maeniana appellata. Haec et solaria quia patent soli. Post haec alii lapide, alii materia aedificavere portibus⁵ Maeniana et foribus⁶ et domibus adiecerunt" (Isid., *Orig.*, 15, 3, 11).

E. "Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt unde et *columna Maenia*" (Nonius, I, p. 91 [Lindsay]).

It is perfectly clear that these five passages are unanimous in so far as the type of construction of the original Maeniana is concerned; or, at least, there is nothing in the shorter passages which would contradict the statements given by the more detailed

⁴ Compare *Schol. Bob. ad Cic., Pro Sest.*, p. 137 (Stangl); *Pseudoasconiana*, p. 51 (Stangl).

⁵ porticibus?

⁶ foris?

descriptions. The original Maeniana, thus, were believed to have been projecting upper balconies (A, C, D) constructed in order to make room for spectators (A, B, C, D) in the higher parts of a building at the edge of the Forum (A, B, C), and they projected from a portico (A, B, C) over columns (A). Any connection with tabernae is nowhere mentioned for this early type. Indeed tabernae are first mentioned in a passage of Vitruvius referring to conditions of his own time.⁷

Even if all the sources agree about the original character of the Maeniana, they do not agree in regard to the date, the inventor, and, implicitly, the place in which they first were used. In these respects the sources are divided into two classes: one of these is composed of A, B, and apparently E; the other of C and D. The former class ascribes the invention to an otherwise unknown Maenius, who lived in the early second century B. C., and connects the erection of the first Maeniana with the construction of the Basilica Porcia. The second class, without indicating local or other details, ascribes the same invention to the most famous member of the Gens Maenia and to a period four generations earlier. If we have to make a choice between these two traditions without regard for other considerations, it seems clear that those sources that contain more local and historical details and, at the same time, refer to a person only mentioned in this connection have to be regarded as more reliable for this problem. It is easy to understand how in the second tradition a famous man became substituted for an otherwise unknown one, but the opposite process is hardly conceivable. Moreover it is obvious that the first class is also preferable from the point of view of the origin of the two sets of traditions. As a matter of fact, it is clear that this class goes back to Lucilius,⁸ i. e. to an

⁷ See below, note 39.

⁸ This fact, generally acknowledged, has also been accepted by Huelsen (*Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, pp. 84 ff.). In spite of that he and others believe the whole story to be legendary. Very strangely, Marx, *Lucilius*, II, p. 382, states on one side that Lucilius had told a story which he might have heard as a child, when the younger Maenius was still alive. But on the other hand he follows the general opinion about the earlier invention of the Maeniana and the honorary column. But what, if not details referring to the whole bargain told by Lucilius, could have inspired the Scholiasts?

author who saw the buildings to which he referred and who lived close to the events. The class C-D, on the other hand, is based on the book of Verrius Flaccus, who no longer could see the Basilica Porcia and the column. While he could easily ascribe the Maeniana to the famous censor, it is inconceivable that Lucilius would have talked about events of his own century without accurate information. Therefore, most modern authors agree that sources A-B are talking about something which existed in reality, although generally they made desperate efforts to distinguish the balcony erected by the younger Maenius from the Maeniana. That this is impossible was shown by a comparison of the description given in all the texts. Although A and B do not use the word "Maenianum" (because they are not commenting on this term but on the Columna Maenia), it is perfectly clear that they describe the same structures as C and D. Furthermore some modern theories are based on the assumption that the earlier Maenius built balconies in the Forum and that four generations later a descendant of the same man repeated the operation, which at that time so startled the minds of his contemporaries that he became known for this act alone! Moreover we have no evidence that there existed in the Roman Forum of the Republic, besides the porches of temples—and we shall see, since the second century B. C., basilicae—façades with columns or porticoes of some kind, which the sources C and D, as well as A and B, require.⁹ The natural conclusion is that the earliest Maenianum was built by the younger Maenius in connection with the Basilica Porcia. This is the invention which Lucilius saw and which a later writer, probably Verrius Flaccus, wrongly ascribed to the famous Maenius of the fourth century B. C.

In this respect the passage of Nonius (E) is especially important, since he apparently follows the earlier and better tradition in mentioning the simple name Maenius and tying up the invention of the Maeniana with the traditions about the Columna Maenia. Undoubtedly, here as in A (where, of course, "unius columnae" and "columna Maenia" are referring to the same column) and in B the column from which the balcony is said to have projected is the Columna Maenia, which got its name, according to this tradition, from the stipulation made by Maenius

⁹ See above, note 3.

for himself and his descendants when he sold his house to the state.

At this point we meet a second and grave difficulty of the modern theory. The Columna Maenia mentioned in our sources A, B, E was a well-known feature of the Roman Forum.¹⁰ Pseudo-Asconius and Porphyrio (i. e. their source, Lucilius, who had seen this monument which had been destroyed by the imperial age)¹¹ say that the Columna Maenia connected, at least locally, with the Basilica Porcia, over which the younger Maenius erected his Maenianum. If such a column had been inscribed

¹⁰ See Platner-Ashby, *s. v.*

¹¹ Occasionally, one reads that the Columna Maenia still stood upright in the 4th century A.D. (Platner-Ashby, *op. cit.*, *s. v.* "Columna Maenia") because of its being mentioned by Symmachus. This is a typical example of the wrong use of quotations from ancient authors without a consideration of the real meaning of the passage. In his typical learned and obscure style, Symmachus discusses in two letters (*Ep.*, V, 54 and 66) a lawsuit about a piece of real estate property. In this case claims have been made on a house which is owned by the client of Symmachus. The house had been owned nearly a century by that family. Now suddenly a certain Eusebius claims that before it was sold to these people the former owner had encumbered it with a debt which had not been repaid. Symmachus claims, in turn, that the family of the present owners had nothing to do with this affair, and that the claims of the opponents went back to a very remote time. In his invective against them he speaks several times despidingly about the procurator of Eusebius, whom he characterizes as an obscure pettifogger who by tricks makes perfectly unjust claims, which, furthermore, have been outlawed by the long period of the present ownership. And in this sense he says among other unflattering remarks: "nunc procurator a columna Maenia multis huiusmodi sutelis foro cognitus inveterata iura supplicationibus quatit, . . ." (*Ep.*, V, 54, 3). The man tries "from the Maenian column" to destroy rights which have been established for a long time. In this way he refers to a monument symbolizing "prehistoric" claims of property rights which are conflicting with present conditions. The man is said to lay claim "from the Maenian column" because he is referring to real estate rights of a very old time, for which obstinate people are fighting even as Maenius did, and which have been outlawed by the later evolution even as the Maenian column had been. The joke is this, that this column does not exist any more and it was already an anachronism in its own time. Instead of being a proof for the survival of the column, which is contradicted even by Pliny, this passage shows that Symmachus and other people of his time were very familiar with the tradition about the younger Maenius and the Maenianum.

with a document confirming the stipulation, it would naturally have been named the Columna Maenia.¹² And there does not exist among the passages of ancient writers referring to the locality of the Columna Maenia (with the exception of one relatively late author) any statement which would contradict this identification. In most of these passages we have only references to a column near the Comitium connected with the Basilica Porcia. A column, especially one standing on the corner, belonging to a portico on the façade of the Basilica that faced the Comitium would be in perfect harmony with the indications given in the sources. Such a place could easily be called "Ad Columnam Maeniam" and be used as the customary seat of the *triumviri capitales* or the plebeian tribunes. That the Columna Maenia was only a part of the Basilica Porcia is confirmed by the much discussed tradition about the plan of the plebeian tribunes to enlarge the room available for their customary seat¹³ by removing the column.¹⁴ If our suggestion is right, this could easily be done by reducing the extent of the portico on the façade of the Basilica at one corner. We learn, moreover, that the younger Cato started his oratorical career with an effective speech against the removal of the Columna Maenia. In my opinion, this speech is a strong confirmation of the fact that the column was a part of the building erected long before by a member of the family of the young orator.¹⁵ As the basilicae in the Roman

¹² The parallel is the "pila Horatia" (Dionys. Hal., 3, 22, 9; Platner-Ashby, *op. cit.*, s. v.) which, incidentally, later was a corner pillar of the Basilica Aemilia, whatever it might have been originally.

¹³ The subsellium of the tribuni did not have a fixed place and could be set up anywhere: Mommsen, *Droit public romain*, 3rd ed., 1892, II, p. 40, n. 3; Daremberg-Saglio, s. v. "subsellium." But in republican times they had, of course, a customary seat in the forum. The tribunal of the Basilica Porcia (so Lange, *op. cit.*, pp. 160 ff.) is excluded for the very reason that the tribuni were not entitled to sit on a tribunal (see also Gilbert, *op. cit.*, III, p. 165). The legend reported by Valer. Max., 2, 2, 7, about the tribuni examining the decrees of the senate on a seat before the entrance of the Curia, because they were not allowed to enter the building, confirms the tradition about their customary seat in front of the Basilica Porcia.

¹⁴ Plut., *Cat. Min.*, 5, 1.

¹⁵ Plutarch indicates this directly in stating at the beginning the fact that the basilica was a "dedication" by the elder Cato (Leroux, *op. cit.*, p. 278, is not fair in his criticism, since he creates the impression that

Forum were named from the families of the executives who had cared for their erection, Porcia, Sempronia, Opimia, Aemilia, and Julia (although in reality they were not dedications by private men), they were regarded—as it is especially known for the Aemilia—as a kind of family monument. If thus the younger Cato started his career with a speech delivered for the sake of the Columna Maenia, which was at least locally related to the Basilica Porcia, the natural explanation is that he fought against a damage threatening the appearance of the monument of his ancestors in the Forum.

As a matter of fact the obvious explanation of the Columna Maenia as a part of a portico on the façade of the Basilica Porcia, identical with the column on which the young Maenius reserved the rights of a balcony in the year 184 B. C., is contradicted by only two statements of one and the same source, the elder Pliny. And this is the only reason why modern interpreters in general believe either that there once existed two columns connected with the Maenian family or that the whole tradition of the balcony of the younger Maenius had nothing to do with the Basilica Porcia.¹⁶ The following passage from

the Basilica and the column are mentioned together only incidentally by Plutarch). The identification of the column with the Columna Maenia is not absolutely sure, but at least the most obvious: Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, p. 93; Gilbert, *op. cit.*, III, p. 165.

¹⁶ There exist strange solutions of the problem in modern literature, of which I give only a few examples, illustrating the confusion which arises from any kind of compromise between the contradicting sources. Thédenat, *op. cit.*, p. 139, thinks that the younger Maenius used the honorary column of the elder for the balcony (so earlier Bunsen, *op. cit.*). That would imply a former position of the official monument on private ground. Indeed Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 213, believed that the elder Maenius had secured the right to erect a balcony on a column on his private ground, which then was preserved in the bargain by his descendant. Marchetti, *op. cit.*, thinks that the younger Maenius preserved a column from the former structure of the house as free standing but different from the Columna Maenia; Ossan, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff., on the other hand, had suggested that the honorary column existed and also an unrelated structure preserved from the house and provided with the balcony. Muenzer, in turn (*op. cit.*), discards the tradition about the younger Maenius, not without hesitation (p. 248), but he assumes that the original honorary column was destroyed when the Basilica was erected (what was then the later column?) and denies that the Atrium Maenium was a house, suggesting that it was called so only because of the vicinity

Pliny is the only source which mentions an honorary column erected for the elder Maenius after the victory of Antium among the oldest monuments of this kind in Rome: "antiquior columnarum (*scil.* celebratio) sicuti C. Maenio, qui devicerat priscos Latinos . . . , item C. Duillio . . . quae est etiam nunc in foro" (34, 20). One important fact is obvious from this: the column did not exist in the time of our witness. It has been stated by Muenzer¹⁷ that the passage referring to Maenius, in so far as some historical facts (here discarded) of the preceding war are concerned, follows a good old annalistic tradition. But, on the other hand, Muenzer himself has stated that this chapter of Pliny was composed from various sources. Thus it seems not at all certain that such a generally reliable source as Varro, who has been used elsewhere in this chapter, has to be held responsible for the mention of the Columna Maenia as an honorary column.¹⁸ In addition, this passage of Pliny is explicitly contradicted¹⁹ by an earlier and reliable source, Livy, who it is absolutely certain directly used sources of a period when the Columna Maenia still stood in the Forum Romanum. He does not mention it as an honorary monument for the older Maenius, but he says (8, 13)²⁰ that the two victors who shared the triumph of the war got two equal honorary monuments in the

of the column. Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 170, 190, accepts the theory of the original Maeniana being upper balconies of the tabernae-porticoes around the forum, but suggests that the Columna Maenia was either a remnant of a former façade-portico of the Maenian house or—rightly—a column of the porch of the basilica (p. 183). Thus he seems to accept both the conflicting traditions about the origin of the Maeniana. It has to be noted that the sources do not mention the preservation of a column but the stipulation of a right in the new building.

¹⁷ *Beitraege zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius*, 1897, pp. 288 ff.

¹⁸ Even in this case a mistake would be possible. See, for a list of Varronian errors, Muenzer, *op. cit.*, p. 144. On the other hand, the Varronian text is hardly preserved here, although some facts may have been drawn from it. "Etiam nunc" refers almost certainly to Pliny's own time.

¹⁹ Muenzer, *op. cit.*, p. 289, states rightly that there is no way to conciliate the two traditions, as several of the authors mentioned in note 1 tried to do, especially in assuming that the statues mentioned by Livy stood on columns.

²⁰ Compare Eutropius, 3.

form of equestrian statues in the Forum, a tradition which is confirmed elsewhere. Since Niebuhr, however, most modern scholars have discarded this testimony in favor of the obviously less reliable information given by Pliny. If we consider the unanimity of our other sources and at the same time the clear contradiction between Pliny and Livy, this procedure seems thoroughly unjustified.

Indeed, such a criticism would probably never have gained favor unless there had been a side glance at a second reference given by Pliny. It seems necessary to repeat this second well-known passage because of its considerable contribution to the misinterpretation of the sources: "*Duodecim tabulis ortus tantum et occasus nominatur; post aliquot annos adiectus est et meridies, accenso consulum id pronuntiante, cum a curia inter Rostra et Graecostasin prospexisset solem; a columna Maenia ad carcerem inclinato sidere supremam pronuntiavit, sed hoc serenis tantum diebus usque ad primum Punicum bellum . . . M. Varro primum (scil. horologium) statutum in publico . . . tradit bello Punico primo . . .*" (7, 212-3). This passage is the most valuable source for the topography of this region of the Roman Forum,²¹ and leads to the localization of the Columna Maenia in a place somewhat east of the Carcer. This would, in my opinion, be the right place for the southern column of a portico on the eastern façade of the Basilica Porcia. However that might be, the passage has wrongly been considered as evidence for the existence of a Maenian column before the First Punic war and thus different from the column connected with the Basilica Porcia, although Pliny might have interpreted his source Varro²² in this sense due to his own well-known method of compiling excerpts. That Varro himself did not follow sources of the period he is discussing for details of buildings he mentions is absolutely clear. He mentions, for example, the Carcer. We know from Tenney Frank's fundamental studies that this building, originally a well-house and only considerably later used as Carcer,²³ was not constructed prior to the third century B. C. As a carcer it did not exist in the period preceding the First

²¹ Compare Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, loc. cit.; O'Connor, *op. cit.*

²² Muenzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 260 and 353.

²³ *Roman Buildings of the Republic*, 1924, pp. 38 ff.; Lugli, *Capitolium*, VIII (1932), pp. 232 ff.

Punic war and as a building for other uses it was certainly not constructed until the last years of the custom discussed by Varro. On the other hand, the phrase "post aliquot annos" shows clearly that Varro is talking about something that was customary from at least the 5th century B. C. down to the middle of the 3rd century. Thus the Columna Maenia too, even if it had been erected in the late 4th century, would have existed during only a short part of the period mentioned. Consequently Varro could not have had any other intention than this: to illustrate the various points of these observations with topographical details of his own period, which is a quite natural idea. Pliny, however, in his obviously reduced excerpt did not preserve the explicit expression of this intention, however that might have been indicated. The passage as it is, therefore, remains a most valuable document for the topography of single buildings in Varro's period, but it proves neither that the Carcer existed and was used as such before the First Punic war nor that there was a Columna Maenia in this early period. It might be true, on the other hand, that the whole tradition of the column of the elder Maenius is rooted in the misinterpretation of Varro, who referred to it loosely in connection with customs prevailing before the middle of the 3rd century B. C.

The conclusions we reach from the preceding analysis are as follows: first, that there never existed an honorary column for the dictator Maenius and that he had nothing to do with the invention of the Maeniana; second, that the Columna Maenia was a column on the façade of the Basilica Porcia, probably on its southeastern corner; third, that this column was called Maenia because the owner of one of the houses, sold to give room for the construction of the basilica, reserved for himself and his descendants the right to erect over it a projecting wooden balcony in order to look down from there upon the games in the Forum. This balcony as a new and unique feature in the Forum was called Maenianum, a name which was later extended to similar constructions. It was probably a small wooden platform on wooden beams and accessible by means of a wooden stairway.

The facts discussed above are very important for the history of the Roman Forum and of the forensic basilica. At the be-

ginning of the 2nd century B. C. the Roman Forum was not only surrounded by temples, a few public buildings, and rows of tabernae, but by private houses such as the one belonging to the Gens Maenia. This tradition about these houses in the northwestern corner of the Forum, given by our sources A and B, is confirmed independently by a well-known passage of Livy: "Cato atria²⁴ duo, Maenium et Titium in lautumiis, et quattuor tabernas in publicum emit basilicamque ibi fecit, quae Porcia appellata est" (39, 44). That the "atria" here are synonymous with "domus" is absolutely clear from the story of the invention of the Maeniana. The house of the Maenii, at least, must have faced the Forum; the house of Titius might have been the neighboring house to the west on the clivus. A similar complex of private property on the very edge of the Forum formed still later the house of the Scipios on the south side; this too was sold for the erection of a basilica, the Sempronia, only 15 years later. It was situated in the eastern part of the area of the later Basilica Julia. "Ti. Sempronius . . . aedes P. Africani pone Veteres ad Vortumni signum lanienasque et tabernas coniunctas in publicum emit basilicamque faciendam curavit, quae postea Sempronia appellata est" (Liv., 44, 16).²⁵ The plural "aedes" might indicate a double house, since the earlier Basilica Porcia also occupied the space of two domus. We know of such double houses,²⁶ which were formed by adding a neighbour's house to one's own property, from the contemporary Tufa-period in Pompeii. And especially interesting, again as compared with Pompeii, is the fact that for the houses on the ground of the later Basilica Porcia as well as of the Sempronia "tabernae coniunctae" are mentioned. These were, of course, the façade

²⁴ Livy uses "atrium" for house also in 5, 41, 7; compare Varro, *Men.*, 36. For further evidence, see *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, s. v. "atrium," p. 1102. In view of the uniform traditions, it is impossible to assume another meaning here. See also: Wistrand, *Corolla archaeologica*, 1932, pp. 57 ff.; Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

²⁵ See, for this passage, the earlier remarkably good observations of Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 55, and recently the excellent discussion of Wistrand, *op. cit.* and Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

²⁶ *Baugeschichtliche Untersuchungen am Stadtrand von Pompeji* (henceforth quoted as *Unters.*), 1936, pp. 171 and 175. For Rome, *ibid.*, p. 203. The term "aedes" seems more to suggest this type than a house with atrium and peristyle (so Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 183).

shops²⁷ so well known from the Pompeian Tufa houses. The workshops mentioned in connection with the house of the Scipios had exactly the same type of *tabernae* structures as can be shown by another Varronian passage (*L. L.*, 8, 55) describing the "*lanienae*" as a special kind of "*tabernae*." The house of the Scipios, as Boëthius has already pointed out, must have had exactly the aspect of the rich patrician houses of the Pompeian Tufa-period with their rows of shops on the façade. Moreover I have recently shown²⁸ that in Pompeii too in the 2nd century and even later there existed at the edge of the Forum, at least in its southern part, private *domus* with shops, in part dating back to the Tufa-period. The Italic *Fora* including the Forum Romanum were, as expressions of a different society, unlike the Greek *Agora*. The latter, even when it was not laid out on regular lines, was at least from the fifth century on a public space surrounded only by public buildings, religious and profane. In Italy (in Rome down to the second century B. C. and in provincial towns even later) the aspect of the Forum was much more like that of medieval European markets. Comparable to the combination of churches, town halls, shops, and patrician houses in these places, the Roman Forum united the socially leading element of patrician society—in the form of stately patrician houses²⁹—with temples, administration buildings, and *tabernae* into a picturesque whole.

On the ground of several such private houses purchased by the state there arose the earliest basilica in the Roman Forum,³⁰ a new type which, shortly before, had been introduced into Rome in the fishmarket nearby.³¹ The use of private grounds is quite natural, since the space already occupied by temples and administration buildings was sacred. The same process was repeated in Pompeii, where the basilica also covered the area of earlier

²⁷ Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 ff.

²⁸ *Unters.*, p. 172.

²⁹ They derived their privileged place from a royal assignation: Liv., 1, 35, 10.

³⁰ Liv., 26, 27, 3 (year 210 B. C.): "*comprehensa postea privata aedificia—neque enim tum basilicae erant . . .*" See Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

³¹ Plaut., *Capt.*, 815; *Curcul.*, 472. See Leo's comments on these passages against doubts about the authenticity and significance. From Plautus we hear only of a basilica in the fishmarket, close to, but not directly in, the Forum (Boëthius, *op. cit.*, p. 192).

private houses and where later monumental buildings in the southern part of the forum gradually pushed away the existing domus (the "Curiae" and the so-called Comitium, the latter preserving in its façade the tabernae-front of a Tufa-period house).³² As a matter of fact, the evolution of the Roman forensic basilica on the market place was conditioned by the existence of private property on the edges of the fora, and this factor must be considered whether in origin the basilica was Greek or Italian. In Greece, since the monumentalization began earlier and only public buildings surrounded the Agora, this type of basilica did not play an important rôle except in such rare cases as the new layout at Corinth after its destruction. Pompeii and Paestum, where porticoes screen the various public and private buildings on the periphery of the forum, are in every respect compromises between the Greek and Roman type. The Roman Forum also never lost the traces of its individualistic growth and never got a unified monumental frame. The forensic basilica of the early imperial age, when long colonnades began to extend along the edge of the open places, represents in its evolution another compromise between Roman and Greek tradition.³³

The traditions about the invention of the Maeniana show that the Basilica Porcia, at least, had a portico on the façade facing the Forum.³⁴ This situation has important bearing on the form of the earliest basilicae at Rome. In view of the topographical situation this portico could be only on the small side, since there was no room for a building facing the open space with its long side.³⁵ Thus the Basilica Porcia belonged to the same type of

³² *Unters.*, pp. 137, 163, 166, 200, 172, 134 ff., 152, 157 ff., 185 ff.

³³ This is not the place to discuss the origin of the Basilica. See now the interesting suggestions by Val. Mueller, *A. J. A.*, XLI (1937), pp. 250 ff. It seems to me that his theory does not account sufficiently for the difference in dates of his various types and the possibility that several of them are only later modifications. This development, not only important for the history of single buildings but also intimately connected with the whole history of the Forum, I tried to sketch in *Real-Enc.*, VI, s. v. "Staedtebau," pp. 2062 ff. and 2071 ff. Brilliant observations were added by Boëthius, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff.

³⁴ This conclusion has already been drawn by Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 50 and Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 159. See also Boëthius, above, note 16.

³⁵ Reber, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.; Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 159; Huelsen, *Roem. Mitt.*, VIII, pp. 88 ff.

longitudinal building as those that faced open spaces with a porch on one small side which we know from the earliest basilicae in Italy, those at Pompeii³⁶ and (somewhat modified) at Ardea. It is natural to assume that the Sempronia, chronologically intermediate between the Porcia and these buildings, had the same plan; in this case, however, the building, running with its long axis parallel to the Forum, was separated from it by the Tabernae Veteres and faced the beginning of the Vicus Tuscus. In the same way the Basilicae Julia and Aemilia later faced the ends of the streets at the entrance of the Forum, but they now had another portico-façade extending along the Forum on the long sides too. For the Sempronia also we have indirect evidence for the existence of a portico on its façade; indeed we hear from Varro that this building was likewise provided with Maeniana (Plin., 35, 113).³⁷ Since a single large picture at one time filled the whole rear wall of this balcony, there can be no doubt that the Maeniana extended only along the short façade of the Basilica³⁸ toward the end of the Vicus Tuscus. Such Maeniana at the very corner of the Forum could, of course, be used for spectators at the games. In any case, the relation of the Sempronia and Porcia in type is clear. The balcony of the Sempronia, extending the scheme which for a unique reason had first been used in the Basilica Porcia, might in this case have occupied the whole length of the façade. The next step in the development is mentioned by Vitruvius: the Maeniana extend over porticoes surrounding the whole forum.³⁹ Vitruvius, fol-

³⁶ See the recent discussion of Mueller (above, note 33); earlier, Lange, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

³⁷ "sub veteribus" here is a short form for Basilica Sempronia, see also Plin., 35, 25; Cicero refers also to these Maeniana, *Ac.*, 2, 70: they would be called "vetera Maeniana" in his time because of their age, without alluding to the tabernae veteres in the vicinity. The meaning is that the shadow of the "good old" Maeniana offers its protection likewise to the good old academic philosophy. "Sub novis," in this passage, refers of course to the tabernae novae on the other side of the Forum.

³⁸ Ebert, *op. cit.*, is obviously wrong in assuming a gallery over the whole length of the Basilica.

³⁹ 5, 1, 1. It seems to me methodically wrong to confound this later passage with the traditions about the 2nd century B. C. The very fact that in the late 2nd century temporary wooden tribunals were erected around the Forum on the occasion of the games (Boëthius, *op. cit.*,

lowing the old Roman tradition, still regards the Maeniana not as simple upper stories of stoaes of the Greek type but as projecting wooden balconies. An inscription from Aeclanum mentioning "(Ma)eniana circ<a> forum"⁴⁰ may refer to this type. Later, with the disappearance of the old primitive features of the Roman market places, the word became a rather vague designation for various kinds of upper galleries, balconies, etc.

It seems clear that the history of the Maeniana as a characteristic feature of the Roman republican forum started from a single and rather capricious invention of one man. If this is true, as I tried to prove, it is obvious that the invention itself was rooted in the traditional structural features of its period, and that its success and development were made possible only because of this intimate connection with an existing "milieu" of architecture. In this curious architectural type we again meet that strange and characteristically Italian interplay between private and monumental architecture. It is a priori clear that Maenius, in securing the right of his family to have a privileged place for viewing the games in the Forum in the upper part of the façade of a public building, tried to preserve some feature of his own house which had previously been used for this purpose.⁴¹ It has been mentioned above that this house belonged to the type of atrium-house with tabernae on the façade well known from the Tufa-period in Pompeii. Now, as the reader will remember, the tabernae of such houses in Pompeii often had in their upper part wooden galleries open toward the street, the so-called "pergolae."⁴² Such pergolae in buildings along the forum would naturally have served as privileged "balconies" for the owners of the houses at the time of the games. Maenius, in startling his contemporaries by applying

pp. 190 ff.) shows that in that period in Rome there did not yet exist extensive upper galleries surrounding the area. The events reported by Plutarch may have been the reason for extending the type in some places in the manner described by Vitruvius.

⁴⁰ *C. I. L.*, IX, 1148.

⁴¹ Compare Reber, *op. cit.*, p. 50, who however based his argumentation on the wrong idea that the houses of this period generally had porticoes on the façade.

⁴² See, for the following remarks, the fundamental article by Mau, *Roem. Mitt.*, II (1887), pp. 214 ff. Further bibliography: *Unters.*, pp. 171 and 181 ff.

wooden balconies to the façade of a monumental building, simply introduced a characteristic feature of domestic architecture into an already existing monumental type because he wanted, for obvious reasons, to preserve this single feature of his former house. The feature then was developed into a customary part of the republican basilicae at Rome. Moreover, it preserved a connection with its origin in domestic architecture not only in its use as a balcony for spectators but in other respects also. We have already mentioned the painter who exhibited a painting in the Maenianum of the Basilica Sempronia in Varro's time. It is in general well known that the upper wooden pergolae of private houses and shops were on the one hand especially adapted for viewing pageants and games and on the other hand suitable for exhibitions; this was the case with the Maeniana too.

Thus the invention and development of the Maeniana on the Roman Forum illustrates in a remarkable way the growth and decline of an architectural type: introduced into monumental architecture from existing Italian domestic construction (for the essential reason that the basilicae succeeded the patrician houses along the Forum), they developed as a typical Roman form during the later republic until they were absorbed, with other traditions of the good old age, into the new monumentality of the early empire.

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A NOTE ON KLEON'S ASSESSMENT.

Last year I published in this Journal a correction of certain views expressed by Nesselhauf on the Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.¹ The debate has now been opened again by Professor Kolbe, who seeks to support Nesselhauf's determination.² In view of the importance of Kolbe's conclusions, if they should be accepted as correct, I feel compelled to make also one or two further comments.

Fortunately, there is general agreement that every argument which is based on the text of the assessment decree should begin from the stones themselves and from the letters actually preserved upon them. The crux of the matter lies in the position of fragment 2, which controls the restoration of the first twelve lines of the inscription.³ Kolbe gives to this fragment a position one letter space to the left of that to which West and I have assigned it, in spite of the fact that the continuous line of fracture along the right lateral surfaces of fragments 2 and 7, which he and Nesselhauf and I all desire, is thereby disrupted.

The position which Kolbe advocates is shown to be incorrect by the photographs which he himself publishes. In one photograph (*op. cit.*, p. 176) he shows the position of fragment 2 as determined by West and Meritt and in his argument he claims that the line of fracture in question is here not continuous. I print in Fig. 1 an untouched copy of this photograph and in Fig. 2 a marked copy with a heavy line showing the continuous line of fracture which Kolbe denies. In Fig. 3 I print an untouched copy of a revised photograph which Kolbe has had prepared in Freiburg (*op. cit.*, p. 178) to show his position for fragment 2 and, as he claims, a continuous line of fracture. In Fig. 4 I repeat this photograph, adding only the heavy lines along the right lateral edges of fragments 2 and 7 to show that the line of fracture is, in fact, not continuous.

These determinations I made in Athens in 1933, and I advo-

¹ *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 152-156.

² Kolbe, *Sitzungsberichte Preuss. Akademie*, 1937, pp. 172-188; see also Nesselhauf, *Gnomon*, XII (1936), pp. 296-301.

³ See Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.*, p. 44 and Plate I.

cate the position which I believe to be right not because I wished it so, but because I was unable to interpret the evidence of the fracture in any other way. I had myself rebuilt the stele in the museum with fragment 2 in its traditional but incorrect position. The transcript which West and I furnished to Tod for publication in his *Greek Historical Inscriptions* depended still on the old position of fragment 2, to which Kolbe would now have us return. But, in order to test the evidence of the fracture, I removed fragments 2 and 7 from the reconstructed stele, found the correct line of cleavage, and rebuilt the inscription accordingly. The necessary patchwork occasioned by this change may be seen today in the photograph published on page 39 of *The Athenian Assessment*, and the relative position of the fragments in question is correctly indicated in the photograph published in the same volume on page 32.⁴

This evidence on which a text of the opening lines of the assessment decree should be reconstructed is, in fact, easily controlled. Either the position to which West and I have assigned fragment 2 is right or it is wrong. I believe that the photographs published in the *Athenian Assessment*, in Kolbe's recent article, and again by me here, show that the West-Meritt position is correct. If these photographs seem doubtful, the ultimate test is to lay the fragments on a table and sight along the broken surfaces, observing the continuity of the fracture across its entire depth from front to back of the stone, not merely along the surface line which predominates in the photographs. I have myself juxtaposed the fragments, both in Kolbe's position and in my own, and sighted along the broken surfaces; anyone who wishes may do the same if he will remove them from the stele and juxtapose them as I did in 1933. In my criticism of Nesselhauf's suggestion I recommended that anyone who wished to propose a new arrangement should make this test. The recommendation still seems to me sound; Kolbe's argument collapses because he has ignored the evidence of the stones as still preserved, where this objective test can be applied.

It should be noted that new evidence which Kolbe advances

⁴ I do not know why Kolbe seems to believe that the line of fracture depends in some way on the vertical columns of letters in the inscription (*op. cit.*, pp. 176-177). Obviously no account was taken of the lettering when the stone was broken.



Fig. 1. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 176) showing the position assigned by West and Meritt to fragments 2 and 7. Kolbe claims that their right lateral surfaces do not here present a continuous line of fracture.




Fig. 2. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 176) showing the position assigned by West and Meritt to fragments 2 and 7, to which is here added a heavy line showing the continuous fracture of their right lateral surfaces.



Fig. 3. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 178), showing the position assigned by Kolbe to fragments 2 and 7. Kolbe claims that their right lateral surfaces here present a continuous line of fracture.



Fig. 4. Copy of the photograph presented by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 178), showing the position assigned by Kolbe to fragments 2 and 7, to which are added heavy lines showing that their right lateral surfaces do not here present a continuous fracture.

for his position of fragment 2 depends on what he conceives to be a necessary restoration in the text (*op. cit.*, p. 177). For him the position is fixed by the reading [ho]ι ἐ[σ]α[γογῆς ἐπ]ιμ[ε]λ[όσθον] in line 12. Here West and I have restored [hoi] ἐσ[α]γ[ογῆς ἐπ]ιμ[ε]λ[όσθον --]. For the first preserved letter Pittakys, who alone saw the lower part of fragment 2 undamaged, read the upper part of a vertical stroke. This is not necessarily, as Kolbe claims, an "einwandfrei gelesene Jota." The vertical stroke is still preserved and to the right of it all the surface of the stone is broken away, as may be seen by reference to the photographs on pages 6 and 32 of *The Athenian Assessment*. So far as one can now judge the letter may be completed as epsilon just as well as iota. But Kolbe writes "Infolgedessen halte ich an Pittakis' 'fest --." He gives also a small drawing showing the iota as it was originally shown by Pittakys in the 'Αρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς, 1862, no. 72. But whereas Pittakys drew the bounding line of the fragment close enough to the vertical stroke so that one, aware of Pittakys' lack of exactness, might legitimately suppose that the surface along the right of the stroke was no better preserved than now, Kolbe has unconsciously favored his own case by showing a wide area of uninscribed stone to the right of his iota. To illustrate this point clearly I print a photograph taken from Pittakys' drawing in Fig. 5 and a copy of Kolbe's drawing, for the sake of comparison, in Fig. 6. The second letter was read by Pittakys as part of a sigma, of which the upper stroke



Fig. 5. Copy of the lower part of fragment 2, as drawn by Pittakys ('Αρχ. Ἐφ., 1862, no. 72).

alone was preserved. This has now entirely disappeared, and Kolbe assumes that it was part of epsilon. There can be no doubt that the stroke in Pittakys' drawing belonged to sigma and not to epsilon; one has only to look at his drawing to be

convinced of this fact (see Fig. 5). Kolbe has shown this stroke in his drawing also (see Fig. 6), but he has changed the




Fig. 6. Copy of the lower part of fragment 2, as redrawn by Kolbe (*Sitzungsber. Preuss. Ak.*, 1937, p. 177).

aspect given by Pittakys so completely that the letter now looks like epsilon—the letter necessary for Kolbe's restoration. No argument can be based on evidence presented in this way.

One further point should be noted. The stone in Athens must be studied as a monument of three dimensions. Kolbe has moved not only fragment 2, but fragment 3 as well, one letter space to the left. In so doing he encounters a conflict between fragments 3 and 8, for the fragments are so preserved that fragment 3 cannot be moved to the left of the position to which it is assigned in *The Athenian Assessment* without intruding on preserved portions of fragment 8. This was made clear in my *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 13, in *The Athenian Assessment*, pp. 6-7, and in the exposition in *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 153-154. The consequences have evidently escaped Kolbe's attention, though he gives in his footnotes (*op. cit.*, p. 178) reference to all these discussions here cited. I see no reason for commenting further on the restorations he proposes (*op. cit.*, p. 181) for the opening lines of the decree. Whatever difficulties they involve (and there are many) are secondary to the physical difficulties of the stone which concern fragments 2 and 7 and fragments 3 and 8.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

THE NATIONALITY OF THE POET CAECILIUS STATIUS.¹

Stattus Caecilius comoediarum scriptor clarus habetur natione Insuber Gallus et Enni primum contubernalis. Quidam Mediolanensem ferunt. Mortuus est anno post mortem Enni (III, Ritschl) et iuxta Ianiculum (iuxta eum in Ianiculo, Ritschl) sepultus (Jerome, *ad Euseb. Chron. A. Abr.* 1838 = 179 B. C.).

Stattus autem servile nomen fuit. Plerique apud veteres servi eo nomine fuerunt. Caecilius ille comoediarum poeta inclutus servus fuit et propterea nomen habuit Stattus. Sed postea verum est quasi in cognomentum appellatusque est Caecilius Stattus (Gellius, IV, 20, 12 and 13).

It is from these two passages that modern scholars have assumed that Caecilius Stattus was a manumitted Insubrian Celt. As typical of this assumption may be quoted the account concerning him in the *Cambridge Ancient History*:² "Caecilius Stattus (c. 219-166 B. C.) an Insubrian captive and the first Celtic author in Rome. . . ." There are, however, grave difficulties in accepting this view. Chief among these may be mentioned the name Stattus, which is neither servile nor Celtic.

The name Stattus is comparatively frequent in the extant Oscan inscriptions, occurring at least three times in Buck's collection.³ In addition at least five examples may be quoted from Latin literature where Stattus is used together with a name which is Samnite: Stattus Statilius (Val. Max., I, 8, 6); Stattus Gellius (Livy, IX, 44, 13); Stattus Minatius (Livy, X, 20, 13); Stattus Trebius (Livy, XXIII, 1, 1-3); Stattus Metius (Livy, XXIV, 19, 2); and one example of a Samnite with Stattus as a nomen: Στάτιος ὁ Σαυνίτης (App., B. C., IV, 25). Further in volumes IX and X of the *CIL* containing the Latin inscriptions from Southern Italy the name occurs at least 37 times. From this evidence, therefore, it would appear that Stattus is an old Southern Italian name, belonging probably to the Samnite tribe. The fact that it appears in literature as both a praenomen and a nomen further suggests a non-Roman origin, for the

¹ The writer wishes to thank Professor N. W. DeWitt for reading this paper in manuscript and offering helpful criticism.

² VIII, p. 412.

³ *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*: Boston, Ginn and Co., 1904, Nos. 20, 49, 62.

Roman name was highly standardized, the various parts not being interchangeable. Samnite nomina and praenomina are, on the other hand, interchangeable, as for example:

- Gavius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and App., *B. C.*, I, 40;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and Val. Max., IX, 3)
- Herennius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, IX, 1, 2;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, XXIII, 44, 1)
- Papius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Vell. Pat., II, 16, 1;
nomen in Oscan inscr. and App., *B. C.*, I, 40)
- Vibius (praenomen in Oscan inscr. and Livy, XXIII, 6, 1;
nomen in Latin inscr. and Cic., *ad Fam.*, XI, 12, 1)
- Herius, always a nomen in Oscan and generally in Latin inscriptions, is a praenomen in Livy, XXIII, 43, 9.

So also Statius is, as we have seen, a praenomen in Oscan and in Livy but a nomen in Appian. It is a cognomen in the case of the poet Publius Papinius Statius, whose native town was Naples.⁴ The name is, it is true, occasionally found as a slave name in Latin as, for example, the slave of Cicero's brother Quintus.⁵ Isolated examples of this kind, however, are not sufficient to prove the servile origin of people bearing the name Statius.

This evidence for the Samnite origin of the name Statius raises the second difficulty in the traditional account that the poet was an Insubrian Gaul, from Milan "as certain writers say." The name is in fact widespread in the Po Valley, occurring—in Volumes V and XI of the *CIL*—85 times. This frequent occurrence, however, does not prove the name to be Celtic. The present writer has, by an investigation⁶ of Samnite names in the south and north of Italy, shown that there is much evidence for a large migration of Samnite farmers to the Po Valley in the years following the Hannibalic War. It may be well to summarize one or two of the points made there. The history of the Po Valley as recorded in the Roman historians is very confused. Although there is no evidence for it, most modern his-

⁴ *Silvae*, III, 5, 81.

⁵ *Ad Att.*, II, 19, 1: "Sed mihi nihil est molestius quam Statium manu missum. 'Nec meum imperium, ac mitto imperium, non simultatem meam / revereri saltem.'" Is it possible that this mention of a manumitted slave, together with a passage of Roman comedy (Terence), has contributed to the mistaken inference that Statius the dramatist was a slave?

⁶ *C. J.*, XXIX (1934), pp. 599-608. (An abstract.)

torians assume that the Celts continued to inhabit this part of Italy down to the Christian era,⁷ even going so far as to assert that Virgil was a Celt.⁸ But we have the precise statement of Polybius⁹ who passed through this district in 150 B. C.: "As I have witnessed them (the Celts) not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent expulsion." He says elsewhere¹⁰ that the wars of the Romans upon the Celts had always been "not for the sake of supremacy or sovereignty, but for their total expulsion and extermination." This expulsion of the Celts must have created a problem because of vacant lands in the Po Valley, which the Romans were apparently unable at the time to colonize by themselves. Added to this is the fact that the Samnites had been dislodged from their home in the south by the devastations of Hannibal's army.

⁷ It is only recently that this view has been doubted. Cf. T. Frank, *C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 327: "It was not long before the Italians began to settle in the neighbourhood of Milan, and in a century (sc. about 100 B. C.) the Insubrian lowlands revealed hardly any traces of Celtic civilization."

⁸ It has also been assumed that Cornelius Nepos was an Insubrian (most recently by Mary L. Gordon, "The Patria of Tacitus," *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 145-161, where she attempts to prove that the historian also was a Celt; also by J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome to the Close of the Golden Age*, p. 423). The reasoning by which Professor Wight Duff makes Nepos a Celt is fallacious: "He was *Padi accola* (Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 18, 127) and a townsman of T. Catius (Pliny, *Ep.*, IV, 28, 1). Since Catius was an Insubrian (Cic., *ad Fam.*, XV, 16, 1), it is a fair inference that Nepos came from the one Insubrian town on the Po—Ticinum near Pavia." This involves several unnecessary assumptions: (1) that Ticinum was Celtic in the last century B. C.; (2) that, since Catius is called by Cicero an Insubrian and Nepos is said to have dwelt near the Po and to have been a fellow-townsmen of Catius, both must have come from Ticinum; (3) that all inhabitants of the same town belong to the same nationality. The letter of Pliny referred to is, however, addressed to Vibius Severus, who was also a townsman of Nepos and Catius. Since Vibius is a Samnite name, by the above reasoning Nepos and Catius would be Samnite also. Further, there is little reason for assuming Catius to be a Celtic name. There was a Quintus Catius, a plebeian aedile, in Rome in 210 B. C. (Livy, XXVII, 6, 19). Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, IV, 21) refers to an old Roman god, one of the Indigitamenta, called Catius Pater. The nomen of the poet Silius Italicus was Catius.

⁹ II, 35, 4.

¹⁰ II, 21, 9; 31, 8.

These historical facts taken in conjunction with epigraphical evidence point to the conclusion, mentioned above, that a large number of Samnite farmers migrated north following Hannibal's departure from Italy and the exodus of the Celts.

During one of these wars of expulsion, it is said, Statius was taken captive and brought to Rome. The tradition followed by some (*quidam*) that he was a Milanese probably arose from the fact that Milan was the chief town in the small district of the Insubres.¹¹ It was there that the decisive battle was fought in 194,¹² after which according to Strabo (V, 213) their village organization came to an end and the tribe as such disappeared. The practise usually followed by the Romans in such cases was to sell the slaves captured in war for work on the farms, as for example Marius' captives of 102, who later became the backbone of Spartacus' revolt. It would be extremely unlikely, therefore, that one Celt would be singled out of all the captives to be taken into a Roman household.

Even without the above evidence to disprove the Celtic origin of Statius, the inherent difficulties in Jerome's account are very great. When and how, being a Celt, with no knowledge of Latin and Greek and probably no education, could he have become so proficient in these languages as to have composed at least 40 plays, some of them adaptations from the Greek New Comedy? Assuming that he came to Rome between the years 200-194 and died in 169 (or, if Ritschl's emendation be accepted, in 166), he would have lived in Rome at the longest 28-34 years. Some of these years must surely have been spent in slavery, for he would scarcely have been freed immediately upon his arrival. Further, it has been shown¹³ that, accepting the traditional dates, Jerome's date (179 B. C.) for the peak of his career is reasonable. This then would leave only 16-20 years for him to have been brought to Rome, to have served as a slave and been freed, to have learned Latin and Greek, and to have established himself as one of the most successful playwrights in the city.¹⁴ If, how-

¹¹ According to Frank's reckoning (*C. A. H.*, VIII, p. 327) it comprised only about 1800 square miles of arable ground.

¹² Livy, XXXIV, 46.

¹³ Pauly-Wissowa, *Caecilius*.

¹⁴ Although he was apparently unsuccessful at first, he later became a favorite (2nd prologue to Terence, *Hecyra*, ll. 1-15). Cf. also Varro (*ap. Non.*, 374): *in argumentis Caecilius poscit palmam*; Volcatius Sedigitus (*ap. Gellius*, XV, 24) places him first in a list of writers of

ever, Statius came from Samnite stock, this question of language would be more easily answered. Even if he had not come into contact with Latin and Greek in the early years of his life, still Oscan—which would have been his native tongue—was an Italian dialect, a sister to Latin; and the district from which he came had reached some degree of civilization.

If Statius was a Celt, such a career would be without parallel, for the cases of Plautus and Terence were not similar. Plautus, was in the first place an Italian and, according to the traditional account of his life, he would have had ample time during the early part of his career, while working at the stage at Rome and while engaged in business as a trader, to become acquainted with both Latin and Greek. If this tradition is doubted, it has recently been shown that it is quite possible that he became acquainted with Greek and perhaps with Menander before leaving his native town of Sarsina.¹⁵

Terence, although he came from Carthage as a slave, may quite possibly have been the son of a southern Italian family which had been taken captive by Hannibal and sold in Carthage.¹⁶ If this suggestion be correct, Terence would have had some knowledge of the Italian dialects and perhaps Greek even before he was brought to Rome as a slave. He then had the advantage of being a protégé of the Scipionic Circle, the outstanding literary society of the time, whose chief interests lay in Latin and Greek literature. Still he wrote only six plays, and even of these some people doubted whether he was the author, thinking that their *elegantia sermonis* pointed rather to some member of the Scipionic Circle, Laelius perhaps.¹⁷

Nor can Statius' choice of language be used to prove his Celtic origin. As far as may be judged from the extant fragments, there is no evidence of any "Celtic fire" which would doubtless have remained in his soul had he been an Insubrian. On the other hand his language is of a boisterous type, with a freedom in the use of abstracts that is typical of Plautus and of southern Italians generally and such as may have existed in the *Fabulae*

palliatae. Suetonius (*Vita Terenti*, II) relates how Terence was bidden by the aediles to read his first play before Caecilius for criticism. Cicero (*De Opt. Gen. Or.*, 1) speaks of him as *fortasse summus comicus*.

¹⁵ A. J. A., XXXIX (1935), pp. 92 ff.

¹⁶ A. J. P., XLIV (1933), pp. 268 ff.

¹⁷ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, VII, 3, 10; Quint., X, 1, 99.

Atellanae. Cicero speaks of him as *malus auctor Latinitatis*¹⁸ and joins him with Pacuvius (who was born at Brundisium) as *male locuti*.¹⁹ But in the first case it is with Terence²⁰ that he compares him and in the second with members of the Scipionic Circle. These comparisons, then, do not suggest lack of ability in the use of Latin. It could not be said that Ennius, Naevius, or Plautus (who were all Italians) possessed this *elegantia sermonis* which Cicero praised in the Scipionic Circle.²¹

Jerome's information that he was an Insubrian Gaul was probably derived from Suetonius' lives of the poets.²² Although it cannot be literally true, inasmuch as Statius is not a servile or a Celtic name, yet it may contain an element of truth. That is, Statius may have come to Rome from the district of the Insubres and even from Milan. It has been shown above that the evidence points to a Samnite migration to the Po Valley after the Hannibalic War. Statius, therefore, if born c. 220 B. C., could not have been born there. Accepting, however, the traditional date for his birth, he would have reached military age about 200. It was just about this time that the Romans were again turning their attention to the Celts in the North in a final attempt to expel them, and it was against the Insubrians that they were fighting. It may be suggested, therefore, that Statius was one of the Italian allies who formed the Roman garrison in the north at this time.²³ It may further be suggested that, just as Ennius came to the notice of Cato in Sardinia in 204 and was brought to Rome by him, so Statius may have been brought to the attention of one Caecilius while still fighting in the north or even after his arrival in Rome. When he began to make a name for himself as a dramatist, he may have taken the name of his patron and kept his own as a cognomen.

Certain identification of Statius' patron is of course impossible. The suggestion may be made, however, that he was the

¹⁸ Cicero, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ *Id.*, *Brut.*, 258.

²⁰ Cf. Horace, *Ep.*, II, 1, 59: *vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte.*

²¹ Cf. *Brut.*, 172; *ad Fam.*, IX, 15, 2 where Cicero dates Celtic influence on Roman speech after the time of the Gracchi.

²² Cf. the preface to his translation of Eusebius' *Chronicon*.

²³ Livy, XXXI, 10, 5: *L. Furius Purpurio tum provinciae (sc. Cisalpine Gaul) praecerat, cetero ex senatus consulto exercitu dimisso praeter quinque milia socium ac Latini nominis.* Also XXXI, 21, 7: *in alas divisum socialem exercitum habebat* (i. e. before Cremona).

Marcus Caecilius, *legatus legionibus praepositus* in Cisalpine Gaul in 200.²⁴ Statius may have come to his notice then or as late as 194, when the allies in the Roman army of the previous year were dismissed from service.²⁵ There is, further, the interesting passage in Pliny's *Natural History* (VII, 101) which gives as Ennius' reason for adding the sixteenth book to his *Annals* his admiration for Titus Caecilius Denter and his brother.²⁶ The brother may perhaps be identified with the Marcus Caecilius Denter who was sent on an embassy to Macedonia and Greece in 173.²⁷ The passage of Pliny would most reasonably be explained by identifying this Marcus Caecilius Denter and the Marcus Caecilius, commander of the legions in 200, with Statius' patron. The close friendship between Ennius and Caecilius would explain how Statius became acquainted with Ennius so soon after his arrival in Rome (cf. Jerome's *Enni primum contubernalis*), for Caecilius would certainly have introduced him, as soon as possible, to the outstanding poet in the city.

It would be curious if Caecilius, the *legatus* of 200, did not appear later in history. The objection that he may have died in battle appears less likely in view of the fact that it was the right wing commanded by Marcus Furius which stood the brunt of the enemy's attack and in which most of the casualties occurred.²⁸ If it seems improbable that a *legatus* of 200 be sent on an embassy 27 years later, the case of Furius may be cited, whose career can be traced from 201 to his praetorship in 173.²⁹ It

²⁴ Livy, XXXI, 21, 8.

²⁵ *Ib.*, XXXIV, 56, 5 and 12. As this is the only mention of such a dismissal between 200 and 194, it may be assumed to have included also those who fought in the campaigns of previous years.

²⁶ If the usual emendation of Teucer to Denter be accepted. The name in Pliny's account has also been emended to T. Aelius (E. M. Steuart, *The Annals of Ennius*, p. 203) in order to make it agree with the account in Livy (XLI, 1, 7; 4, 3), where two brothers, T. and C. Aelius, are mentioned as tribunes in the Istrian War. The emendation makes it possible to place in Book XVI a fragment of Ennius, otherwise doubtful (15 of Bk. XVI, Steuart). There are, however, so many uncertainties in dealing with the fragments in general, and with the names in this account in particular (cf. Havet, *Bibl. de l'école des hautes études*, XXXV, pp. 35 ff.), that there is no obligation to accept this emendation. We do not know anything further of Caecilius' interest in literature; nor do we of that of Terentius Lucanus who adopted Terence.

²⁷ Livy, XLII, 6, 5.

²⁸ *Ib.*, XXXI, 22, 2.

²⁹ P. W., *Furius*, 56.

may be assumed that these two men and their colleague Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who died during an epidemic in 180, while holding the office of pontifex,³⁰ were in the year 200 at the very beginning of their careers.

The chief points in the above argument may be summarized as follows: (1) epigraphical and literary evidence points to the name Statius as being neither servile nor Celtic but Samnite; (2) the successful literary career of Caecilius Statius, hard to explain if he was, according to the tradition, a manumitted Insubrian Gaul, becomes intelligible if he was of Samnite birth; (3) Jerome's account may, however, contain this truth, that he was one of the Italian allies fighting for Rome in the north during the final war of expulsion of the Insubrians; (4) Statius may have been discovered by a Caecilius either in the north or later in Rome and may have kept his own name after adopting that of his patron in the arts, Caecilius.

The importance of the above suggestions, if they be accepted, is greater than the mere establishment of the racial origin of Caecilius Statius. The improbable assumption that a Celt, the only example in Roman literary history and at such an early date, became one of the leading dramatists in Rome will no longer be necessary. His career will, on the other hand, accord well with the interesting fact that during the third and second centuries B. C. practically all Roman writers were of Southern Italian origin.

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³⁰ Livy, XL, 42, 6.

A THOUGHT PATTERN IN HERACLITUS.

"They that seek gold, dig up much earth and find little" says Heraclitus (22).¹ Students of the classics, familiar as they are with the dusty business of archaeological or literary excavation, may nevertheless be warned that we are going to burrow for a small grain of Heraclitean philosophy in an especially unpleasant and unpromising ground. The late legend on the life and death of the obscure philosopher is an accumulation of imbecilities. Its author (or authors) tried to be facetious and ironical, but the attempt resulted in stupid vulgarity.

In Diogenes Laertius, 9, 3 (= *Vors.*, A 1), the last period of Heraclitus' life is thus described: "... finally he fell into misanthropy. He secluded himself and lived in the mountains, feeding on grass and plants. This caused him to contract dropsy. He went back to town and consulted the physicians, asking them in cryptic language whether they were able to turn deluge into drought. But they did not understand. So he buried himself in a place where cattle were stalled, hoping that the tepid cow-dung would have an evaporating effect. But not even that helped, and so he died, being sixty years old."

The repellent story is not based on any historical tradition. Lassalle was the first to remark that it belongs to a certain group of stories and anecdotes that invent appropriate deaths for prominent people.² The fictitious conditions under which famous men are said to have ended their lives symbolize their peculiar merits or foibles. In the case of Heraclitus the story is unusually circumstantial and the caricature unusually elaborate. As the judges of the underworld condemn the great sinners to suffer what they did unto others, so the author of this posthumous libel turns loose against Heraclitus the alleged defects of his writing and the absurdities of his doctrine. And

¹ I quote from Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, chapter 22 in the 5th ed., Berlin (Weidmann), 1934 (= ch. 12, previous editions). The numbers, if not preceded by "A," refer to the "B" series.—All the fragments of Heraclitus (with few exceptions) have recently been discussed with circumspection by Olof Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, Leipzig (Dieterich), 1935.

² Ferdinand Lassalle, *Gesamtwerke*, ed. Schirmer, Leipzig (Schirmer), 1905, vol. 6, p. 58, note 1.

in addition he throws his victim into such situations and makes him commit such actions as Heraclitus, outraging decent humanity, had slanderously ascribed to ordinary man.

Let us try to explain, in the spirit of its originators, the Philistines' impotent revenge on genius. Heraclitus, the scorner of humanity, cannot bear any longer the intercourse with his fellow creatures and retires into uninhabited mountains. He had charged ordinary people with enjoying only the crude pleasures of the body, like animals feeding on weeds (4), and of being blind to real values, like asses that prefer straw to gold (9). Now he himself, in his secluded remoteness from proper living conditions, under the sway of bare material necessity which he so haughtily despised, has to eat grass and weeds. Heraclitus had advanced the theory that the soul of man consists of divine and living fire, but that in most men the flame is soiled and deteriorated by a considerable admixture of water, preventing the mind from shining brightly and understanding clearly. Now fate makes Heraclitus contract a dropsy as a consequence of his unhealthy diet. Heraclitus, being well aware that "it is death for souls to be turned into water" (36), is compelled to return to the city and to consult the doctors. What a humiliation! Had he not insulted in his book the whole profession by maintaining that its practitioners only took money from their patients for inflicting further pains on them (58)? If what Heraclitus taught were true, viz. that "what is moist dries" (126; cf. [Heracl.], *Epist.* V, p. 72, 33, Bywater), he should have been cured easily. But unfortunately he spoke to the doctors in the style with which he drives his readers to despair: he asked them to turn deluge into drought,³ and they did not understand what he wanted them do. This served him right. How often had he abused all humanity for not grasping the meaning of his riddles (1 and *passim*)! Now Heraclitus tries a cure of his own invention. He buries himself in dung, and, on the assumption that the process of life is sustained by a constant exhalation and evaporation (12 *et al.*), he hopes that the tepid manure will save him. But his hope is vain, and he dies.

³ Lassalle is probably right when he feels that the very words *ἐρομβρία* and *αὐχμός* are taken from some passage in Heraclitus.

There are some variants and additions in other versions. Thus Neanthes of Kyzikos (A 1, 4) relates that the transformation (μεταβολή) of the philosopher into an apparent heap of manure caused the dogs not to recognize (ἀγνοεῖν) him; consequently, they ate him up. According to Heraclitus, life means incessant change, and transformation is a kind of rest and renewal (μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται, 84). On the other hand, he had upbraided his unbelieving public telling them that "dogs bark at all those whom they fail to recognize" (μὴ γινώσκωσι, 97).

Our interpretation of the legend does not claim to be accurate throughout. Our incomplete material does not allow us to quote point for point the particular and specific references which the author had in mind when composing his parody. We have been able, however, to illustrate the story from beginning to end by some pertinent tenets and sayings of Heraclitus. But there is one notable exception. That Heraclitus should have buried himself under filth is an idea not warranted by the known fragments of Heraclitus.⁴ And yet this loathsome oddity recurs in all the different versions, with only slight variations in details.⁵ It is therefore a legitimate guess that this motif is, like all the rest, parodic, and that Heraclitus, in one of his irksome criticisms, had used the words "he buries (κατορύττει) himself in filth," or the like.

Now it happens that the two significant words βορβόρῳ κατορωνυγμένον recur in a no less dignified book than Plato's *Republic*, and that they recur in a quotation from an unnamed author. Plato says (*Rep.*, vii, 533 d): ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος . . . τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωνυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω. That Plato is quoting someone is proved by the words τῷ ὄντι which, as they stand, can only mean τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ πάλαι ἔλεγον σοφοί τινες ἄνδρες. We may conclude with confidence that the author whom Plato

⁴ Frags. 13 and 37 seem to be somehow related but their purport is as yet uncertain (Gigon, p. 121).

⁵ The tradition varies in so far as Heraclitus either buries (κατορύττει) or anoints himself or asks children to cover him with the substance. (Time and again he expresses his disdain for immature childhood; now he needs the help of children.) The stuff is always described as cowdung; only Suidas (A 1a) speaks instead of sand. To the evidence as printed in *Vorsokratiker* may be added Marc. Aur., 3, 3, 4.

quotes is Heraclitus, and that Heraclitus had said: the ordinary man cannot perceive metaphysical reality because he has buried himself in filth. This accounts well enough for two words in Plato's quotation;⁶ but what about the rest? What about the "eyes of the soul, prevented by barbarism from clear perception"?⁷ They are taken, almost literally, from another saying of Heraclitus:

107 Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων.

The double coincidence (both between the quotation and the biography of Heraclitus, and between the quotation and fragment 107 of Heraclitus), a coincidence in expressions of such a peculiar coinage, makes the identification certain. It may be accepted as established that Plato, in his one quotation, combines two cognate passages from Heraclitus, frag. 107 and the new one.⁸

One inference is at once obvious. Heraclitus' book contained a thought which Plato was to develop into his cave parable. Heraclitus had contended that man is buried in filth and that thereby his spiritual view is obstructed. Plato, in the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*, sets forth how man is, as it were, buried in a subterranean cave, unable to see the daylight of spiritual truth. It is now clear that Plato, when quoting Heraclitus in the same seventh book of the *Republic*, is paying homage to the archaic author who, by his blunt and crude verdict on the human state, had given him the inspiration for his consummate parable of the cave.⁹

⁶ Adam in his commentary on the *Republic* (Cambridge [Univ. Press], 1902) says that the image βορβόρω κατορρωγμένον is taken from Orphic theology and refers to *Rep.*, ii, 363 d: Μουσαῖος . . . καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ . . . τοὺς ἀνοσίους . . . καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν "Αἰδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες . . . (= *Orphic. fragmenta*, ed. Kern, no. 4). The relationship between the two passages in the *Republic* will be discussed below on p. 323, note 32.

⁷ The words ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω are not part of the quotation but refer back to Plato's own cave simile (cf. 518 c ff.).

⁸ The blending of the βορβόρος fragment and the βάρβαρος fragment results in the pun βορβόρω βαρβαρικῶ. Perhaps the pun, in some form or other, was already in the original.

⁹ It is not necessary to expatiate on the analogous way in which

For Heraclitus himself, the result does not appear spectacular. Two words, something like *βορβόρῳ κατορύττεται*, have been recovered. But the gain might prove less meager if we were in a position to restore also the original setting of the tiny bit of new evidence and to determine its original bearing. This should not be impossible since Plato's quotation shows beyond doubt in what sense the image was applied by Heraclitus. Perhaps the new fragment may shed some light in its turn on the other tradition.

Looking round for analogies among the known fragments, we note, in the first place, fragment 107, an allusion to which had been blended by Plato with the allusion to this one. Both fragments refer to the same idea of Heraclitus that ordinary man, however able and experienced according to current standards, has only a superficial contact with reality. But to him who has seen the light of metaphysical truth, things become transparent. His insight penetrates through appearance and proceeds to the core of objects and events. He witnesses a spectacle more sublime than anything one could suspect (18) and at the same time as close to everyday life as the most manifest sensations are. For it is not to a remote dreamland somewhere in the void that the Heraclitean discoveries carry the mind, but they make the enlightened among us understand more deeply this our world, make them experience more fully and intelligently these our lives, and make them perform more wisely and aptly the actions which are required from the best.¹⁰

In the second place, there are three more fragments in which "dirt" or "mud" is mentioned (13, 37, 5), and to these may be added the evidence appropriately collected by Bywater in his

Heraclitus and Plato call for liberation of the mind from confinement and entanglement. The fundamental identity of views necessarily led to parallelisms in detail.

¹⁰ It is in the particular Heraclitean sense that I shall distinguish in the following pages "metaphysical reality" or "the divine" from "superficial reality" or "the mundane," and "the enlightened" from "ordinary man" respectively. I admit that these expressions are vague, but it is beyond the scope of this article further to determine the vista which Heraclitus claims to have opened up. The specific quest and pursuit of the early metaphysicians has been admirably clarified by Georg Misch, *Der Weg in die Philosophie*, Leipzig (Teubner), 1926.

note on frag. 13 (= no. 54 in his edition).¹¹ An imaginative mind, when confronted with this accumulated evidence, will at once see emerge from it the idea of an elaborate symbolism, or even allegorism, a system in which certain philosophical conceptions seem to be represented by certain definite metaphors, one of them being "filth." A critical mind, however, will soon raise the objection that all combinations are vague and precarious unless the proper relation of the different notions and their position in the Heraclitean system are reliably ascertained. Fortunately this is feasible. The single symbols can be accurately interpreted as elements in a characteristic pattern of Heraclitus' thought. The pattern, as we shall see, is more than just a favorite scheme of reasoning or speaking. It is not an external form, interchangeable with several others, but it has been instrumental in molding to some extent the substance of the doctrine.

The pattern is obvious in this saying:

79 Ἄνθρωπος νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος, ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

Man is stamped as infantile by divinity, just as the child is by man.

For the sake of convenience, we call this pattern by the name of the geometrical mean and transcribe it by formulae such as *God/man* = *man/boy*, or else $A/B = B/C$, using mathematical language rather loosely and disclaiming mathematical strictness. To ascertain the actual meaning and function of the pattern, we shall have to analyze the instances in which Heraclitus uses the scheme, starting from fragment 79.

There are three planes: the levels of God, man, and child (A, B, and C). The degree of perfection decreases, and the degree of imperfection increases, in equal measure in the transitions from A to B and from B to C ($A/B = B/C$). Or (and this will paraphrase more correctly what Heraclitus had in mind) we might speak of contrasts and say that the contrast between perfection and imperfection is the same in both cases. Thus man, being the geometrical mean, may be called wise when compared to a boy, and childish when compared to God. He combines opposite qualities. It all depends on the standard by

¹¹ The fragments will be quoted and discussed below, on pp. 322 ff.

which he is judged. An adult man is perfect according to conventional conceptions but utterly defective according to philosophical truth.

Of the three elements A, B, and C, each has its characteristic function. The member C (child) is a known magnitude and its inferiority is unquestionable. For it was a truism for Heraclitus and his public that a child is a weak, foolish, and despicable being.¹² Referring to the indisputable defects of a child, Heraclitus makes the startling assertion that any respectable and dignified citizen when viewed in the light of divinity, is by no means less miserable than an infant. B (man) is tantamount to C (child) when compared to A (God). Thus the term C (child) serves as predicate in the statement, and it indicates what specific quality or circumstance is ascribed to B and A: in this case, imperfection and perfection respectively.

It follows that the element C varies according to the predicate to be given the statement, or even to the shade of its meaning. Another saying of Heraclitus expressed the same idea of human imperfection in a more bitter and caustic way through the choice of a different term of reference. The saying is not preserved in its original wording, but its purport was that the most beautiful and wise of men, when compared to God, is like an ape (82 and 83). That which makes the ape appear so hideous, contemptible, and ridiculous is the fact that he seemingly tries to look like a man and to act and behave like a man. This is precisely the situation of man in reference to God. Humanity is a caricature of divinity.¹³

The pattern implies, as we have seen, the statement that the middle element B, when considered from a higher standpoint, is no better than its apparent opposite C. Thus Heraclitus can reduce the equation to a shorter form by simply asserting that B

¹² It may be recalled that in the art of the period children are represented as miniature adults. The specific positive qualities of children were only discovered much later.

¹³ The element B is put here in the superlative: "even the most beautiful and most wise of men." Heraclitus is fond of using the superlative in such statements and to show that even those who are commonly considered as supreme in reality are incompetent and ridiculous (56; 57; cf. 124). For the comparison of ape and man cf. McDermott, *T. A. P. A.*, LXVI (1935), p. 167.

virtually amounts to its opposite C. Of this type are the statements in frag. 1 that ordinary people are equally uninformed before and after they have been told the truth; that they do not experience their own experiences; that even while awake they are like sleepers, unaware of what they had ever known before. All such assertions can easily be transformed into the complete scheme of the double proportion, e. g.: the consciousness and alertness of ordinary people, eagerly pursuing their activities, is like unconscious and torpid sleep when compared to the state of a mind that has awakened to the contact with metaphysical reality. The opposites are said to be equivalent also in this fragment:

34 Ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκάσι· φάτις αὐτοῖσιν μαρτυρεῖ
παρόντας ἀπείναι.

They that have no understanding, though hearing, are like ¹⁴ the deaf. The expression "present but absent" is fitting for them.

Those who hear the message and are present in a certain sense (viz. bodily) are virtually deaf and absent (viz. mentally) if they do not understand what has been said and fail to establish a contact with that metaphysical reality which surrounds them and which is the very essence of their existence. When we thus qualify the opposite notions, in order to make them compatible, by adding "bodily" and "mentally," we must be careful not to overlook that the two restrictions are on a different plane. It is mental comprehension alone that really matters. In statements of this type, Heraclitus does not mean to say that any predication can only be relative and therefore has to be properly qualified as to the conditions under which it is valid. The wording of fragment 79 shows how far Heraclitus was from

¹⁴ Here, as in frag. 1, the notion "tantamount" is rather vaguely indicated by εἰκάσι. Heraclitus does not use technical language for the expression of his pattern. All the early Greek philosophers abstain from developing technical language. The specific meaning is not couched in specific terms or stereotyped schemes but it results by implication from an unlimited variety of expressions in current language and style, including instances, images, and other devices to guide the imagination. The philosophical ideas are intimated to the reader instead of being forced upon him with rigid and coercive strictness.

advocating relativity as a universal and uniform principle. It is by no means to an equally limited degree correct to call ordinary man wise or foolish, for his claim to wisdom is based only on his superiority to complete foolishness, while the contrary verdict is passed on him by God's wisdom. Relative, and relatively real, is man's wisdom but his foolishness is absolutely true. When Heraclitus distinguishes two different factors making for contrary predications, he usually implies that only one of them is decisive and the other comparatively negligible and futile. In the following fragment he explicitly distinguishes between the bodily and the mental factors in perception, but at the same time he makes it clear that the final result depends on the soul:

107 *Κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων.*

Bad witnesses for men are eyes and ears of those that have barbarian souls.

Many a time the opponents of Heraclitus will have recurred to common-sense experience in order to refute the lofty paradoxes of his creed.¹⁵ But their experience, so Heraclitus points out, though they are proud of being civilized and enlightened Greeks, amounts to no more than the experience of primitive savages with an horizon confined to their base needs and menial interests.¹⁶ The insight is a question not of sensual perception and superficial assimilation but of a deeper consciousness and thorough interpretation.¹⁷

In all the instances quoted so far it was always the element C (child, ape, sleeping, deaf, etc.) alone which varied, and with it the predicate of the statement. The term B constantly represented ordinary humanity, and the element A referred, in some

¹⁵ Cf. the attitude of the half blind cave-dwellers in Plato's *Rep.*, vii, 516 e toward those who see.

¹⁶ Again we can form a double proportion: Barbarian / Greek = Greek / the really enlightened.

¹⁷ Perhaps the notion "barbarian" indicates rather the inability to understand Greek (or, figuratively, to understand the language of reality) than the lack of civilization and education. The difference is only slight, as in any case the fragment is concerned with the problem of interpretation.

sense or other, to God and the Absolute. The equation of the geometrical mean is a method of denouncing and humiliating humanity; it is equally a method for praising and extolling the divine. But there is one more gradation implied in the scheme. The term C (child, barbarian, etc.) is, as we have observed, a well known thing with notorious defects; the term B (ordinary man) happens to be a supposedly well known magnitude and a supposedly worthy subject, but the equation reveals that the common evaluation is erroneous and that the qualities of man are in actual fact the opposite of what was generally assumed. But then the term A (the Absolute) represents that which was unknown to mankind, not visualized by anyone, not worshipped or revered appropriately, until Heraclitus discovered its real essence and preached its gospel. God and True Reality are a something beyond the ken of inexperienced experience, senseless sensations, unreal realizations, and unwise wisdom; something beyond the competence of human imagination and description. The scheme of the geometrical mean thus becomes a device to express the inexpressible and to explain the inexplicable. The equation may be rewritten, on this view, with an x instead of an $A : x/B = B/C$. What is God? God is that compared to which the most perfect man will appear as an infant or as a hideous and ridiculous ape. What is divine clarity of mind and the insight of an illuminated soul, burning in a clear, unadulterated, fiery glow? It is a state in comparison to which ordinary consciousness is like sleep, and sober reasoning like the numbness of a drunken man, not knowing whither he goes, his soul being moist.¹⁸

¹⁸ I have combined frag. 1 (sleep) and frag. 118 ("Dry soul, wisest and best") with frag. 117: "A man when drunk is led by an immature child, not noticing whither he goes, his soul being moist." Frag. 117 is in itself an instance of the geometrical mean (Man, drunk / child = child / man, sober; cf. *supra*, pp. 90 f.). But I feel confident that this fragment, taken as a whole, in the original was only the one half of a double proportion, such as indicated in the text above. It is not likely that Heraclitus should have condescended, for its own sake, to a trivial denunciation of intoxication, or to a physiological proof of his thesis on the nature of the soul. And the words "not understanding whither he goes" are echoed, within a series of excerpts from Heraclitus, by Marcus Aurelius, 4, 46, 2: "he who forgets where his way leads him" (= Frag. 71; cf. Seneca, *Epist.*, 98, 10: *obliti quo eant*,

Constantly upbraiding humanity, scolding and abusing it, Heraclitus tries to arouse it from its spiritual stupor and numbness and calls it to a new and unheard of awakeness and sobriety. He hates mysticism and ecstasy (14; 15), just as he despises vulgar intoxication, and yet he has a message that demands an almost superhuman effort of the mind to reach the state of illumination:

18 Ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσai, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὼν καὶ ἄπορον.

Unless one hopes against hope, he will not find out that which is indiscoverable and inaccessible.¹⁹

Instead of trying to enrapture his readers, to envelop them in a misty cloud of vague enthusiasm and whirl their minds upward to the beyond in a tornado of oratory, Heraclitus is content calmly to point out the direction in which the reasoning has to travel. Like the Delphian God who "does not tell nor hide but indicates" (93),²⁰ Heraclitus asks his readers to find the transcendental by the indirect means of extrapolation, through the device of the double proportion. The greatness of the metaphysical organization, the perfection of the hidden harmony which is far finer than the apparent one (123; 54), is indicated by him in this same way:

124 <ὅκ>ωσπερ σάρμα ²¹ εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος κόσμος.

The most perfectly organized universe is like a heap of garbage dumped at random — (*scil.* when compared to the less obvious organization behind and beyond the manifest regularity of sun, stars and life²²).

scil. ad mortem; and Pind., *Nem.*, 6, 6 ff. in a context strongly influenced by Heraclitus), where the "way" is clearly metaphorical. It seems therefore that the "drunken man" was only an image used for exposing the state of man in general.

¹⁹ In this instance, the combined opposites do not express incompetence but on the contrary the triumph of him who overcomes almost invincible obstacles.

²⁰ Cf. Snell, *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 371.

²¹ *σάρμα* is an excellent emendation by Diels for *σάρξ*.

²² There is no means, as far as I can see, to have the quotation fit precisely and with strict logic into Theophrastus' own argument. The smoothest way, however, of coördinating the quotation with the rest

The obscure frag. 52 is perhaps taken from a similar context:

52 Αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παίζων, πεσσεύων· παιδὸς ἢ βασιλῆϊ.

Human existence is a child at a game, playing draughts; a child rules as king.

The course of nature, the sway of necessity, the codes of law and convention, or careful planning, or whatever else is controlling our lives, all this amounts to the wilful moves of a child playing a game of arbitrary rules²³ — *scil.* when compared to the one law divine. This interpretation, however, is no more than a guess.

The notion of "the one divine law" which we tentatively supplied in the preceding fragment is to be found in this saying:

114 Ἐν νόμῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολλὸν ἰσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

One must speak in accordance with reason and by this means²⁴ strengthen oneself through that which is common to all, as a community (*scil.* is strong) through its law; and even more strongly (*scil.* does reason support those who are in keeping with it), for all human laws are fed by the one divine, for it prevails as much as it will and is sufficient for (and equal to) all of them and superabounding (superior).

Reason is, according to Heraclitus, not an achievement of the

of the context is to make Heraclitus say that the metaphysical system is even more perfect than the apparent organization, and to have Theophrastus use the quotation for indicating that it would be absurd if the fine organization of our visible universe were brought about by accident and fortuitous chance and not by correspondingly well organized definite principles.

²³ Cf. Plato, *Laws*, vii, 803 c-804 b.

²⁴ It seems to me obvious that λέγοντας is also governed by χρὴ. Otherwise the participle would have been put in the future or the auxiliary μέλλω inserted, as in the Platonic reverberation of this sentence, *Rep.*, vii, 517 c: δεῖ ταύτην (*scil.* τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδέα ἢ δημοσίᾳ. (That the preceding part of Plato's sentence also is indebted to Heraclitus can be inferred from its coincidence with Pindar, *Isthm.*, 5, 1 ff.; cf. *Gnomon*, VI, p. 13.)

individual but a suprapersonal power; it is common and universal (frag. 2, etc.). Thus Heraclitus at first remarks that, as communities are strong as long as they act in conformity with their constitutional law (cf. 44), so individual minds are strong when they comply with the common law of reason. But then, as in an afterthought, a new gradation is added in the scheme of the geometrical mean: The individual citizens / the common law of their social organization = all the individual community laws / the law of laws, the one divine law.²⁵

Our analysis has ascertained that Heraclitus had a predilection for the thought pattern of the geometrical mean, and that this scheme helped him in the arduous task of approaching the conception of the transcendental. The essence of the pattern is²⁶ that mundane values, when compared to the paramount, are tantamount to their opposites, the non-values. This general idea is implied in various statements and expressed in various ways. There is no external uniformity. Heraclitus does not use stereotyped figures of speech, though the thought pattern seems to invite and provoke their application.²⁷ Nor does he clothe his thoughts in the distinctive but monotonous livery of technical language.²⁸ In the absence of any technical terms, there is no clue to indicate the field in which Heraclitus may have become acquainted with the scheme of the continued proportion before he applied it to metaphysics. Perhaps he had learned from the Pythagoreans about the harmonious contrasts in a succession of tones with equal intervals (i. e. equal proportions of string length) and about correspondent progressions in geometry and algebra.²⁹

²⁵ This equation differs from all those analyzed before. No disparaging criticism is implied, for Heraclitus had no intention of depreciating the laws of man. This time positive and direct advice is given and the transcendental is extolled not by contrast alone but explicitly and directly.

²⁶ With the exception of frag. 114, cf. the preceding note.

²⁷ It is true that there is much in the style of Heraclitus to remind the reader of the *figurae orationis* as they were taught later by rhetoricians, but in the writing of Heraclitus the subject determines the expression and not the reverse. Cf. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, 1, pp. 18 ff.; *Logos und Rhythmus*, p. 23.

²⁸ Cf. *supra*, p. 316, note 14, and Snell, "Die Sprache Heraklits," *Hermes*, LXI (1926), p. 353.

²⁹ There are some references to music and musical harmony in the

The function of the pattern is now, I hope, sufficiently well established to allow us to integrate and to interpret with its support another group of incomplete fragments.

- 9 Ὅνοι σύρματ' ἂν ἔλουντο μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν.

Asses would prefer chaff to gold.

The text suggests the equations: Ass/ordinary man = ordinary man/the discriminating philosopher, and correspondingly: Refuse/gold = gold/real values. This interpretation is corroborated by the following two fragments.

- 4 Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves felices diceremus cum inveniant orobum ad comedendum.³⁰

- 29 Αἰρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντὶ πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὄκωσπερ κτήνεα.

The best men prefer one thing to all other things, everlasting fame to things mortal; but the many are glutted in the way of cattle.

The mass of humanity is degraded to the rank of their domestic animals, and their happiness to the delights of cattle and asses.³¹ With archaic thoroughness, Heraclitus further and further exploits the conception of man owning animals, disposing of them freely and despising them profoundly, but not being aware that, measured against the standard of what he ought to be, he is by no means their superior. For it is an easy guess that when Heraclitus speaks of

- 13 βορβόρῳ χαίρειν
revelling in filth,

he is denouncing the pleasures of the unenlightened. And this

fragments (10 *cum test.*; 51). Pythagoras is mentioned twice (40; 129). The usual derogatory tenor does not preclude indebtedness to the school (cf. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, 2, p. 188). It is less likely that Heraclitus should have invented the scheme of the continued proportion independently.

³⁰ It goes without saying that the original form of this saying was different from the text as given by Albertus Magnus.

³¹ Speaking of the fodder of asses (9), Heraclitus aptly uses the word σύρμα "litter, refuse, chaff," just as he had compared the kosmos to σάρμα "garbage" (124).

becomes certain on the strength of some other allusions to these utterances of Heraclitus: Clem. Alex., *Protr.*, 10, 92, 4: Οἱ δὲ (the heathen) σκολήκων δίκην περὶ τέλματα καὶ βορβόρους, τὰ ἡδονῆς ρεύματα, καλινδούμενοι ἀνοήτους καὶ ἀνοήτους ἐκβόσκονται τρυφάς, ὕδεις τινὲς ἄνθρωποι. “ὕες” γάρ, φησὶν, “ἡδονται βορβόρῳ” μᾶλλον ἢ καθαρῷ ὕδατι καὶ “ἐπὶ φωρυτῷ μαργαίνουσιν” κατὰ Δημόκριτον (= *Vorsokr.*, 68, B 147). Plotinus, I, 6 (περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), 6: Διὸ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς “Αἶδον κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον. οἷα δὲ καὶ ὕες, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ.³² A new, and more specific, note is brought into the caricature by this saying:

37 Heraclitus ait sues caeno, cohortales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari.

For the expression “they wash in mire and dust” (κόνει = “pulvere vel cinere”) implies that those whose horizon is restricted to this world, when trying to cleanse themselves, actually do nothing but befoul themselves a second time. The unenlightened, unable to find their way out of this sphere of worldliness and “filth,” try to wash off mire with mire. For the madness of such a procedure Heraclitus has found an especially striking example in the rite of purifying murderers by washing their hands with the blood of a pig:

5 Καθαίρονται δ' ἄλλψ αἵματι μαινόμενοι, οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο, μαίνεσθαι δ' ἂν δοκοίη εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιφράσαιτο οὕτω ποιέοντα. Καὶ τοῖς ἀγάλμασι τουτέοισιν εὔχονται, ὁκοῖον εἴ τις δόμοισι λεσχηγένοιο, οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οὔτινές εἰσι.

³² It is obvious (and was so interpreted by Plotinus) that the sinners in the underworld were thought to be buried in mud because they had been revelling in filth, as it were, during their lifetime. The conception of their punishment is derived from the verdict on their guilt. Now the punishment is attested for the Orphics by Plato in book ii of the *Republic* (cf. *supra*, p. 312, note 6), while the verdict on their behavior in life is attested for Heraclitus (frag. 13; 37; and Plato's quotation in book vii). It follows either that both ideas were originally Orphic and that Heraclitus borrowed the one from the Orphics, or that the Orphics borrowed from Heraclitus the one conception and duplicated it with the idea of correspondent punishment. This would have taken place in the time between Heraclitus and Plato.

They purify themselves by defiling themselves with more blood, as if one who had stepped into mud would wash himself in mud; any man who discerned what he (the ritual purifier³³) was doing would deem him mad. And they pray to these images, as if one were to prate to dwellings, not knowing (this refers to the man who addresses images instead of the gods) what gods are and heroes.

That in the rite actually the same substance, blood, is applied to take away the stain of bloody murder makes the blunder the more manifest, but it is not essential for what Heraclitus intends to make clear. The main thing is that some mundane matter is applied as a remedy for such a pollution. Not even in his religious acts does man succeed in establishing a contact with the beyond. Instead, he clings to "these" images (the word "these" is significant), which may or may not be the dwelling places of divinity but certainly are not themselves divine. He cannot escape the mire of this superficial reality; and, when he tries to do so, he only covers himself with more of the same substance. How, then, should he be able to visualize that which is beyond the ken of trivial experience? The vicious circle of ignorance and faulty behavior closes and imprisons its victim in a grave of "filth."³⁴ In this sense Heraclitus had exposed ordinary man as "burying himself in filth."

Thus the new fragment has found its place in the Heraclitean system. It has been linked to a considerable number of other fragments, which have all proved to be interrelated and to combine into a solid and homogeneous fabric. Not only do they express cognate and coherent ideas but most of them approach the metaphysical reality by the same procedure, the thought pattern of the geometrical mean. Using this scheme, Heraclitus contends that ordinary man, when compared to the enlightened is no better than a domestic animal; and that the superficial reality to which he confines his horizon, when compared to the

³³ The style and structure of this fragment has been analyzed in *Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1924, pp. 105 ff.

³⁴ While in the vicious circle a wrong attitude prevents a true understanding and the lack of understanding prevents an improvement in behavior, quite the opposite is true for those souls which possess the logos: 115 ψυχῆς ἔστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.

transcendental, is no more valuable than refuse and filth. Plunging into menial experience, man covers, as it were, his organs of perception with a crust of mire.³⁵ A comparison of this type inspired the originator of the Heraclitus legend to his miserable invention. He made the metaphysician, when stricken by the very realistic and mundane pains of bodily disease, try to wash off his sickness by covering himself with a crust of cow-dung.³⁶

We could stop here if we were concerned only with the new

³⁵ Empedocles (*Vorsokr.*, 31, B 2, 2) likewise speaks of "the many petty imprints blunting our thoughts," and again he says (in frag. 110) that, just as the metaphysical insight will wane in a mind set on worldly things, it will wax and increase by itself (*αὐτὰ αὖξαι*) in a mind engrossed in "pure" meditations (= Heraclitus, frag. 115, cf. preceding note).—It is worth while to compare, for the sake of analogy, the expressions of medieval Christian mysticism. I translate some passages by Tauler (ca. 1300-61), all taken from one and the same sermon "Beati oculi qui vident quod vos videtis et c." (no. 45 in Vetter's edition, *Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters*, 11, pp. 194-201). In spite of the fundamental differences on which it is needless to expatiate, some coincidences are striking. "Man has two kinds of eyes, external and internal eyes. And but for the internal eye man would be like some other kind of animal or beast" (cf. Heracl., frag. 107, p. 317 of this article; and fragments 9, 4, 13, 37, pp. 322 ff). "Dear children, how can it be that noble reason, the internal eye, is so miserably blindfolded that it fails to perceive the true light? The fatal defect results from this: a thick coarse skin, a thick hide is laid over it, and this is love and affection to creatures, or else to one's own self or some of what one possesses, and through that one has become blind and deaf. . . . What are those skins? They are whatever you turn to intentionally. . ." (cf. Heracl., the new fragment; frag. 34, p. 316; frag. 1). "My dear, let yourself sink down, sink down to the bottom ("entsink in den grunt"), and all the best of all things will be yours. . . . This true humiliation sinks down into the divine internal abyss" (cf. Heracl., frag. 101; frag. 45, p. 327). "This is the naught of which St. Dennis has said that God is none of whatever can be grasped or understood or comprehended" (cf. Heracl., frag. 18, p. 319).

³⁶ Dung is mentioned by Heraclitus in frag. 96: *νέκυνς κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι*. For the sake of demonstration we might circumscribe the probable purport of this saying in the style of frag. 5: "They revere dead bodies and worship them as heroes with ritual offerings, not understanding that carcasses are more properly to be cast away than dung." Heraclitus wants to make as clear as possible the line of demarcation between priceless values such as a living soul enlightened by the logos and worthless non-values such as a dead body emptied of the soul which it once contained.

fragment and its interpretation. But the story of the geometrical mean in the philosophy of Heraclitus is not yet ended, for the extant tradition appears to yield yet other interesting instances.

The scheme helps us better to understand the well known fragment

- 53 Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.

Strife is father of all things, and king of all things, and he appointed some as gods and the others as men, he made some to become slaves and the others to be free.

Here again three levels are mentioned. Man (the ordinary free citizen) holds the central position between the gods above and the slaves below him. As slaves are ruled by (free) men, so man is controlled by his heavenly lords: The gods/(free) men = free men/slaves. The power behind both these relationships is the same creative and dominating force of strife. The slaves have been thrown into their position through the strife of warfare, and between gods and men there is not only the contrast of opposite qualities (62) but also antagonism and strife as expressed in Hesiod's and Aeschylus' representations of the Prometheus myth.

The following fragment is not concerned with man and god but with some phenomena of nature's:

- 99 Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, ἔνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρον εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν.³⁷

If the sun did not exist there would be night in spite of all the other stars.

The fire of any star, of any αἰθόμενον πῦρ διαπρέπον νυκτί, cannot break the spell of the night, nor can they all together with their combined efforts; but the one sun outshines them all and turns night into day, ἐν ἀμέρᾳ φαεινὸν ἀστρον ἐρήμας δι' αἰθέρος.³⁸ The

³⁷ The wording is hardly authentic.

³⁸ I borrow expressions from the exordium of Pindar's first Olympian to indicate that this passage, like others, shows the influence of Heraclitus. In the exordium are implied the Heraclitean ideas of water being superior to the varieties of the base element, and of fire equally surpassing water (see *infra*, pp. 333 ff.); of day and the one sun sur-

glamor of all the stars, brilliant though they are, amounts only to darkness and is called night by comparison with that period in which the one sun illuminates the world (Darkness/brilliancy of the stars = brilliancy of the stars/light of the sun).

Thus the sun is extolled as by far the greatest of all the fires in our visible universe. But then again we read:

3 Ἡλίου εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπέου.

The width of sun: that of one human foot.

Lying down on your back and lifting one leg, you are able to blot the whole sun with one foot. The largest and most powerful of the heavenly bodies does not amount to more than that. This sounds exactly like many of the statements which we have analyzed. Even the greatest things of this world are contemptible—viz. when compared to divine things. The other half of the double proportion is missing. Can we hope to recover it?

In our extant tradition (A 1, 7) a reference to this fragment 3 is linked to another fragment (45), and we have been unwise in ignoring their connection. The other fragment supplies perfectly what is needed and makes an admirable complement:

45 Ψυχῆς πείρατα ἴων οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν, οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

The boundaries of soul you will not find, wandering in whatever direction, so deep is the logos it possesses.

The soul is the one thing in the world of man that can blend with the boundless logos, the all-embracing law of laws. Through insight and clear consciousness the soul can share in the supreme power of the logos and can intelligently and actively live the rules that govern the universe, instead of being unwittingly and passively controlled by them. The sun, on the other hand, is not more than an intermittent phenomenon, annihilated every night and produced anew on every morning.³⁹

passing night and the many stars (Heraclitus, 99); of fire corresponding to gold (90); and of renown (as won by an Olympian victory) corresponding to gold (29 + 9).

³⁹ Frag. 6; Plato, *Rep.*, 498a with schol. Cf. Gigon, *op. cit.* (p. 309, note 1), p. 84 ff. Gigon is right in pointing out the similarity in the views of Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Cf. also frag. 16.

The course it has to take is strictly prescribed to it and the police officers of Nature's justice enforce the heavenly traffic rules:

- 94 ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.

Sun will not overstep its measures; if it does, the Erinyes, assistants of Justice, will find it out.

While the logos in the soul may increase indefinitely (115), the extension of the sun is invariably determined by the size of the container in which the flaming masses are gathered. For the thing that man calls sun is not a real body, freely floating in the void, but a certain quantity of fiery exhalation rising from below during day time and intercepted by a bowl turned upside down. The sun is not so much an object as a transitory process, a fire kindled when the bowl rises, being sustained throughout the day by a steady flow of new material and extinguished as soon as the bowl sets at the horizon. That petty mechanical appliance, the bowl with what it holds, can be covered and blotted by one human foot (3). But—it is only a “but” we have to supply—the same foot, wandering in any direction, will never reach the end of a living soul. So deep is the logos it possesses (45).⁴⁰

It can hardly be doubted that the thought pattern of the continued proportion was primarily used, if not invented, by Heraclitus in order to clarify the contrast between the mundane and divine. But we may well expect that so familiar a tool has served him for other purposes as well. One instance is his definition of a generation. A generation is passed, so he says, and one cycle of human nature completed, as soon as, after the lapse of thirty years, the begetter sees the begotten a begetter.

⁴⁰ It is not impossible that the three fragments 99 and 3 + 45 were connected in the original as indicated in our text above: The sun by far surpasses all other fires, but the sun itself is equally surpassed by the soul (fires / sun = sun / soul). The brilliancy of the sun is the “mother of our eyes” (Pind., *Paeon*, 9, 2), but what are the eyes of the body when compared to the soul with the living and perceiving logos in it? The latter thought is expressed by Plutarch (*De Fortuna*, 98c) in connection with Heraclitus, frag. 99; and on the other hand it is implied in Heraclitus, frag. 107. Seneca, *Epist.*, 88, 13 may or may not be vaguely related.

The cycle closes when the equation *Son/father* = *grandson/son* has been enacted, so that the central figure is endowed with both the opposite qualities, sonhood and fatherhood.⁴¹

There may be more instances in our extant tradition. But, if anywhere outside the sphere to which the scheme properly belongs, we shall first of all expect it to underly the theory of three⁴² elements of nature. As fire for Heraclitus is either identical or cognate with the divine, it may well be that it takes the position of the divine (A) in the equation, with water and earth as the B and C elements respectively.

The authentic evidence as to the Heraclitean theory of elements is scanty and the indirect tradition unreliable. The best approach to our problem, though it requires some discussion, is the historical one. Tracing the development of the idea both before and after Heraclitus and comparing his thesis with those of his predecessors and successors, we can hope to reach a more definite result and to understand more fully its implications.

Heraclitus was the only philosopher to assume three elements. Thus their number coincided with the number of the states of matter, the gaseous, liquid, and solid. Heraclitus taught that the elements are convertible into one another and in fact laid a special stress on the conversions. We can therefore say as well that he assumed only one element, the basic form of which is fire. "Fire" can be precipitated and become "water," and "water" can freeze to "earth," and *vice versa*. The relation of the other liquids to "water," and of the other solid substances to "earth" is not determined but it is obvious that with him, as with many others, "water," "earth," and perhaps also "fire" each represent a whole group of different varieties. The quantities resulting from the conversions are said by Heraclitus to be determined by a λόγος, i. e. law of proportions (31), and the general relationship of "fire" to all other substances or objects is one of "equivalence" or "exchange value" (*ἀνταμοιβή*, frag. 90).⁴³ This system might have worked out very well and

⁴¹ Heraclitus, A 19. For particulars, cf. *supra* pp. 89 ff.

⁴² Gigon, pp. 99 ff., contends that Heraclitus assumed four, instead of three, elements. His arguments are not convincing. Cf. Cherniss, *A. J. P.*, LVI, p. 415.

⁴³ It goes without saying that any attempt at paraphrasing implies some adulteration and modernization of the original conceptions.

have led to important progress,⁴⁴ had it not soon been superseded by the theory of four elements, earth, water, air, and fire. The new theory, introduced by Empedocles, became then canonical and prevailed for a very considerable number of centuries.

Shortly before Heraclitus, Anaximenes had laid down the similar thesis that the basic element is "air," and he had also maintained that "air" can be transformed into other substances. With him, density is the determining factor, and as density can exist in an indefinite number of degrees, any number of substances can be brought under the same principle and can find their places in the one progression. We are told that according to him air, when rarified, becomes fire, but when condensed, becomes in succession wind, cloud, water, earth, and stone. We thus get away from the idea of some very few elements. Perhaps Anaximenes even assumed that the number of possible conditions of matter is indefinite.

Contemporary with Heraclitus and holding views diametrically opposite to his, Parmenides, in his analysis of the world of appearance, assumed a strict duality of elements. They are called "fire" and "night." The positive and the negative element do not change into one another, and their interaction is restricted to attraction and mixture. Their quantitative relationship is determined by sums, not proportions; since there cannot be any void, the sum of both elements in any given space is a constant.⁴⁵ The qualities resulting from any given mixture are likewise controlled by the laws of addition and subtraction. As the one element is nothing but the negative counterpart of the other, equal quantities of both will neutralize each other and the amount of surplus remaining on this or that side will determine the character of the resulting quality and the degree to which the mixture possesses it (*Vors.* 28 [Parmenides] B 16 and 18). It is obvious that this theory is unrelated to that of Heraclitus.

The philosophical systems of Anaximander, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes have to be ruled out as far as this problem is con-

⁴⁴ A progress, it is true, in which Heraclitus himself would not have taken much interest. Like most of the *φυσικοί*, he was no physicist, though every one of them made good use of whatever physical phenomenon might help to corroborate his system.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Göttinger Nachrichten*, 1930, pp. 176 ff.

cerned, because there is nothing in the extant evidence to allow a fruitful comparison.

Thales alone seems to remain. He maintained, we are told, that water is the basic substance. But not even to the ancients was authentic information about his theory available, as he did not write a book to expound his doctrine.

Instead, we possess in its original form one precious little piece of very early evidence, allegedly contemporary with Thales, which refers to a theory of two elements. This text is not usually mentioned or discussed in connection with the history of Greek cosmology. For the author of the passage happens to be not a philosopher but a poet, and a rather poor satirical poet at that. It is odd enough that we should receive such information from such a quarter; but, badly in need of authentic material as we are, we have to take whatever we can get and be grateful.

Semonides of Amorgos, in his otherwise well known iambos on womankind, enumerates nine types of bad women and one of good women. With the exception of only two, all the types are determined by their resemblance to certain animals, swine, fox, dog, ass, cat, horse, and ape for the bad types, and bee for the one good type. In the wording of the text, however, not only is there similarity but each type is said to be made by the Olympian gods "out of" (ἐξ) the animal to which it belongs. With the archaic Greeks, substances and objects are determined by inherent qualities much more than by size and quantity or by shape and arrangement of the parts within the whole. This particular view is largely responsible for the archaic theories concerning the elements composing the universe.⁴⁶ As to the types of women, the principle led to the idea that their characters are due to the qualities of the substance which was used in making them. In seven plus one types, as we have seen, a certain animal substance is said to be the cause of the resulting character, and these eight make a natural and homogeneous

⁴⁶ The theory of Anaximenes is a notable exception in that it makes all the main qualities only a function of one quality (density) and that this one quality is assumed not as being simply present or absent, pure or adulterated, but as existing in various degrees. Density has no specific substratum but is a factor in any substance. All this is strikingly unarchaic.

series. But in the middle of this series Semonides has inserted a pair of entirely different substances. Two bad women are "molded out of earth" and "made out of sea" respectively, and their characters bear the marks of the qualities inherent to earth and sea:

- Semonides, 7, 21 Τὴν δὲ πλάσαντες γήινην Ὀλύμπιοι
 ἔδωκαν ἀνδρί, πηρόν· οὔτε γὰρ κακόν
 οὔτ' ἐσθλὸν οὐδὲν οἶδε τοιαύτη γυνή,
 ἔργων δὲ μῶνον ἐσθίειν ἐπίσταται.
 25 Κούδ' ἦν κακὸν χεიმῶνα ποιήσῃ θεός,
 ῥιγῶσα δίφρον ἄσπον ἔλκεται πυρός.
 Τὴν δ' ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἥ δὲ ἐν φρεσὶν νοεῖ.
 Τὴν μὲν γελᾷ τε καὶ γέγηθεν ἡμέρην·
 ἐπαινέσει μιν ξείνος ἐν δόμοισ' ἰδὼν·
 30 "Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε λωίων γυνή
 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων,"
 τὴν δ' οὐκ ἀνεκτὸς οὐδ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδεῖν
 οὔτ' ἄσπον ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαίνεται τότε
 ἄπλητον ὥσπερ ἀμφὶ τέκνοισιν κυών,
 35 ἀμείλιχος δὲ πᾶσι κάποθυμή
 ἐχθροῖσιν ἴσα καὶ φίλοισι γίγνεται·
 ὥσπερ θάλασσα πολλάκις μὲν ἀτρεμῆς
 ἔστηκ' ἀπήμων, χάρμα ναύτησιν μέγα,
 θερέος ἐν ὥρῃ, πολλάκις δὲ μαίνεται
 40 βαρυκτύποισι κύμασιν φορευμένη·
 ταύτη μάλιστ' ἔοικε τοιαύτη γυνή
 ὀργήν, φνὴν δὲ † πόντος ἀλλοίην ἔχει.

It is obvious that here a cosmological system is reflected according to which two basic substances, or qualities, make up the whole of the universe. Earth is the negative, passive, and more material element and is primarily characterized by its lethargic inertia. The only activity which the corresponding woman possesses, her only "ability" (ἐπίσταται), is consumption of food-matter. The lack of energy gives rise to the comparison with a cripple (πηρός), a person who is by himself helpless and will get nowhere by his own effort. The positive element, sea, on the other hand, is distinguished by an excess of wilful spontaneity. It is spirited to the extreme, sometimes raging in dreadful fury and sometimes "laughing" ⁴⁷ in peaceful and happy mood. Thus earth and sea, as together they make the bulk of the world in

⁴⁷ The Greeks speak of the "laughter" of the sea when it is sparkling as in quiet and friendly happiness (Aesch., *Prom.*, 90, etc.).

which we live, also provide together the main qualities which it takes to equip the world with whatever else it contains: the solidity and inertia of matter on the one hand and, on the other hand, the activity of motion and force together with the spontaneity of will and spirit. Everything can be broadly explained through the presence, the interaction, and the antagonism of the contrasting primary qualities. Sea, of course, as the active power, has the leading role and its partner is subjected and in some way subordinated to it. Thus even in this dual system it could be said that the primary agent or cause of everything is one, viz., sea or "water."

After the time of Thales and the unknown authority behind Semonides (he may be identical with Thales), the sea preserved its key position in the system of Anaximander (*Vors.*, 12, A 27 and 30), fundamentally different though his views otherwise were, and to some degree also in what Xenophanes taught.⁴⁸ Sea held the central position among the three elements for Heraclitus likewise, and Clement says that sea, in his doctrine, is "the germ of creation" (31 testim.). This word may or may not correctly describe what Heraclitus meant but certainly it is sea from which both ways are open, the way upward through the rising fiery whirlwind to fire, and downward to earth:

- 31 Πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα· θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἤμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἤμισυ πρηστήρ —. Θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.

The second part seems to be incomplete and therefore somewhat obscure, but it can hardly be doubted that λόγος is used in a sense which at least comes very near to "correspondence" or "proportion,"⁴⁹ and that the proportion, whatever the ratio may be, is meant to prevail in all the four upward and downward conversions: Fire/sea = sea/earth. There is no lack of further corroboration for the equation. The middle term always combines opposite qualities, as we have seen in numerous instances, since its relations to the things above are the opposite of those to the things below it. This is precisely stated for the sea:

⁴⁸ Cf. *Vors.*, 21, Xenophanes, A 33, 5-6; Gigon, p. 66.

⁴⁹ The idea of a ratio and fixed proportion in the relationships among the elements is likewise borne out by frag. 90.

- 61 Θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μιαιώτατον, ἰχθύσι μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον.

Sea is purest water and foulest, to fish drinkable and life-giving, to men undrinkable and destructive.

In the sea all pollution collects, and yet its waters are used for ritual purification; ⁵⁰ it is pure when compared to dirt, but foul when compared to purity. The sea is life for base animals with much earth in their constitution, ⁵¹ but it is death for higher life endowed with a soul of fire. ⁵²

Life and the soul of man is, in the view of Heraclitus, a process sustained by continuous conversion of "water" into its opposite, "fire," i. e. through evaporation. Evaporation supplies the air for respiration and thus supports consciousness and reasoning; evaporation likewise brings about the assimilation of food (A 15; A 16, 130). ⁵³ The opposite transformation, precipitation, is death for souls:

- 36 Ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι· ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

It is death for souls to be turned into water, and for water

⁵⁰ For particulars cf. *Philologus*, LXXXVII (1932), p. 475.

⁵¹ For the idea of prevalence of earth in base animals cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 92 a-b and Taylor's note on 92a, 4.

⁵² Perhaps Heraclitus has also spoken of the sea as being mastered and dominated by the "fire" of storms, but overpowering and destroying in its turn the solid matter of ships (frag. 53 likewise implies the progression, Master / servant / servant's slave, *supra*, p. 326). This idea is indicated, though not very clearly, in Nicander, *Alexiph.*, 172-6. The passage from Nicander has been inserted by Diels among the fragments of Heraclitus (A 14a) because Nicander uses the Heraclitean expression πῦρ δαίζων (= frag. 30) and because the scholion on Nicander twice refers to Heraclitus. The first reference in the scholion should be emended to this effect: ὅτι δὲ δουλεύει ἡ θάλασσα ἀνέμοις κατὰ τὸ πῦρ τοῦ θεοῦ (176), κατὰ θεῖον νόμον δηλονότι, τοῦτο [[δὲ]] καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Μενεκράτης (which?) εἶρηκεν.

⁵³ In the early theories respiration and digestion are closely connected and in fact identical. The action of "fire" (heat) which disintegrates and concocts the food to prepare it for assimilation is thought to be both dependent on and responsible for respiration by Plato in *Timaeus*, 78e and 80d. The lungs, named πλεῦμονες for their function in respiration, are likewise supposed to be the recipient of drink (Alcaeus, frag. 94 Diehl; Plato, *Tim.*, 70c and 91a).

to be turned into earth. But out of earth water is born, out of water soul.

The two downward conversions are equivalent to a twofold death, and the two upward transformations to a double birth, with water (it is not "sea" this time) in the central position, where the ways of birth and death meet.

We are now in a position to reach a conclusion. The old conception of sea and earth as contrasting elements or bodies ⁵⁴ possessing opposite qualities still prevails in the system of Heraclitus, with a similar relationship between the partners. But then Heraclitus follows Anaximenes in increasing the number of the elements and in assuming that they are convertible into one another. Unlike Anaximenes, however, he considers the changes from one condition to the next not as slight and gradual transitions but as violent and dramatic transformations from opposite to opposite, and he restricts the number of elements to three. By this means they are made to coincide with the three states of matter (the solid, liquid, and gaseous), and at the same time to comply with the pattern of the geometrical mean. The contrast between dead inertia and vivid power exists twice in this configuration, with sea or water in the central position. This thesis explains the kosmos and the meteorological phenomena but it holds good equally in everyday experience. Fire and heat, the substance of life, makes dead matter in the rigid state gain life and motion and melt; and again it makes half-dead matter in the heavy state of liquidity gain real life and energy, lose its weight,

⁵⁴ Our little survey has shown that the theory primarily referred less to the substances water and earth than to the objects sea and land, the components of the world in which we live. To the prehistory of the conception belong the Homeric similes symbolizing powerful motion by the waves of the sea and stubborn resistance by the stable cliff upon which the waves break. In some of the similes storm takes the place of roaring sea, or storm is associated with waves to symbolize the will of the leaders who stir the crowd (sea) and push it into motion. Solon (frag. 11 Diehl, cf. Jaeger, *Berliner Sitzungsberichte*, 1926, p. 81) uses the simile of sea and wind in order to state that not the crowd (= sea) but the leaders (= storms) are responsible for political unrest. This clever remark in some way precludes the development from Thales (sea or water as motive power) to Anaximenes (air as motive power). As a rule, the discoveries and theorems of Greek philosophy are preceded by anticipation on the moral field.

break its bonds, freely evaporate upward and become during the transition, *in statu nascendi*, conscious breath and living soul. Deprivation of fire and life, making things travel downward on one and the same path, has the opposite result.⁵⁵

As soon as Empedocles had firmly established his four element theory, the scheme of the geometrical mean was seemingly ruled out for ever from that province. But just at this late stage of the development it happened for the first time that the scheme was explicitly, as such, applied to the elements of nature. Plato in the *Timaeus* (31b ff.) deduces the Empedoclean system by starting from the extreme elements fire and earth, and then pointing out that an intermediate is necessary to bind the conflicting bodies to one another. He goes on to say that the binding element, in order to serve its purpose of mediation and harmonization, must be determined by the principle of the geometrical mean, for only through a geometrical progression can a complete cycle of mutual relations be brought about. But, as elements are tridimensional bodies, he infers that not one but two geometrical means have to be inserted between fire and earth. The final result is a sequence of four elements, determined by the double equation $\text{Fire/air} = \text{air/water} = \text{water/earth}$. It has been assumed that either Plato himself, or possibly Philolaus, introduced into cosmology the "Pythagorean" idea of the geometrical progression.⁵⁶ We now learn that Heraclitus had done it long before, except for the mathematical strictness of expression. The difference in the number of elements is really negligible. For every reader of the *Timaeus* will feel that the duplication of the geometrical mean comes as somewhat surprising and unconvincing.⁵⁷ The line of thought leads rather

⁵⁵ This, however, is perhaps not the whole story. If we can trust our indirect evidence (A 1, 9-11), Heraclitus, in order to account for the phenomena of day and night and of the weather, introduced two kinds of evaporation, a bright and a dark one. This would involve a concession in the line of Anaximenes and not be consistent with the main thesis. But Cherniss (*A. J. P.*, LVI, p. 415) is inclined to disbelieve the accounts of a double evaporation, and they are indeed open to several grave objections.

⁵⁶ Cf. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 98.

⁵⁷ Plato's argument that there is one geometrical mean for planes but two for tridimensional bodies seems to be based on the theorems Eucl., *Elem.*, viii, 11 and 12 (cf. Eva Sachs, *Philol. Unters.*, 24, Berlin

to three, instead of four, elements, mutually related according to the simple pattern of the geometrical mean. This is exactly what Heraclitus taught. With an unimportant modification, Plato finally formulated with technical precision a basic principle of Heraclitean thought.

The strong consistency in the grandiose system of Heraclitus imposes on the interpreter the duty of seeking the connections between the parts of the doctrine, connections which in the original were either expressed or tacitly implied. On the other hand, there is much to mislead our efforts. The power of Heraclitus' thought and style is so overwhelming that it is apt to carry away the imagination of his readers (of those at least who do respond) beyond the limits of sober interpretation. Neither the ancient philosophers and physicians nor modern scholars have escaped the danger of allowing their fancy to run riot and heraclitizing on their own account. The Stoics especially blended with their own ideas the inspirations for which they were indebted to the obscure philosopher. We have to use all the material and yet be utterly suspicious of the views under which it is presented. Almost every single statement in the indirect tradition, if it can be compared with the original saying to which it refers, affords a striking proof of limited ability, not to speak of limited will, to assimilate archaic thought and reproduce it correctly. It is fortunate that we are able to settle some of the problems by tracing back a certain pattern of Heraclitus' original thought.

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[Weidmann], 1917, p. 126, note 1; substantially the same explanation is given by Taylor, p. 96, but a different one by von Fritz, *R. E.*, XVII, 2268, s. v. Oinopides).

Index to passages cited: Anaximenes: 330; n. 46. Empedocles: n. 35. Heraclitus, A 1, 3/4: 309; 325. A 1, 9-11: n. 55. A 14a: n. 52. A 15/16: 334. A 19: 328 f. A 130: 334. B 1: 316-8. 3: 327 f. 4: 322. 5: 323. 6: 327. 9: 322. 13: 322. 16: n. 39. 18: 313; 319. 29: 322. 31: 333. 34: 316. 36: 334. 37: 323. 44: 321. 45: 327 f. 52: 320. 53: 326; n. 52. 71: n. 18. 79: 314; 316 f. 82/83: 315. 90: 329. 94: 328. 96: n. 36. 99: 326-8. 107: 312; 317; n. 40. 114: 320. 115: n. 34 f. 328. 117 and 118: n. 18. 124: 319. Orphics: nn. 6; 32. Parmenides: 330. Pindar: nn. 18; 24; 38. Plato, *Rep.* ii 363d: n. 6; vii 517c: n. 24; 533d: 311 f.; *Tim.* 31b ff.: 336. Sch. Nic. *Alex.* 172: n. 52. Semonides: 331. Solon 11: n. 54. Tauler: n. 35. Thales: 331; 333.

A CHRONOLOGICAL PROBLEM: THE DATE OF THE DEATH OF CARUS.

In view of the fact that the available historical evidence for the years 282-283 A. D. is not extensive, the determination of the chronology for the reign of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Carus presents many problems. One of the most difficult of these problems is concerned with the date of Carus' death, an event which took place some time in the latter part of the year 283. Vogt¹ and Domaszewski,² basing their chronological calculations upon the evidence of the Alexandrian coinage and the material contained in the so-called "Chronograph of 354," reached the conclusion that Carus met his death before August 29 of that year. Their arguments may be summarized as follows:

(1) To all appearances, the Alexandrian coinage of Carus does not go beyond the year A, the first year. At any rate, no coins of the year B are known. Vogt therefore assumes that Carus reigned sometime between August 28, 282 and August 29, 283.³ The first year (A) of Carinus and Numerian, the sons of Carus who were associated in the imperial government with their father, corresponds to the first year of Carus, although at the beginning of his reign Carus gave them only the rank of Caesars. During the course of the year A Carinus was made an Augustus, while Numerian was not accorded this title until some time in the year B, the second year.⁴ Coins of Carinus and also of Numerian for the year 3 are known, indicating that the brothers continued to rule after August 28, 284.

(2) Substantiating evidence for the theory that Carus ruled only one year may be found in the "Chronograph of 354" which records the length of his reign as ten months and five days. Therefore, as far as Carus is concerned, the coin dates and the "Chronograph" are in agreement.

¹ J. Vogt, *Die alexandrinischen Münzen*, Stuttgart, 1924, p. 166.

² A. von Domaszewski, "Die Daten der Scriptores Historiae Augustae," *Sitz. Heid. Akad.*, VIII (1917), pp. 34-35.

³ Vogt, *op. cit.*, p. 166. The Alexandrian regnal year ended August 28 and began August 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

(3) Basing his conclusions on the foregoing evidence Domaszewski calculated the approximate dates for the reign of Carus as September 7, 282 to July 11, 283.⁵ Historians generally agree in placing the death of Numerian in the autumn of 284 and that of Carinus in the spring of 285.

Nevertheless, in spite of the apparently indisputable testimony of the Alexandrian coinage and the "Chronograph of 354" regarding the brevity of Carus' reign, there is much to be said for the theory of the older historians headed by Schiller⁶ who thought that Carus did not die until December, 283.⁷ Moreover, a study of the epigraphic sources, hitherto disregarded, lends strong support to this earlier opinion. The following table of the dates at which Carus presumably received consular and tribunician honors will serve to demonstrate this point:

Sept. 282 ⁸ —Jan. 283	tr. p. I cos. I— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 1117, 4760; VIII, 968; <i>E. E.</i> VIII, 740; <i>A. E.</i> (1923) 16, 103. ⁹
Jan. 283—Sept. 283	tr. p. I cos. II— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 3660, 4102; <i>E. E.</i> VIII, 227.
Sept. 283—Dec. (?) 283	tr. p. II cos. II— <i>C. I. L.</i> VIII, 5332, 10250, 12522.

Mattingly has already put forth arguments to show that in the third century the tribunician power was renewed on the anniversary of the date on which each emperor first received it rather than on December 10 as Mommsen supposed.¹⁰ The inscriptions noted in the table above can be interpreted only as additional proof for Mattingly's theory. Lest it be urged that this is the merest coincidence, it is only necessary to point to the coins and

⁵ Domaszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁶ H. Schiller, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Gotha, 1883, I, p. 884.

⁷ They based their theory upon a rescript of Carus (*Cod. Greg.*, II, 2, 2) dated in that month and year.

⁸ It is possible that Carus did not actually become emperor until October (Domaszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 34).

⁹ *A. E.*: "Année épigraphique" in *Revue Archéologique*.

¹⁰ H. Mattingly, "Notes on the Chronology of the Roman Emperors from Valerian to Diocletian," *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, XIII (1927), p. 14; "Tribunicia Potestate," *Jour. Rom. Studies*, XX (1930), pp. 78-91; Mommsen, *Röm. Staat.*, II, p. 796.

inscriptions of the preceding emperor Probus which tell the same story, demonstrating beyond any question that Probus, who first received the tribunician power in July 276,¹¹ annually renewed this power in the month of July and not in December.¹²

If Carus' second grant of the tribunician power *had* been conferred in December 282, it would have been impossible for an inscription to record TR. P. I COS. II (as we find it in *C. I. L.* II, 3660, 4102; *E. E.* VIII, 227) since he would have to have been TR. P. II before becoming COS. II. Moreover, if this had been the case, we should expect to find him as TR. P. II COS. I for the period December 10, 282–January 1, 283. No inscriptions of the TR. P. II COS. I type are known, however, and since all the evidence points in the opposite direction, it may be concluded that Carus was not made TR. P. II until September 283, the anniversary of his accession. At that date, therefore, Carus must have been still alive.

Although there is apparently no way to put aside the evidence of the Alexandrian coinage except to produce strong arguments

¹¹ H. F. Stobbe, "Tribunat der Kaiser," *Philologus*, XXXII (1873), p. 78.

¹² Probus was consul in 277, 278, 279, 281, 282 (Pauly-Wissowa, II, p. 2519), and we may correlate his consulships and grants of the tribunician power as follows:

July 276–Jan. 277	tr. p. I	— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 4881
Jan. 277–July	I cos. I	—II, 1116; XI, 1178
July–Jan. 278	II	I —III, 8707
Jan. 278–July	II	II
July–Jan. 279	III	II —XII, 5437, 5511; <i>E. E.</i> VII, 693.
Jan. 279–July	III	III
July–Jan. 280	IV	III
Jan. 280–July	IV	III
July–Jan. 281	V	III— <i>C. I. L.</i> II, 3738
Jan. 281–July	V	IV
July–Jan. 282	VI	IV—II, 1673
Jan. 282–July	VI	V —Cohen, 460 (Vol. VI, Probus)
July–Oct. (?)	VII	V

If a similar table is worked out on the supposition that the tribunician power was renewed on Dec. 10, it will be found that the inscriptions *C. I. L.* II, 1116 and XI, 1178 cannot be used since there will be no place for tr. p. I cos. I. More important, however, is the fact that the coin Cohen 460 (tr. p. VI cos. V) will not fit into such a system. Therefore the solution offered in the above table is the most satisfactory.

for disregarding it,¹³ the "Chronograph of 354" presents no such obstacle. It is a well-known fact that the "Chronograph" is seldom accurate. The length of the reign of Carinus and Numerian as given in the "Chronograph" is 2 years, 11 months and 2 days. This estimate is too long by at least five months. According to the same chronicle Diocletian and Maximian ruled 21 years, 11 months and 12 days. Actually they reigned less than 21 years. It is not advisable, therefore, to use the "Chronograph" for important chronological details.

The theory that Carus died in July 283 cannot be reconciled with the evidence of the literary sources. The ancient historians of the fourth century A. D. agree that Carus was killed by a bolt of lightning during a severe thunderstorm after his victorious army had penetrated Persian territory as far as Ctesiphon.¹⁴ This story in itself gives us the date for the event. Thunderstorms occur in Mesopotamia frequently during the winter months (November-March) and *never* in July.¹⁵ Furthermore, Diocletian, who was with Carus at this time, was, in later life, notoriously afraid of thunderstorms, and it is quite likely that having witnessed Carus' accident he feared that a similar fate might overtake him.¹⁶

Another bit of epigraphical evidence which strengthens the supposition that Carus was still alive in the autumn of 283 is to be found in *C. I. L. VIII*, 10283 in which Numerian as Caesar

¹³ Mattingly, *Jour. Eg. Arch.*, XIII (1927), p. 16 implies that coins of the year B of Carus *have* been found, but this must be a misstatement. One particular point in connection with the Alexandrian coinage should be noted, however. Numerian does not become an Augustus until some time in his *second year*. If Carus had died in July, as Domaszewski supposed, it is difficult to see why Numerian did not appear as Augustus on the coins late in the first year or from the very outset of the second year. As long as Numerian remains a Caesar, we should expect to find coins of his father Carus as Augustus since Numerian probably was proclaimed his successor by the Persian expeditionary force.

¹⁴ Eutropius, IX, 18; Victor, *De Caesaribus*, 38, 3; Festus, XXIV; and others. Lightning struck Carus' tent, and he perished in the flames.

¹⁵ Professor A. E. R. Boak of the University of Michigan has been so kind as to forward to me the opinions of Professor LeRoy Waterman and Professor Clark Hopkins, both well acquainted with the climate of Mesopotamia, who are agreed that a July thunderstorm would be out of the question entirely.

¹⁶ Constantine the Great, *Oratio ad Sanctorum Coetum*, Chap. 25.

is mentioned as *consul designatus*. We know that Numerian was consul for the first time in 284.¹⁷ The *consules designati* were usually announced in the latter part of the year;¹⁸ and therefore the inscription can be dated in the autumn of 283. If Numerian was still Caesar at that time, his father cannot have been dead.

The conclusion that Carus reigned until nearly the end of 283 is amply justified by the arguments advanced above. The last rescript of his reign is dated in December of that year,¹⁹ and it seems probable that his death occurred in that month.

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¹⁷ Pauly-Wissowa, II, p. 2513.

¹⁸ Mommsen, *op. cit.*, I, p. 558.

¹⁹ *Cod. Greg.*, II, 2, 2.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF THE SARAPION MONUMENT.

The many fragments which belong to the Sarapion monument were assembled and published by Oliver in *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 91-122. This triangular monument, inscribed on all sides, contains a paean of Sarapion, a catalogue of *παλαιστοί*, and the paean of Sophocles. To these fragments of Oliver may now be added another fragment, previously published in the *Corpus* but not identified as a part of this inscription, which necessitates a new interpretation and date for one side of the monument.

The first publication of this fragment was made by Pittakys (*Eph.*, 943) who stated that it was of Pentelic marble and that *εὑρέθη τὸ 1839 εἰς τὰς πρὸς τὸ δυτικὸν τοῦ Ἑρεχθείου ἀρχαιολογικὰς τοῦ [sic]*¹ *ἐρείνας*. Later, Rangabé (*Ant. Hell.*, II [1855], 673) published it with no additions to the transcription of Pittakys. Finally, Dittenberger (*I. G.*, III, 3839), listing it among *fragmenta incerta*, reproduced it from a copy made by Koehler. It now bears the Epigraphical Museum number 8321.

This fragment may be identified with certainty, and it contains part of the top four lines from the right side of the monument. At the top of the fragment are to be found continuations of the two incised lines which may be seen in the photograph given by Oliver (*op. cit.*, p. 104). The lower of these was incised 0.015 m. above the words *ἀγαθῇ* of Oliver's group and *τύχῃ* of the new fragment; the distance between the two incised lines is 0.035 m. The new fragment is to be placed between the two pieces E. M. 9646 and E. M. 8517, shown in Oliver's diagram on page 105.

The following text for the first four lines of the right side is now proposed:

Ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ
Ἐπὶ ἀρχοντος Μου[νατί]ου Θεμισωνο[ς] $\frac{4}{5}$ -]ιέως
ιέρε[ως] δ[ιὰ] βίου Φλ[αονίου] Ὀ]νησικράτου[ς] $\frac{5}{6}$ -]αιέως
ζακ[ορεύοντος] Εὐκαρπίδου] τοῦ Ἐκπά[γλου] Βερεν[εκίδου]

Oliver had followed Graindor in restoring in line 2 of this

¹ τοῦ should apparently be deleted in accord with innumerable examples of this same sentence in Pittakys' writings. Otherwise, the reading might be emended to -ικὰς μου ἐ.

right side the name of the archon Μουνάτιος Οδοπίσκος Ἀζηγιεύς, who held office about 174/5 A. D.² Since the front of the monument, containing the paeon of Sarapion, furnished the information that Quintus Statius Glaucus, priest of Asclepius, had erected the monument in honor of his grandfather Sarapion, the year of the ἐφηβεία of the grandson (ca. 218/9 A. D.) dated both his appointment as priest and the *terminus post quem* for the erection of the monument sometime after 220 A. D.³ In line 7 of the front of the monument Oliver restored the name of the archon in whose year the monument was erected as Λε[ύκιος Διονυσόδ]ωρος.

In regard to the interpretation of the right side, whereupon is engraved a catalogue of παιανισταί, Oliver explained that the archonship of Munatius Vopiscus (ca. 174/5 A. D.) recorded the year of the original occasion on which the paeon of Sarapion was chanted, and connected this occasion with a religious ceremony during the plague of Antoninus.⁴ Approximately fifty years afterwards the grandson erected the monument to Sarapion and included the catalogue of the chorus.⁵ A priori, one might question that a list of all the members of a chorus should have been retained for fifty years; and, with the new readings, the occasion for the singing of the paeon must in fact be moved down to the later date. The archon was not Munatius Vopiscus, but Munatius Themison, and the latter may now be recognized as an immediate predecessor of Λε[ύκιος Διονυσόδ]ωρος. The identification of the zakoros in line 4 as Εὐκαρπίδης Ἐκπάγλου Βερενικίδης who was kosmetes about 218/9 A. D. is very nearly certain.⁶ The priest Flavius Onesicrates appears as ἱερεὺς διὰ βίου in *I. G.*, II², 4532.⁷ This latter inscription records the votive-offering made by Claudia Agrippina, the wife of the dedicator of the Sarapion monument. And although this relationship of wife and husband is not mentioned on the votive tablet, the dedicatrix was of sufficient maturity to set up the tablet on her own volition with no mention of her parents. The votive-offering, then, can scarcely be dated before the close

² Graindor, *Chronologie des archontes athéniens sous l'Empire*, pp. 178-79.

³ *I. G.*, II², 2226 and 3704.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 and 121.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁶ *I. G.*, II², 2224.

⁷ See also *I. G.*, II², 3685.

of the second decade of the third century, and Onesicrates' priesthood must be placed in approximately this same period.

The restoration of the name of the archon as Munatius Vopiscus caused Oliver to identify Δικίνιος Φίρμος of line 3 of fragment *h* as Φίρμος Ὁ Γαργήτιος, who had been ephebe in 163/4 A. D. (*I. G.*, II², 2086, line 50), and Δικίν. Φ[ίρμος] of line 5 of fragment *h* as Φίρμος Ὁ Γαργ., who had been ὑποσωφρονιστής in 154/5 A. D. (*I. G.*, II², 2067, line 111). However, the name Φίρμος occurs too frequently to permit this identification on the basis of the similarity of one element of the name, and with the new date both identifications must be rejected. Among many occurrences of the name may be mentioned Λι. Φίρμος, who was ephebe at the end of the second century (*I. G.*, II², 2120, line 1), and Λικ. Φίρμος, who also was ephebe about the same time (*I. G.*, II², 2136, line 3).

Inasmuch as the chanting of the paean must be dated after 220 A. D., one piece of evidence must be rejected which Oliver used to strengthen his identification of the Sophoclean paean engraved on the left side of the monument as a hymn to Coronis, and not the famous παιὰν εἰς Ἀσκληπιόν. Oliver suggested that this hymn was extracted from a partial oblivion about 175 A. D. with the result that Tertullian (*ad Nationes*, 2, 14), writing about 197 A. D., could conclude from the fame and solemnity of this great occasion that more honor was paid to Coronis at Athens than even to Theseus.⁸ The passage in Tertullian may no longer be connected with this occasion for the singing of the Sophoclean paean.⁹

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⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 114 and 121.

⁹ After this paper was in galley-proof, I received K. Keyssner's "Zu inschriftlichen Asklepios hymnen," *Philologus*, XCII (1938), pp. 269-284. Keyssner did not examine Oliver's work in detail, but he identifies our Sophoclean paean as the hymn to Asclepius (pp. 277-278) and rejects Oliver's conclusions concerning the anonymous paean of Erythrae (p. 284).

The text of numerous curse tablets is written in *Spiegelschrift*, for the most part in such manner that it is only necessary to read the lines from right to left in succession either downward or upward. Another mode of composition, and one not so obvious, permits the normal practice of reading the lines from left to right, but reverses the spelling of the individual words or phrases. This method, which is rarely used, is illustrated by a lead tablet inscribed in Latin in the latter years of the second or the early years of the third century. It was discovered at Bath in 1880 and edited originally by Charles E. Davis, who reconstructed the text on the basis that the lines were to be read from right to left. When it did not emerge as a *defixio* in spite of the ancient preference for lead in the preparation of curse tablets, it was inevitable that further attempts should be made to bring it within that category. Later editors discovered that a perfectly good *defixio* resulted if instead of reading the lines from right to left, one applied this principle only to the successive words and phrases.¹

Although Wuensch republished the text of the Bath tablet in the introduction to his edition of Attic *defixiones*,² he failed to see that the same method could be applied with considerable advantage to a lead tablet of the fourth century B. C. from Attica.³ From the carefully drawn facsimile which Wuensch gives, I have derived the following diplomatic transcript.

A.

NOTAPAYEΩΔATAKNAT
 TΩΛΓIAKNHXΨNHTIAKOTAPA
 YEΣOTIAKOT[.]PAYETEMΣOKIAN
 ΣNAIOΣOIAKISΩTTAPIINΣOTAPAY
 5 ETEM : NOTYA[.]AKNATTΩΛΓOTIAIΩΔA
 TAKNHXYΨNHTIAKOTΩIAINETONISEΛETIA
 KIOKIANYΣIOΣOIAK

¹ Both versions as well as a bibliography and a brief history of the decipherment of the text can be found in Auguste Audollent, *Defixionum Tabellae quotquot innotuerunt tam in graecis Orientis quam in totius Occidentis partibus praeter atticas in Corpore Inscriptionum Atticarum editas* (Paris, 1904), No. 104.

² Richard Wuensch, *Defixionum Tabellae Atticae* (= *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*, Appendix, Berlin, 1897), p. xxv.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 66.

B.

ΙΣΕΝΩΤΥΟΤΑΤΕΙΤΝΑΝΕΣΙΤΕΙΑΚ

ΙΟΜΕΙΕΙΤΤΑΡΠΣΟΛΛΑ

In order to obtain sense from this text, Wuensch adopted a striking and ingenious arrangement. He read the first fourteen letters of line 1 from right to left, then read upward in the same way beginning with the end of line 7 and proceeding to NAT in line 1. With line 8 he made a new start and read first line 8, then line 9 from right to left. The result is an intelligible, but confused text, with an awkward and improbable syntax:⁴

A.

Καταδῶ Εὐάρατον·

καὶ ὅσοι σύνδικοι κ-

αὶ Τελεσίνο<ν> τὲν Ἰδιώτο(ν) καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατ-
αδῶ Ἰδι<ώ>το(ν), γλῶτταν κα[ὶ] αὐτόν: μετ' Ε-

- 5 ὑάράτο(ν) σ<ν>νπράττωσι καὶ ὅσοι ἂν σ-
<ύ>νδικος μετ' Εὐαρ[ά]το(ν) καὶ το(ὺ)ς Εὐ-
αράτο(ν) καὶ τὴν ψ<ν>χὴν καὶ γλῶτ-
ταν.

B.

καὶ ε(ῖ)τις ἐναντί<α> ε(ῖ) τὰ τούτων ἐς<τ>ί

- 10 ἄλλος πράττ{ι}ει ἐμοί.

Wuensch was by no means blind to the syntactical and stylistic difficulties inherent in his arrangement and proposed in his notes possible emendations of ll. 5-6 and 9-10. On the assumption that our *magus* reversed only words and phrases instead of whole lines, the following text, correct in grammar and simple in style, is obtained with no change in the order of the lines as given on the tablet.

⁴ I have modified Wuensch's text to the extent of making it conform to the recommendations of the *Union Académique Internationale. Emploi des signes critiques. Disposition de l'apparat dans les éditions savantes de textes grecs et latins. Conseils et recommandations*, Paris, 1932. I have nevertheless retained his use of ο(ν) for ο = ov and of ε(ι) for ε = ei in order to avoid a textual apparatus.

A.

Εὐάρατον καταδῶ, καὶ γλῶτταν
καὶ τὴν ψ<υ>χὴν Εὐαράτο(υ),
καὶ το(ῦ)ς μετ' Εὐαρ[ά]το(υ) σ<υ>νδίκο(υ)ς,
καὶ ὅσοι ἀν σ<υ>νπράττωσι μετ' Εὐαράτο(υ),
5 κα[ι] αὐτόν: γλῶτταν Ἰδι<ώ>το(υ) καταδῶ
καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ Τελεσίνο<υ> τὸν Ἰδιώτο(υ)
καὶ ὅσοι σύνδικοί

B.

ε(ι)σι τούτων. τὰ ἐναντεί<α> ε(ι)τις καὶ
ἐ{ι}μοὶ πράττει ἄλλος.

6. τέν: for τόν. An alternative arrangement is τὴν χυχὴν τὸν (= τὴν) Ἰδιώτο(υ) καὶ Τελεσίνο(υ), and an argument in its favor is that no other accusative on the tablet has simple ο for ον whereas ο is regular for ον.
8. ἐναντεί<α>: for ἐναντία. No other reading is possible from the facsimile supplied by Wuensch, but cf. ε twice in line 9. ε(ι)τις: possibly, but not necessarily, an error for εἴτι.
9. ἐ{ι}μοί: ε for ε, as in line 8 ε for ε twice. Nevertheless, the influence of the adjacent ε cannot be completely discounted. Cf. note to line 8.

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PLUTARCHEUM.

Plutarchus quo loco egregia arte et ad excitandos legentium animos accommodata mortem Cleopatrae describit (*Vit. Anton.*, 86, 1) his utitur verbis, quae sic exhibeo ut in Ziegleri editione extant: λέγεται δὲ τὴν ἀσπίδα κομισθῆναι σὺν τοῖς σύκοις ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θρίοις ἄνωθεν ἐπικαλυφθεῖσαν· οὕτω γὰρ τὴν Κλεοπάτραν κελεῦσαι· μὴδ' αὐτῆς ἐπισταμένης τῷ σώματι προσπεσεῖν τὸ θηρίον.

Haec non prorsus sana esse non fugit homines doctos; velut Ziegler καὶ ante τοῖς θρίοις delere voluit, Madvig verba τῷ σώματι proscrispsit. Illa autem offensio, ut ipse coram mihi significavit Ziegler, distinctione mutata tollitur; verbis enim οὕτω . . . κελεῦσαι

parenthesin contineri et μηδέ illud non excusari nisi cum καὶ antecedente coniunctum. Rei grammaticae ita satisfactum est; sed restat aliud. Quid enim sibi vult ἐπισταμένης? Regina sane ipsa anguem adferri iussit atque etiam quomodo celanda sit praescripsit: id autem hic nihil ad rem, ac ne callidissimi quidem serpentis intererat comperire, utrum regina de omni re certior facta esset an non. Una igitur littera mutata scribendum est ἐφισταμένης: ne cum regina quidem accessit ad fiscellam anguis prosilit eiusque corpus adgreditur.

Fabulam potius quam historiam narrari—optime tamen narratur—Plutarchus ipse significat. Talia in mortibus singularibus describendis saepe fieri constat; in memoriam revoco quae in libro gratulatorio Felici Ramorino tradito de Claudii morte scripsi, nescio quo pacto haud recordatus, Rudolphum Herzog (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, 125, 235) eadem fere ante me dixisse.

W. KROLL.

HIPPARCHEUM.

In codice Pomponii Melae, qui unus extat, III, 70 haec traduntur: *Taprobane aut grandis admodum insula aut prima pars orbis alterius ipparchius dicitur; sed quia habitatur nec quisquam circum eam esse traditur, prope verum est.* Haec aliquam lucem accipiunt ex Plinii loco VI, 81: *Taprobanen alterum orbem terrarum esse diu existimatum est antichthonum appellatione; ut insulam liqueret esse, Alexandri Magni aetas resque praestitere.* Certe is, qui mundi formam ita adumbravit, ut posteri diu in eius verba iurarent, insulam esse Taprobanen docuit; qua de re in docto Herrmanni commentariolo (*R. E.*, IV A, 2263) plura legas licet. De antichthonibus post Eudoxum locuti sunt; cf. Kauffmann, *R. E.*, I, 2531; Gisinger, *ibid.*, XIX, 833.

Melae et Plinii locos si comparabis, cognosces illam de antichthonibus opinionem vetustiore fuisse et repudiatam esse, postquam Taprobanen circumnavigari posse compertum est (nam esse dudum in *isse* correctum est). Errant igitur qui Hipparcho hanc opinionem obtrudunt; id quod Bergero, qui olim confidentius iudicaverat, oboluit (*Gesch. d. wiss. Erdk.*, 462). Vel Albertus Rehm autem rem non improbabilem iudicaverat (*R. E.*, VIII, 1680). At patet locum illum Melae minime sanum ac

ne per compluria quidem saecula sanatum esse. Legebatur enim fere *prima pars orbis alterius Hipparcho dicitur*: ita v. g. Tzschucke, qui vol. II, 3, 251 se dubitare dicit et cum alia tum *ut Hipparchus dicit* reponi posse significat sermonis adsurditate recte perspecta. Illud *ut Hipparcho dicitur* nullo modo ferri potest; neque propter rem (nam Hipparchus de re post Alexandrum vel certe Eratosthenem certa dubitare non poterat) neque propter verba: dativus enim ille auctoris non ferendus est, quod sensit Barbarus (vel Vinetus), praepositionem *ab* addens, passivique usus excusationem non habet. Non sensit Wachsmuth loco se mederi arbitratus, cum *ut Hipparcho dicitur* scribebat, astronomo doctissimo eam opinionem inculcans, quam ille non reicere non potuit. Ceterum commemorare necesse est *sed* illud post *dicitur* a Perizonio et plerisque in *et* mutatum esse: nihil enim erat cui verba *sed quia . . . prope verum est* opponerentur.

Verum vidit R. Hansen (*Nov. ann.*, CXVII, 497), id quod nescio quo pacto fugit Frickium Melae editorem. Vel enim a ratione palaeographica veri dissimile est *ipparchius* in *Hipparcho* mutandum esse; nec minus ab re, cum Mela in tanta brevitate compendii sui auctores afferre non soleat neque cur hic potissimum id fecerit inveniri possit. Ille igitur ductus traditos fideliter interpretatus *id parcius* restituit; quod si examines, videbis id sententiae qualis re vera est (sc. cum *sed quia habitatur* sequitur) optime satisfacere. Id igitur dicit Mela Varronem ut opinor secutus: id quod pauciores adfirmant, Taprobanen initium antichthonis esse, ideo probabile est, quod habitatur i. e. sedes ἀντιχθόνων est (nec spondeo non immixtas esse opiniones quales Mela, I, 4, profert), et quod quemquam eam terram circumnavigasse non traditur. Offendas in forma orationis: *parcius* usurpatum esse videtur pro *rarius*, auctorque munditias sermonis captans his verbis dixit pauciores huic opinioni favere. Ac sane mirum est, Varronem ad recentiore aliquem se adplicasse, qui veram Eratosthenis sententiam impugnaverat. Neque id mirum in homine doctrina et industria magis quam iudicio excellenti.¹

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¹ Malavialle, *Rev. de philol.*, XXIV (1900) 29, eos nominat qui Hansenio adstipulati sunt, ex quibus commemoro Konr. Miller, *Mappae-mundi*, VI, 120.

REVIEWS.

R. E. WITT. *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism.*
Cambridge University Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 147.

This, the third volume to be published in the new *Cambridge Classical Studies*, is an examination of the epitome of Platonic philosophy which bears the title Ἀλκινόου διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων. The last two chapters of the book are devoted to an investigation of the identity of the author and to his place in the history of Platonism; the bulk of the work, the first seven chapters, is an analysis of the structure and philosophical content of the epitome with the main purpose of determining the sources of the interpretation of Plato which it presents.

A review of the evidence concerning the name Ἀλκίνοος leads to agreement with the conclusion of Freudenthal that both the *Didaskalikos* and the *Prologus* were written by a single author, Albinus; but Freudenthal's theory that our text is only a late and abbreviated edition of the original is rejected. In the last chapter the position of Albinus as a "typical middle Platonist" is more closely defined, and his theology and psychology are compared with those of Plotinus; Dr. Witt decides that Albinus was probably of little importance for Plotinus. The conclusion of the first part of the investigation is that the *Didaskalikos*, though mainly dependent upon the system of Antiochus of Ascalon, is directly derived from Arius Didymus, who in his account of Plato, while borrowing from Antiochus, introduced of his own accord elements from Aristotle and the Old Academy which Antiochus himself had not used. To reach this result Dr. Witt, after identifying the general Stoic and Peripatetic elements in the *Didaskalikos* and calling attention to the traces of Xenocratean doctrine to be found therein, sketches the characteristics and consequences of the eclecticism of Antiochus, establishes the sources from which his doctrines may be determined, and then proceeds to study systematically the doctrines in the *Didaskalikos* for agreement or incompatibility with those of Antiochus. Agreement in part with Antiochus, in part with Arius, and the presence of Posidonian elements as well as influences of the Old Academy, all this leads to the decision that the influence of both Antiochus and Posidonius is indirect; then, supposing that the author used a single doxographical source, Dr. Witt decides that this source was most probably Arius "whose account of Plato would naturally be coloured by the views not only of Antiochus but of Posidonius also." The intimate relationship of the *De Platone* of Apuleius, Hippolytus'

account of Plato (*Refut.*, I, 19), and the *Didaskalikos* is reasserted (after Howald and Sinko); but for the Arian work which is the source of all three Dr. Witt holds to the *Epitome*, rejecting—though not in very decisive terms—Howald's hypothetical Arian handbook "A."

That Albinus used the *Epitome* of Arius cannot, I think, be denied; and Dr. Witt presents cogent objections to the hypothesis that Antiochus is the direct source of the *Didaskalikos*. His own conclusion, however, requires the assumption that Albinus used a single doxographical source; and this leads him far beyond the point warranted by his evidence. Proposed as a *possibility* on p. 96 and taken for granted on p. 103, the hypothesis of a single source is presumably supported by the attempt in the intervening pages to show that the *Didaskalikos*, *De Platone*, and Hippolytus, *Refut.*, I, 19 are intimately related. Yet, in order to maintain that the *De Platone* and *Didaskalikos* have as their single source the *Epitome* of Arius, Dr. Witt has to suppose that Apuleius "took considerable liberties with his original"; but then why presume that Albinus may not have done the same? It is not plausible to suppose that the pupil of Gaius and the editor of his lectures could have followed the *Epitome* of Arius without allowing the influence of Gaius to manifest itself in his treatment of that source.

I do not wish, however, to argue the psychological improbabilities of the "Einquellenprinzip," to which Witt himself objects when Strache uses it (pp. 27, 95), but only to point out that the desire to establish Arius' *Epitome* as the source of the *Didaskalikos* has now and again led to errors in the interpretation of the *Didaskalikos* itself. In the attempt to reconcile the *De Platone* and the *Didaskalikos* Witt says, for example, that the identification of ἡ πλανωμένη τε καὶ ρευστὴ οὐσία with τὸ μὴ ὄν "is probably implied in chapter XXXV" of the latter work (p. 100, n. 2); but this chapter merely reproduces the doctrine of the *Sophist* concerning τὸ μὴ ὄν as "otherness" and contains no hint of such an identification.¹ It is the same thesis which induces him to cite the "hominem ab stirpe ipsa neque absolute malum nec bonum nasci" of Apuleius as a point of agreement with the οὐδὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἢ φαύλους of

¹ Witt cites *Didaskalikos*, p. 189, 18-20: ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . μετὰ συνεμφάσεως τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ ὄντι παρέπεται. Hermann reads: ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καθ' ὃ ἐξακούεται, οὐ ψιλὴ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ὄντος [cf. *Sophist* 257 B-C], ἀλλὰ μετὰ συνεμφάσεως τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον [cf. *Sophist* 258 A-B], ὅπερ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ὄντι παρέπεται [*Sophist* 259 B, 256 E-257 A and cf. p. 189, 20-22]. So with p. 189, 15-18 cf. *Sophist* 258 E 6 ff. and 238 C-239 A. With either reading the implication is not that ἡ ρευστὴ οὐσία is τὸ μὴ ὄν but, quite to the contrary, that even the idea of being itself has the attribute μὴ ὄν. Of the parallels cited above, Witt's *Loci Platonici* contain only 258 E which is equated with p. 189, 20.

Albinus (p. 101). The order in which Apuleius treats the five senses Witt admits is not that of the *Didaskalikos*, but he calls it significant that in the latter work the order "which is exactly the reverse of the Platonic is the arrangement recognized by Arius Didymus" (p. 102). This is an unfortunate statement, for in Arius, *Frag. Phys.*, 15 (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 456, 1) the order "sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch" refers to Aristotle, *not* to Plato. Furthermore, the reason for this order is not far to seek, since it is the order followed by Aristotle himself in the *De Anima* (418 A 26-424 A 15). Finally, lest the use of this Aristotelian order in the treatment of Plato be itself considered an indication that Arius is the source, let it be noted that Theophrastus himself followed this order in reporting Plato's theory of the senses (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 500, 7-18).²

The passage on the ideas in the *De Platone* (I, chap. 6) is, according to Witt, "like the opening of *Didaskalikos* XII certainly derived from Arius Didymus" (p. 99). Now the opening of *Didaskalikos* XII does appear to be an abridgment of the fragment of Arius preserved by Eusebius (cf. Diels, *Dox. Graec.*, p. 447); but, whereas elsewhere in the *Didaskalikos* (chaps. IX, X [p. 164, 26-27, 37], XIV [p. 169, 33-35]) the ideas are said to be the thoughts of God, this doctrine does not occur in the fragment of Arius or in the Albinus passage parallel to it. Witt says that "we may conjecture" that Arius placed the ideas in the mind of God, his argument being that *Didaskalikos* XII is similar to IX and that "it is natural to conclude that both chapters are derived from Arius, and that the omission in XII has no significance" (p. 75 and note 2). This is just to assume the thesis that has to be proved, namely that the *Didaskalikos* was derived from a single source. Moreover, if Albinus copied this doctrine from the *Epitome* which was also the source of the *De Platone*, why does Apuleius not describe the ideas as

² In *De Sensu* 439 A 7 Aristotle lists the sensibilia in this order and it probably became conventional after Theophrastus who uses it in his reports of Empedocles (*Dox. Graec.*, pp. 500, 19-502, 5), Cleidemus (*ibid.*, p. 510, 4-11), and Democritus (*ibid.*, pp. 513, 10-515, 22: sight, hearing, "the other senses"), though his order for Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes is different in each case (*ibid.*, pp. 506, 23 ff.; 507, 8 ff.; 510, 14 ff.). Epicurus (*Ad. Herod.*, §§ 46a-53) uses the order: sight, hearing, smell (the other two not being treated); Chrysippus (*St. Vet. Frag.*, II, p. 238, 36) listed the five senses in the Aristotelian order, preceded however by *φωνή* which he treated separately. It is not quite true to call this order "exactly the reverse of the Platonic" either, for, although in the *Timaeus* from 61 C to 68 D tactile qualities, flavors, odors, sounds, and colors are discussed in that order, Plato has already discussed sight and hearing in 45 B-47 D, so that one might treat the sections on sounds and colors as subsidiary and, following the *Timaeus* strictly, get for the Platonic order: sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell. The order of Apuleius (sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell) is very close to this.

thoughts of God?³ It can hardly be more likely that Apuleius systematically excised from Arius references to this doctrine than that its occurrence in Albinus is to be credited to a source other than that common to the *Didaskalikos* and the *De Platone*.

At the same time it would have been more helpful to analyze more fully the content of chap. IX than to insist that it is similar to XII "save that the idea is not once again defined as νόησις θεοῦ." For example, it would be of some importance to notice that the second sentence (p. 163, 12-16) is reproduced almost exactly by Chalcidius (*In Tim.*, § 339 [p. 363, 5-11]) just before he comments upon *Timaeus* 51 D-E, which is the source of the last argument in chap. IX (p. 164, 1-5, not noted in Witt's *Loci Platonici*). Witt is impressed by Theiler's comparison of Varro's identification of the ideas, "exemplum secundum quod fiat," and Minerva with the statement of Albinus: οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινός ἐστι γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τινος . . . καὶ πρὸς τι (p. 163, 35-37); he, as well as Theiler, takes this designation of the idea then to indicate the theory of "the thoughts of God" (p. 72). Even in Albinus, however, this passage (p. 163, 34-37; cf. p. 163, 16-18) is an argument for the existence of ideas which has no real connection with that particular interpretation of them. A comparison of Alexander, *Metaph.*, p. 88, 20 ff. shows that neither the designation of the idea as πρὸς ὃ nor the argument in full involves any such doctrine (καὶ ὁ τῶν τεταγμένων γινομένων αἰτίαν λέγων τὸ πρὸς ἐστὼς γίνεσθαι τι παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι [possibly from Aristotle's *De Ideis*; cf. Robin, *La Théorie Plat. des Idées*, note 19]). A similar criticism must be made of Witt's argument that Diogenes Laertius, III, 13 shows "that the view of the ideas as the thoughts of God was held by some members of the Academy contemporary with Alkimos." Witt contends (p. 71) that in

³ In *De Platone*, chap. XII there is the definition "providentiam esse divinam sententiam, conservatricem prosperitatis eius cuius causa tale suscepit officium; divinam legem esse fatum per quod inevitabiles cogitationes dei atque incepta complentur." "In this passage," Witt remarks, "πρόνοια is identifiable with God's νόηματα" (p. 100). If by this he means that the passage identifies πρόνοια and the ideas, he should have to admit that it is inconsistent with the fragment of Arius which distinguishes God's πρόνοια from the ideas (*Dox. Graec.*, p. 447 A 24-27, cf. *Didaskalikos*, p. 167, 9-11). Apuleius' definition of providentia no more implies that the ideas are thoughts of God, however, than does the διανοηθεὶς πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι . . . of *Didaskalikos*, chap. XII (p. 167, 21), which passage Witt himself in his final section (pp. 133 f.) marks as inconsistent with the theology of chap. X and the interpretation of God's relation to the world-soul (p. 164, 35-37; cf. p. 169, 31-35), where again the ideas appear as thoughts of God. Here, incidentally, the world-soul is represented as ἀποβλέπουσα πρὸς τὰ νόητα αὐτοῦ (scil. τοῦ θεοῦ) . . . ἐφιεμένη τῶν ἐκείνου νοημάτων (p. 169, 33-35) whereas in chap. XII πρὸς τινα ἰδέαν κόσμου ἀποβλέπωντος, παράδειγμα ὑπάρχουσιν is said of God himself (p. 167, 7).

calling the idea ἀϊδιόν τε καὶ νόημα Alcimus implied that God was the thinker; yet Alexander refers to a theory of the ideas as ἀΐδια and νοήματα according to which, his arguments show however, these "eternal thoughts" were *not* supposed to be thoughts of God (*Metaph.*, pp. 92, 18-28; 103, 1-4).⁴

Some discussion is wanted also of the interesting passage concerning the extent of the world of ideas and the disagreement among Platonists there indicated (p. 163, 22-27; n. b. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀρέσκει . . .); this passage is an important piece of evidence for the history of a controversy which touched the very foundation of Platonism and for which we have testimony reaching from Aristotle's *De Ideis* (cf. *Metaphysics* 990 B 10-17; Alexander, *Metaph.*, pp. 79-83) and the seventh Platonic epistle (342 D) to Proclus (e. g. *In Parm.*, V, p. 63 [Cousin]: οὔτε τῶν κακῶν ιδέας εἰσείσομεν ὥς τινες τῶν Πλατωνικῶν).

Such omissions are not to be expected in a book which the author claims to be "an exhaustive examination of the *Didaskalikos* itself" (pp. ix and 2); the truth is that the desire to establish Arius as Albinus' source often eclipses entirely the interest in the *Didaskalikos* itself. This is not to deny the importance of establishing the historical connections of such a work as the *Didaskalikos* nor to depreciate the value of Dr.

⁴ Since the description of the idea as νόημα is in the Alcimus passage followed by διὸ καὶ φησιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τὰς ιδέας ἐστάναι καθάπερ παραδείγματα and this is practically a verbal quotation of *Parmenides* 132 D (τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει) which follows immediately the refutation of the thesis that each idea is a νόημα ἐν ψυχαῖς, the Alcimus passage (if the text is right; cf. Breitenbach *et al.*, app. crit., *ad loc.*) may be simply a stupid misinterpretation of *Parmenides* 132 B-D. Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 A 27 (οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν), however, points to an interpretation of the ideas as "thoughts"—and *not* thoughts of God—at least as early as Aristotle, and the *Parmenides* passage itself is evidence for this (cf. Friedländer, *Die Platonischen Schriften*, pp. 466 f.). Those who discuss the origin of the "thoughts of God" theory seem to overlook this indication that it was preceded by a theory of ideas as "thoughts of men." The historical transition to "thoughts of God" is lacking, although Aristotelian influence in that direction is highly probable (cf. R. M. Jones, *Class. Phil.*, XXI, pp. 324-326; Witt, p. 73, against Theiler). For Witt's attempt (p. 71) to establish Xenocratean influence on the doctrine, however, I can find no evidence. He cites only *frag.* 60 in support of his statement that Xenocrates "regarded the Dyad or World Soul . . . as the Number in which the Ideas are contained" so that "since he called both Monad and Dyad Gods" he could be said in a sense to have held that the Ideas are contained in God. *Frag.* 60, which merely defines the soul as self-moving number, is apparently a mistake for *frag.* 15 where alone the world-soul is identified with the dyad, an identification itself open to grave doubt (cf. Jones, *Platonism of Plutarch*, pp. 97 ff.); but nowhere is this dyad said to "contain the ideas," and whether it were the determinate dyad, as Heinze contends, or the indeterminate it is hard to see how it could.

Witt's contribution to the study of the history of Platonism but only to suggest that neglect of significant parts of the text in question cannot help weakening the conclusions concerning those historical connections. Of the same order is the temptation to overlook significant differences in seeking similarities which will help to establish the source. Dr. Witt in refuting Strache and Theiler points out that for all the likenesses between Antiochus and the *Didaskalikos* there are important differences. Yet in his own positive argument he is not always guiltless of the same kind of error. His eagerness to find doctrines of the Old Academy, for example, makes him discover on p. 165, 32 the theory of indivisible lines (pp. 17, 77-78), although Albinus says merely *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐπίπεδον πρότερον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ πρότερον ἢ τὸ ἐπίπεδον*. This, given only as an example of the priority of a part to that of which it is a part, does not, of course, imply that the line is indivisible (cf. also p. 165, 16-17: *ἐπιφάνειαν νοήσαντες, εἶτα γραμμὴν, καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ σημεῖον*); even for Aristotle the point is not "part" of a line (*Physics* 241 A 3).⁵

In spite of such omissions and occasional errors, however, Dr. Witt's detailed study is in the main sound; and, whether or not he has made it plausible that Arius was the chief source, he has done good service in analyzing the kind of Platonism represented by the *Didaskalikos*. His final chapter is particularly illuminating; and attention should be called to his analysis, among the sources for the study of Antiochus, of Clement's *Stromateis* VIII. It is to be hoped that Dr. Witt will soon publish the critical text of the *Didaskalikos* which along with the present study was presented as a Cambridge Dissertation.

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⁵ Similarly far-fetched is the contention (p. 15) that the account of λόγος in chapter IV is ultimately Xenocratean. Xenocrates had a triple division (*ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἴσθησις*) whereas Albinus has only *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* and makes the correlate of the latter *τὰ αἰσθητά*, its *ἀρχή* being *αἴσθησις* (p. 154, 28-29). The definition of *αἴσθησις* (p. 154, 29) should be compared with the Platonic *Definitions* 414 C; its *ultimate* source is *Philebus* 33 E-34 A as that of *μνήμη* (p. 154, 34) is *Philebus* 34 A 10 and that of *δόξα* (p. 154, 35) is *Philebus* 39 A (cf. p. 155, 12-15 with *Philebus* 39 B-C). The ultimate source of *τὸ βέβαιον* connected with *ἐπιστήμη*, of *δόξα* with the opposite, on p. 154, 22 ff. is *Philebus* 58 E-59 C. None of these parallels is given in Witt's *Loci Platonici*; instead he compares parts of chap. IV with Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 216 ff. (pp. 53-55).

Inscriptiones Graecae, Voluminis II et III Editio Minor: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis Anno Postiores, Pars Tertia, Fasciculus Prior: Dedications, Tituli Honorarii, Tituli Sacri. Ed. IOHANNES KIRCHNER. Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1935. 4°. Pp. viii + 362. M. 122.

An adequate review of this big agglomeration of materials is next to impossible; Körte has done a good job,¹ but I have seen only two other reviews.² What they have said is not repeated in the following notes which are intended for actual users of the fascicule—a fascicule which is important for archaeologists, for historians of politics, of cults, and of institutions. All will agree that the editing is masterly, the flaws are petty.

Abbreviation. In the old Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum, which became Inscriptiones Graecae, Volume II, edited by Koehler, went from 403/2 to 30/29 B. C., and Volume III, edited by Dittenberger, went from 30/29 B. C. through to the end of pagan inscriptions. These volumes are cited properly as I(nscriptiones) G(raecae) II or III, or more conveniently as IG II¹ or III¹. In the new Editio Minor, the entire contents of the old Volumes II and III are combined, so that Kirchner's work, to be completed in eight fascicules, runs from 403/2 to the end of pagan times. The abbreviation of this new work might be the accurate but cumbersome IG II-III²; it is to be hoped, however, that present practice, which agrees with the understood wishes of the editor himself, will continue, so that the last inscription, for instance, in the new fascicule will always be cited properly as IG II² 5219, or as some prefer *I. G.*, II², 5219. (The form IG II, iii, i², 5219 is certainly to be discouraged, and the form IG III² 5219 also need never be used.)

*Omissions.*³ The dedication to Isis et al., Epigraphical Museum inv. no. 649, can be proved to be Athenian, not Delian (*Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], pp. 208 f.). The dedication published by Pittakys ('Εφ. 'Αρχ., no. 224), read by him as -νίππου Βυζαντι-, has never found a place in the Corpus; the mere fact that Pittakys alone reports it is not a sufficient reason for omitting it. I have not found in this or the preceding fascicule the text *ἱερὸν Μητρός* ('Εφ. 'Αρχ., 1899, p. 239), which gives the location of a shrine of Magna Mater in Athens (cf. Judeich, *Topographie*², p. 398); nor the text [-----] | [Θ]εοδώρου | 'Απόλλων Πατρὸς[φ] | ἀνέθηκεν from 'Αρχ. Δελτ., II (1916), p. 143 (see now *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 110 n.). Sixty-

¹ *Gnomon*, 11 (1935), pp. 625-641.

² Kolbe, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 57 (1936), pp. 2170-2174, and Ziebarth, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, 56 (1936), pp. 380-387.

³ Körte (*loc. cit.*) noted two omissions.

eight *titulorum honorariorum incerti generis fragmenta* included by Dittenberger (IG III¹ 954-980, 982, 984-1004; addenda 963a-998a) are omitted from the new fascicule.⁴ These texts range in length from --]OΞY[-- (IG III¹ 1001), rightly omitted, to larger texts such as [τὴν δεῖνα] Δεω[νίδου? τοῦ ἐπωνύμου ἄρ]χοντος [θυγατέρα, κανηφορ]ήσα[σαν, --- ἀνέθηκε]ν, σωφρ[οσύνης ἕνεκα] (IG III¹ 989), which some scholars may feel should properly be retained in a Corpus. It is encouraging to note, therefore, that practically all of the relevant smaller inscriptions discovered on the Acropolis by B. Tamaro are included.⁵—The new fascicule was able to include only the first published inscriptions from the American Excavations of the Agora, namely those included in the inventory numbers 1-500, which are only a fraction of the eventual total; for others the student must consult successive issues of *Hesperia*.—An interesting relief found in Piraeus, inscribed ΗΡΑΚΛΕΟΞ | ΑΛΕΞΙΚΑΚΟ should appear (L. D. Caskey, *Museum of Fine Arts, Boston: Catalogue of Greek and Roman Sculpture*, pp. 102-104, No. 47, with photograph).

Duplications. Among the ca. 2460 inscriptions in the new fascicule, some are inevitably duplicated by error.⁶ Ziebarth calls attention to the similarity in text of IG II² 4442d and IG II² 4498. The two titles are undoubtedly one and the same: the measurements of the stones differ only because the dimensions are recorded in a different order. Further, IG II² 3183, fragment c, appears also as IG II² 3180; IG II² 4371a (addenda, p. 352) appears again as 4428; and 4670 is the same as 5015. Likewise among the 103 inscriptions which Körte (*loc. cit.*) finds in honor of Hadrian, who undoubtedly received more honorary inscriptions than any other individual, some texts probably repeat others.

Arrangement. Dedications might conceivably be grouped according to the status of the dedicants, or according to the deities to whom the dedications were made. In either system prohibitive difficulties would arise. Kirchner has wisely abandoned any severely logical plan: the first groups are by dedicants;

⁴ IG III¹ 985 has been republished, with a photograph, but without knowledge of previous publication, by B. Tamaro, *Annuario d. R. Scuola arch. d. Atene*, IV/V (1921/2), p. 64, no. 139. The original, as Pittakys said, was a large monument.—IG III¹ 997 also reappears as *op. cit.*, p. 67, no. 183.

⁵ Her useful epigraphical survey of the Acropolis can be brought up to date by noting that in *op. cit.*, pp. 55-67, no. 18 = IG II² 3962, no. 52 = 4318, no. 79 = 4029, no. 97 = 4080, no. 106 = 3180, no. 108 = 3272, no. 121 = 3409, no. 146 = 4157, no. 153 = 4919, no. 166 = 3721, no. 173 = 3582.

⁶ Ziebarth, *loc. cit.*, has noted that IG II² 2939 = IG II² 4339.

the next groups include statue bases and the like, arranged according to the status of the persons honored; there follows a section of artists' signatures; then dedications by private persons, arranged according to the deities. This scheme is simple and good. Any scheme involves dangers for the unwary researcher. Thus the student of sculpture will find sculptors' signatures scattered through various sections; the student of the cult of Asklepios will find much of his material outside the section "Donaria Aesculapii"; even dedications by the Athenian Demos are not all in one place.⁷ The volume of indexes will eventually remedy some, but not all, of this trouble; some dedications do not mention the name of the deity.

Descriptions. Most of the descriptions of the monuments are doubtless correct. This branch of the study, however, has developed less than others; archaeologists will therefore not accept the descriptions, always brief in any case, without controlling them. Thus IG II² 4702 is a stele with a sculptured relief, not an altar—the word *ara* is overworked; and the text itself of the curious tripartite monument IG II² 4994 cannot be rightly understood from the one word "basis" (*Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], p. 214). Part of a true altar—the altar of Apollo Patroös—, a "tabula," IG II² 4984, has now been properly published (Thompson, *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 110; also a new altar, *op. cit.*, p. 106). Among more unusual forms, some examples of actual Athenian allotment machines have recently been identified (IG II² 2864, see "Prytaneis," *Hesperia*, Suppl. I [1937], p. 198). IG II² 4833 and 4835, each described merely as "marmor," will be shown in a forthcoming article to be corners of elaborate cult tables. Beginning with a small new fragment from the Agora, and eventually including IG II² 3563, 3631, 3796, 4510, 4544, and many other fragments, the large tripod-base inscribed with the paean by Sophocles has been built up (Oliver, *Hesperia*, V [1936], p. 91 ff.); the inscribed block which has proved to be the crowning member had been identified as Athenian by Kirchner (formerly IG XII, 9, 40, as if from Karystos; IG II² 3796).

Misprints. The extraordinarily high standards of previous fascicules have been maintained. I have noted only IG II² 2797, line 6, read *Θυμαυράδην*, and 2967, commentary on line 6, where

⁷ In one matter of this sort, even Körte (*op. cit.*, p. 639) was misled, or at least his statement is misleading. Dedications involving the Egyptian gods are more numerous than the 18 to Zeus Hypsistos, although the sanctuary of the former has not been excavated, whereas that of Hypsistos has (list of Egyptian dedications in *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX [1937], p. 214).—Hypsistos in the Greek world has been fully treated by Nock, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXIX (1936), pp. 55 ff.

the year is 346/5. The spacing of the type is of course not intended to imitate the original at all closely, but the occasional gross irregularities, as in IG II² 2797 and 2798, diverge unnecessarily much from the originals. These instances are exceptional; in the main the setting of the type, the work mostly of one veteran craftsman, is unimpeachable, and the student will not be misled who remembers that in monumental work especially the masons spaced their letters regularly.

That some 101 inscriptions were first studied, and are published for the first time in this fascicule, by the editor himself, will not surprise those who have known him. Johannes Kirchner received his doctorate in 1883, finished the *Prosopographia Attica* in 1903, and has now edited some 5300 epigraphical texts in IG II², not to mention many in Ditt., *Syll.*³; in 1935 appeared his valuable *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*. In August 1935 he arrived in Athens to continue work on the last fascicule of texts in IG II² (the sepulchral monuments), and by June 1936 he had checked over all the *ca.* 12,800 inscriptions in the Epigraphical Museum, had examined practically all the other known grave monuments in Athens, including those in the Agora Excavations, and had taken part in an exploration of Attica which turned up about 100 more unpublished inscriptions (*Hermes*, LXX [1935], pp. 461 ff.; *Ath. Mitt.*, forthcoming). To congratulate such a scholar is superfluous. One thinks rather of what the example offered by his soundness, keenness, and vigor means today for classical studies of every sort, wherever pursued.

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PIERRE BOYANCÉ. *Études sur le Songe de Scipion* (Bibliothèque des Universités du Midi, Fascicule XX). Paris, E. de Boccard, 1936. Pp. 192.

In the first part of his book Boyancé gives the text of the *Somnium Scipionis*—according to Ziegler's edition (p. 12)—and its translation into very clear and adequate French. Then he discusses the most important philosophical ideas of Scipio's speech: his conception of the world (ch. II), of the soul and immortality (ch. III), of glory and the great year (ch. IV). Boyancé prefers this method of writing several essays to that of writing a commentary (p. 9) because of the main purposes which he has in mind: to show that Posidonius is not the philosopher whom Cicero follows and to determine the theories which really moulded his thinking. For Boyancé considers the

myth of the *Somnium* to be original (ch. I) only in the sense that he ascribes originality to Cicero as a writer, not as a thinker (p. 9).

The Posidonian influence on the *Somnium* has already been disproved by Reinhardt, Heinemann and Harder, as Boyancé is well aware (p. 38). Since his book appeared, Bignone too has rejected such an assumption (*L'Aristotele perduto* I, 1936, pp. 240 ff.). Yet the older theories have a strong hold on the interpreters; it is, therefore, not improper to deal once more with them. Besides, Boyancé's discussion of the arguments brought forward for and against the thesis often contributes, beyond the immediate problem, to the understanding of the philosophical doctrines involved. What he says about the term *αἰγῆ* and its meaning in the various Stoic systems (pp. 65 ff.) is especially interesting and valuable. In this argumentation there are but few mistakes. His claim, for instance, that Cicero did not admire Posidonius as a stylist (p. 45) can hardly be accepted. After all, Cicero sent one of his writings to Posidonius for correction (ut ornatus de iisdem rebus scriberet [*ad Atticum*, II, 1, 2]).

On the other hand, Boyancé is right, I believe, in establishing the importance of Cleanthes for the solar-theology (pp. 78 ff.; 174); therein he agrees with R. M. Jones. But the possibility of the influence of Heraclides Ponticus is very uncertain (pp. 74, 137). The fact that friends of Cicero were interested in problems which are treated by Cicero too (pp. 168 ff.) does not prove anything about the historical dependence of the statements made by Cicero. Nor is it a convincing procedure to reconcile, as does Boyancé, Cumont's theory that the deification of Hellenistic kings is relevant for Cicero's belief in the immortality of statesmen with Harder's contention that these are different things (pp. 141 ff.). Finally, since the sentiments alone of the *Somnium* are considered to be Roman, whereas the ideas as a whole are declared to be Greek, it is difficult to understand how the idea of the immortality of the statesman should be a Roman conception (p. 173).

I hesitate the more to enter into any argument about these points because a decision must necessarily be based on considerations outside of the *Somnium*. The mere interpretation of the text, however, is not yet far enough advanced, and it is astonishing that Boyancé did not go into greater detail with this problem. Where he deals with the composition at all, he accepts in general Harder's analysis of the *Somnium* (R. Harder, "Über Ciceros *Somnium Scipionis*," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft*, VI [1929], Heft 3). Although he is so bitterly and ironically opposed to the logic of "Quellenforschung"—and this with good reason—he himself is primarily, even exclusively, interested in discovering the

sources. But many questions concerning the understanding of the text are still unsolved, the answers to which must affect the discussion of the more general problems.

To give an example, I take the main theme of the *Somnium*, the rejection of human glory. Boyancé is satisfied with characterizing this attitude as being equally far from the confidence in human glory, expressed in *De officiis*, as from the disillusion regarding human glory, shown in *De finibus* (pp. 158-9). Harder says that the rejection of human glory is the philosophy of a man whose expectation for just recognition of his merits has not been fulfilled in this world; he therefore seeks a compensation in the life to come (p. 149). But Scipio, having urged the statesman to despise glory among men and having described how limited in space and time this glory is bound to be, concludes therefrom: quocirca si reditum in hunc locum desperaveris, in quo omnia sunt magnis et praestantibus viris, quanti tandem est ista hominum gloria . . . (VI, 25). Scipio then declares that the acquisition of human glory cannot counterbalance the loss of immortality. In the *Somnium* immortality is promised only to the just and pious statesman—ea vita via est in caelum (VI, 16). He who abandons these principles can no longer hope (desperaveris) to return to the heavenly abode, although he may thus acquire the recognition of his compatriots. But the tenuousness of what he then would gain cannot be compared with the stability of what he is in danger of losing. In such a case he must make his choice: he should despise human glory; he should look up to the heavens (igitur alte spectare [VI, 25]) and not devote himself to the earth. For the aim of the statesman is not the reward of men but the eternal requital bestowed on him by God (illa divina virtus non statuas plumbo inhaerentes nec triumphos arescentibus laureis, sed stabiliora quaedam et viridiora praemiorum genera desiderat, [VI, 8]). If it is demanded of him, he cannot hesitate to give up the one for the other. Cicero himself alluding to the *De re publica* writes to Atticus: quod si ista nobis cogitatio de triumpho iniecta non esset, quam tu quoque approbas, ne tu haud multum requireres illum virum qui in VI. libro informatus est. Quid enim tibi faciam qui illos libros devorasti? Quin nunc ipsum non dubitabo rem tantam abiicere, si id erit rectius. Utrumque vero simul agi non potest, et de triumpho ambitiose et de re publica libere (*ad Atticum*, VII, 3, 2). This is no attitude of indifference concerning human glory; it is not the renunciation of what the world does not grant and which is therefore sought after in another world. Rather is it the repudiation of a good that one can get but because of a moral standard does not feel allowed to accept. It is, therefore, impossible to determine the source of Cicero's remark as a Hellenistic declamation against glory, comparable to the reflections

of Marcus Aurelius (Harder, pp. 131, n. 4; 133). Nor is it necessary to suppose that the Romans, in general, had not the same esteem for glory as the Greeks (Boyancé, p. 160).

Cicero's demand does not mean that the statesman should never indulge in human glory. If it is acquired in a justifiable way, he may rejoice in it. Scipio himself says: *principem civitatis gloria esse alendum* (V, 9), and he declares that the state would remain safe as long as homage is paid to the princeps (*ibid.*). Boyancé tries in vain to reconcile those statements, not taken into account by Harder, with his interpretation of the myth; they are irreconcilable. At no period of his life did Cicero renounce glory as such. In *De finibus* (III, 57) it is Cato who is speaking, not Cicero as Boyancé wrongly presumes (p. 156). Scipio knows that the philosopher alone is able earnestly to treat the vanity of all glory (I, 26-29). The man of active life must believe in the value of human endeavor.

Scipio admires the philosopher on account of his superior attitude toward glory; he admires the philosophical discussions as such (I, 29). This is symbolic for the philosophy of the *Somnium*. There is no primacy of the active life over the theoretical one, as is generally assumed (Boyancé, pp. 139 ff.; Harder, p. 119). It is true that the active life is stressed much more than is usually done in the Hellenistic systems; but the philosopher and the statesman both have the same claim to immortality as is expressly stated in the *Somnium* (VI, 18). This admission is not a "Bruch" in the composition (Harder, p. 120), nor a contamination of two sources; for that nothing on earth is nearer to God than statesmanship (I, 12; cf. VI, 13) is said in defiance of those who assert that the life of the philosopher alone leads to the salvation of man. In the introduction to the whole treatise Cicero defends and establishes the right of political activity against the current philosophical doctrines of his time; he must do so, he says, because otherwise the purpose of his book would be meaningless. But nothing indicates that he goes so far as to dethrone the theoretical virtues or to claim that the value of philosophy is less than that of political activity. He coördinates the statesman and the philosopher, and this was bold enough an adventure in those days. It is, however, not the theory of Dicaearchus, which Cicero certainly knew (*ad Atticum*, II, 16, 3; VII, 3, 1). It is the philosophy of the Academy or, at least, the philosophy of Antiochus (*ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita, si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus. Nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt aut, qui altiore animo sunt, capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis, aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt* [*De finibus*, V, 57]).

Boyancé speaks of a dogmatic Platonic belief in immortality (p. 176) which Cicero embraces in the *Somnium*. But the

myth is a dream, which must not be understood only psychologically (pp. 50 f.). Scipio is the friend of Panaetius who does not recognize the truth of dreams; the contents therefore remain mere conjecture (cf. I, 15). Cicero explicitly emphasizes that all these things are only dreamed by Scipio; one is never allowed to forget this fact (contrary to Harder's opinion, p. 148). At the moment in which he relates his dream Scipio seems rather to dream than to narrate what he has dreamt (*St! quaeso, inquit, ne me e somno excitetis* [VI, 12]). Human glory is rejected not because of a dogmatic belief but, so to speak, on account of a postulate or a probability alone.

Cicero, in writing his books on the state, proves himself first of all to be a sincere follower of the Academy and to be consistent in his views on the principles of political activity. This fact—and many others which I cannot mention here but which should and could be ferreted out by a careful interpretation of the text—have to be taken into consideration before it will be possible to give a convincing analysis of the sources. Until this has been done, I do not think it permissible to pass judgment, as Boyancé does, on the originality of Cicero either as a writer or as a thinker.

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GERDA BUSCH. Untersuchungen zum Wesen der *τύχη* in den Tragödien des Euripides. Heidelberg, Winter, 1937. Pp. 75.

Not the oldest, but the most long-lived ancient conception of fate, *τύχη* is the power that one associates particularly with Greek tragedy, and above all with Euripides. One's off-hand impression would doubtless be that the action of his plays, like the language, is full of *τύχη*. But that the references to chance on the part of the characters are out of all proportion to the actual rôle of chance in the plays is the somewhat surprising conclusion of this dissertation.

Dr. Busch begins by analyzing the meaning of the word *τύχη* in its various contexts, as it is qualified by some ninety different epithets, favorable or unfavorable (the latter being far the more numerous), or as it stands in relation to other words. Next she deals with the moral implications of the word: the inscrutability, and the moral dangers, of luck; its opposition to virtue; the possibility of man's collaborating with *τύχη*. There follows a discussion of the relation between *τύχη* and other powers (*χρεών*,

θεῖον, ἀνάγκη, πότμος, μοῖρα, δαίμων, and the gods). Here it appears that *τύχη* varies greatly in the extent to which it is regarded as independent or as the embodiment of a divine power; its personification is rare before the fourth century. Little attention is given to the persons who express particular views; so far as it is possible to divine the view of the poet himself, Dr. Busch believes that he usually regards *τύχη* and everything enigmatical as dependent on the gods; apparently she is not troubled by doubts as to the strength of the poet's religious faith. Though not much is to be made of chronological development, the earlier plays show more of *τύχη* as equivalent to fate; the later plays tend to present *τύχη* as chance. Freakish, capricious *τύχη* is not to be found; the one surviving play in which *τύχη* does not appear is the *Bacchae*.

From these competent analyses the author passes to the consideration, in a meager final section, of the rôle of *τύχη* in the several plays; this should have been the most complete part of the dissertation, but it is far from adequate. Not only the *Bacchae*, the *Cyclops*, and the *Rhesus* are excluded from consideration, but also the two plays devoted to the glorification of Athens (*Supplices* and *Heracleidae*), and the *Andromache*, in which the appearance of Peleus is termed the help of a *deus ex machina*. Four more plays are dismissed as having their action controlled wholly by a form of destiny: the *Iphigenia Aulidensis* (the divine command to sacrifice Iphigenia), the *Hercules* (the madness sent by Hera), the *Phoenissae* and the *Orestes* (a family curse). The *Hecuba* and the *Troïades* are merely labelled as examples respectively of unhappy fortune and of sudden disaster. There remain for very brief consideration three plays of fate (all, as it happens, comparatively early), and four that turn on recognition.

The *Alcestitis* is analyzed as depending on the privilege vouchsafed by Apollo to Admetus of circumventing a predestined lot (cf. 695: καὶ ζῆς παρελθὼν τὴν πεπωμένην τύχην), though at the expense of a corresponding doom for Alcestitis, which is escaped only by the intervention of Heracles. This Dr. Busch unconvincingly declines to regard as "einen glücklichen Zufall," in view of the cheerful character of the ending, which, she argues, has nothing to do with the poet's faith. (What does she make of the last speech of Admetus?)

The *Medea* is rightly seen to involve *τύχη* to the least possible extent; it turns on the supernatural powers of the heroine.

The tragic death of Phaedra, in the *Hippolytus*, is ascribed solely to irresistible necessity, springing from the pressure of Aphrodite (*τύχα Κύπριδος*, 371 f.; cf. 469 f.; 315), and appearing to Theseus as the fulfilment of a curse (818 ff.). The tragedy of Hippolytus himself is not mentioned.

What, then, of the four "recognition dramas"? The recognition in the *Electra* of brother and sister is promoted by the arrival of the old man, due to a lucky chance; yet the word *τύχη* is not used of it, but rather of the success of Orestes' undertaking (610 f.; 648), which he attributes to the gods whose agent he is (890 ff.).

Of the many incidents in the *Helena*, Menelaus ascribes to *τύχη* only his escape from shipwreck (412) and his reunion with Helen (645; cf. 698); and Dr. Busch holds that all the incidents are the means by which the divine will is carried out, as indeed Helen herself believes, despite casual allusions to *τύχη*.

In the *Iphigenia Taurica*, at least, one might suppose that the success of the fugitives hinged on chance, in the timely delivery of the letter. But even here, as Orestes himself urges (909 ff.), all depends on coöperation with the opportunity presented by chance, which is based ultimately on the will of the gods as declared by Athena (1435 ff.). No mention is made of the wave and the temporary obstacle that it presents.

Finally, in the *Ion*, it is Apollo's plan that is of fundamental importance, though in the incidents it is *τύχη* that delays its fulfilment, that almost wrecks Ion's life (1512 ff.), and that indeed is the making of the play. Following a hint of F. Solmsen, Dr. Busch suggests that the *ἄγνοια* of the characters in the throes of the recognition scenes is a symbol of human weakness and of the obstacle which it presents to the gods' desire to turn chance to man's advantage. The suggestion should be considered more fully in the light of the whole Euripidean attitude toward the gods, and of tragic irony in general, as indeed all the plays, in their general intent and in the manipulation of incident, need a closer analysis than Dr. Busch has undertaken.

The author's conclusion is that an arbitrary *τύχη* prevails as little in the "recognition dramas" as in the "fate dramas" of Euripides; moreover that the occurrences of the word *τύχη* bear no relation to the influence of *τύχη* in the action, and are often mere expressions of unfortunate individuals or of temporary circumstances and moods. (I am tempted to call *τύχη* a Euripidean *cliché*.) "Tyche übt also in der Handlung Euripidischer Tragödien kein Amt aus."

It is nevertheless true, as Dr. Busch admits, that the poet's mind was constantly preoccupied with the idea of *τύχη*, now more, now less independent, and of its relation to gods and men, even if he did not commit himself to a belief in the overmastering power of chance. The gods, whatever they might be, remained, at least for dramatic purposes; and it can be no accident, I think, that Euripides chose to end no less than five of his extant plays (*Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Helena*, *Bacchae*) with all but identical lines:

πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων,
 πολλὰ δ' ἀέλπτως κραίνουσι θεοί·
 καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
 τῶν δ' ἀδοκῆτων πόρον ἦρε θεός.
 τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα.

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W. E. J. KUIPER. *Grieksche Origineelen en Latijnsche Navolgingen. Zes Komédies van Menander bij Terentius en Plautus. Verhand. d. Kon. Akad. te Amsterdam, XXXVIII, no. 2, 1936. Pp. 300.*

This book is too important to be neglected by the student of new comedy. If he does not already read Dutch, he must make shift to do so. The author reconstructs six plays of Menander from Roman adaptations, viz. the four utilized by Terence and two, *Synaristosae* and *Dis exapaton*, that contributed to Plautus' *Cistellaria* and *Bacchides*. A summary in English is provided. This is, however, by no means an adequate substitute for the author's detailed argument, and it omits his reasoned statement of the chronology of the plays involved. There is also a full index and a schematic conspectus of the six plays which serves as a convenient guide to the author's reconstruction. He uses every available method—from deduction where data exist to speculation where the field is unencumbered by facts. The precision of his results is a guarantee that he has shirked no difficulties; he would be the first to admit that when precision is attained, there is a corresponding lack of certainty.

The author is a thorough student of Menander. He is most convincing when he bases his construction on character. It is laudable to rescue the fallen women of Roman comedy and restore them to the respect that they enjoyed in the Greek scene. A surprising number of them are Samians, even Thais of the *Eunuchus* and the two *Bacchides*; hence they are eligible to be recognized as Athenians and to marry. The roystering youths of Roman comedy are serious lovers in the Greek. Thus the rescue of a girl from servitude in Menander's *Adelphi* was praiseworthy; in the Roman play it is sheer dissipation, and the happy ending becomes immoral. I should go further than Kuiper and assume that the slave Syrus is almost pure Roman, and that the revelry which he encourages was not in the Greek play at all. The love of Ctesipho must have been the main theme in the Greek; his progressive enlistment of Aeschinus,

Micio, and Demea in its service would provide a natural development. Menander likes nothing better than to show a helpless babe or a hapless lover winning his way step by step to a final triumph. The debate between Micio and Demea belongs in the center of the play, not in the prologue. Kuiper compares the conversion of Demea to that of Charisius in the *Epitrepontes*. He thinks that a slave's narrative probably served as introduction to the entrance of the changed Demea. This becomes a certainty when we consider that the changed Demea would in the Greek production appear in a new mask; he would have to be introduced. I am inclined to think, however, that the farcical ending of Terence's play may be nearer to Menander's fifth act than Kuiper will allow. It is probably right to insert a recognition scene in the fourth act and to make the discovery of Demea's own misdeeds a motive for his reform, but the note of levity is typical of Menander's endings.

Where reconstruction is based on technical considerations, the results reached are more plausible separately than collectively. Kuiper narrows and universalizes Frank's statement of Terence's new technique, whereby he discarded the omniscient prologue and substituted suspense for comic irony. Kuiper finds a place for a divine prologue in each of the six plays and stresses the requirement that the god must supply a fact unknown to all the characters alike. He also assumes that the Roman dramatists omitted or modified recognition scenes in great numbers in order to avoid the marriage of half-brother and sister that was permissible in Greek comedy. Furthermore, if the Romans chose a *meretrix* for a heroine, they had to forgo the final wedding that is conventional in Menander. Kuiper makes great play with the principle that where there is a ring there must be an *anagnorisis*. This kind of reconstruction is more or less mechanical and inadequate. Menander was a genius and his invention was infinitely varied. Ingenuity in discovering the ends of acts and the gaps of construction in Plautus and Terence cannot create again the living works of art that they dismembered and disguised. It is rather surprising at first to discover that Menander can be constructed more readily from Plautus than from Terence. In the case of the latter the imitations have largely the tone of the original. It is hard to avoid the absurdity of arguing: What I like is Menander; what I don't like is Terence.

The book is well got up; I have noted no errata beyond those cited by the author. He resists the temptation to quote Terence as Menander except when he proves (page 136) from *Eunuchus* and *Heauton* that Menander did not, if he could help it, bring girls of good family on the scene. This may well be true, but what is proved for Terence is by no means proved for Menander. The minute criticism of details must wait for a critic of this

work who can equal the industry, acumen, and experience that are displayed in it. The result will be an even larger book. I can give no idea here of the abundance of fruitful comment that distinguishes Kuiper's work.

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HERBERT C. YOUTIE. *Tax Rolls from Karanis (Michigan Papyri, Vol. IV, Part I)*. University of Michigan Press, 1936. Pp. xv + 437. \$5.00.

Although only three documents are included in this volume, they comprise over 13,450 lines of text, and constitute the most complete record of taxation yet discovered in any Egyptian village. Since they are from successive years (A. D. 171-173), the information concerning the taxes included in the documents is fairly complete. The task of decipherment and transcription was done by Professor Youtie in collaboration with Drs. Pearl and Schuman. The enormous labor involved can only be appreciated by those who have struggled with the difficult chirography of Egyptian scribes, and the editors deserve high praise for the successful accomplishment of an arduous task. For technical reasons the text alone is published in this volume. Indices and commentary will follow later. Until these appear the reviewer will be content to indicate the nature of the documents and their value to scholars.

The registers are in the form of day-books kept in the local office. Payments in multiples of four drachmas evidently deal with the poll-tax, and these form the majority of the entries. Other taxes, specifically named, are the various imposts on garden land, baths, guards, watch-towers, water-guard, donkeys, camels, rental of flocks, beer, trades, ἀριθμητικὸν κατοίκων, and a few entries of other miscellaneous taxes. The γερῶν or γερρῶν is not otherwise known, and is evidently a tax paid by priests on temple offerings. The puzzling entry χς, usually paid in tetradrachms, is new. More perplexing is the entry λο χς or λο χς ιερ () without any numeral. In the daily totals, however, the payment is clearly 12 obols for the priests, and 20 obols for the laity. These fees, paid at the end of the year, or as arrears at the beginning of the year, may be the supplementary charges on the poll-tax paid by individuals. At Karanis the guard-tax is not collected from those subject to poll-tax as appears to be the case elsewhere, but is assessed on those who are exempt from the poll-tax because of age or ill health.

The payments of the garden taxes present novel features. The *geometria* was paid in four annual instalments. These

taxes were all calculated on the 6-obol standard and the total was entered on the right margin. On the left margin, however, these sums were converted into the $7\frac{1}{4}$ -obol standard, and the daily totals were also calculated on this basis. The *dragmategia*, paid in money, seems to be collected at Karanis from certain classifications of garden lands, or is at least paid by holders of such property.

Payments in "filthy" (*ῥυπαραί*) drachmas throw some light on this currency, though the evidence is somewhat confused. In payments with this currency the supplementary tax is never mentioned, and this fact may lend support to the theory that *ῥυπαραί* is a term of account to describe tax payments which include the supplement. The tax of a third on baths is usually paid in *ῥυπαραί* drachmas in units of 28 dr. (payments of 12, 20, and 24 dr. 28 ob. occur once each), but in one case payments for three years are made in ordinary currency at the rate of 21 dr. 5 ob. yearly and the total is given as 87 dr. 2 ob. The *dragmategia* is always paid in *ῥυπαραί* drachmas and the amount is usually converted in the left margin to the $7\frac{1}{4}$ -obol standard. The interest on a loan (224, 1671) is paid in ordinary currency without supplement, while interest on the value of land (224, 4857, 5051) is paid in *ῥυπαραί* drachmas without supplement. From this evidence it is apparent, whatever the meaning of the term, that *ῥυπαραί* has nothing to do with the number of obols in the drachma.

The supplementary charges are not recorded for the poll-tax, nor for the various levies for guards. On the *ἐπιστατικὸν ἱερέων* the rate is uniformly one-seventh whereas the other taxes pay the usual rate of a sixteenth, except for the dyke-tax where the rate is a sixth.

These rolls contain a vast number of names and will add much to the prosopography of Karanis. It is worth noting that the majority of holders of garden lands are either Romans or women. Following the entries of these holdings there is frequently a name in parentheses. This may be the lessee from the owner, but in some cases the entry appears to be a place name, and may be the name of the estate. Some of these holdings were once parts of great estates: Antonia, Germanicus, Maecenas, Doryphorus, Pallas, Seneca, Lourijs, Severianus, Gallia, and Charm() all had grants of land at Karanis. Money seems to have been advanced by the state for purchase by the present holders, as several entries record interest on loans or payments for the price of land. Possibly these entries reflect an effort on the part of Marcus Aurelius to raise money for his Danube campaigns by the disposal of land in Egypt.

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Papyri Osloenses, Fasc. III, edited by S. EITREM and LEIV AMUNDSEN. Published by Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo on commission by Jacob Dybwad, 1936. Pp. xi + 326, and 12 Plates (separately). Kr. 50.

The third and, thus far, largest fascicule of Oslo Papyri is, like its predecessor, a volume of miscellaneous papyri, containing literary texts (Nos. 65-76), documents (77-165), and minor fragments of both classes (166-200).

The most important piece of the first group is No. 71, the upper half of the first thirteen columns from a late first or early second century roll of Isocrates' *Panegyricus*. The extant portion goes as far as section 54 of the text; the editors therefore calculate that the complete text must have required 48 or 49 columns, making the roll about 4.7 meters in length. The textual variants which the papyrus brings us for the first time are unimportant. With regard to already known variants the papyrus agrees in at least 17 instances with the Codex Urbinas (Γ) and in at least 5 instances with the "inferior" MSS—thus pointing once again the general lesson of the papyri for textual criticism, namely, that no one MS, whether by virtue of its antiquity or for any other reason, can lay claim to an uncorrupted tradition and, therefore, to a uniformly superior text.

The documents begin with a fragment from a "Religious Calendar concerning the Imperial Cult" (No. 77; after 169 A. D.). No. 78 is a fragment of an edict of Hadrian already known from two rather mutilated copies in the Cairo Museum (rereadings of which, by O. Guéraud, are appended). The Oslo fragment serves to confirm the text of the Cairo copies at several points.

More important is No. 79, a fragment from a copy of an edict issued in 134/5 A. D. by the Prefect of Egypt, M. Petronius Mamertinus. Though too much is lost at the right and the left for the reconstruction of a continuous text at any point, it is possible to grasp the provisions of the edict in broad outline. At one of his assizes the Prefect was apprised that many persons had fled their homes because of financial inability to perform the liturgies to which they had been assigned (ll. 6-7). He therefore orders that such flights cease (ll. 8-9), and that "men of means and fitting" be assigned to replace those who had already fled (ll. 11-12). It is difficult to see why the editors think that in this edict "the prefect on the whole expressed sympathy with the oppressed liturgi" (p. 62). The contrary seems rather to be the case. It should not surprise us to find, if by some good fortune the missing portions of this edict are some day brought to light, that the Prefect backed his injunction against flight with a threat of punishment. (The edict of M. Sempronius Liberalis

of 154 A. D. [*BGU*, 372 = Wilcken, *Chrestomathie*, 19] tells us that fugitive *liturgi* suffered immediate proscription.) In any case, Mamertinus' injunction against flight proved ineffectual. To cite but a single indication, one which the papyrus itself affords: Though the edict was issued originally in 134/5 A. D., the present fragment is from a copy made after July 10, 138. The necessity for reaffirmation of the edict can only signify that the flights continued despite the Prefect's order.

No. 111 consists of portions from a register of "free men and freedmen" (l. 124) of Oxyrhynchos. The register is unique in that it is arranged according to houses in their topographical sequence, and for each house the free and freed male inhabitants, including minors, are set down in the sworn statement of the owner or tenant. Though the register is called *δημ(οσία) ἀπογρα(φή)* (l. 123) and perhaps *κα[τ' οἰκίαν ἀπογραφή]* (l. 5), it is not connected with the regular fourteen-year census but is clearly an extraordinary record compiled in 235 A. D., five years after the last preceding census. Nor is this register a synoptic record compiled from the individual declarations of that census. Of the many differences which the editors point out between this register and those synoptic records, we may note in particular that in many cases (cf. the list, p. 145) the deponents distinctly state that in the last census they were registered as domiciled in a different quarter of the city. Indicative of the economic distress of the times is the fact that in the Western District of the Hermaion Quarter (apparently a well-to-do section of the city, and the only section for which the register approaches completeness), only 22 houses were inhabited as against 27 uninhabited. Of the uninhabited houses, moreover, five (ll. 168, 171, 211, 214, 286) are designated as belonging to the fisc—which means that they were confiscated for non-payment of taxes. The exact purpose of this register remains as yet undetermined. The editors' suggestion that such a register gave the administration a ready-to-hand list of all persons subject to liturgies receives strong support from the omission of women and from the fact that no personal declaration is required of a freedman past the age of 70 (ll. 151-153).

No. 123 (22 A. D.), as the editors correctly point out, adds the weight of its evidence in support of Preisigke's view (*P. Strassb.*, II, pp. 66-69) that there was in the first half of the first century a *στρατηγὸς τοῦ Ἀρσινόιτου* who was the superior of the three *μείσι-strategoi* and who was concerned *imprimis* with matters of police. The most recent summary of the evidence on this vexed question of the "general" strategos, that of H. Henne, *Liste des stratèges des nomes égyptiens à l'époque gréco-romaine* (Cairo, 1935), pp. *35-*36, seems to have been overlooked by the editors.

In No. 138 (323 A. D.) the note to line 1 on the chronology

of the datings by "the consuls to be designated" should contain a reference to the definitive discussion of the papyrological evidence by E. H. Kase, *A Papyrus Roll in the Princeton Collection* (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 32-36.

The volume shows the same careful preparation that marks the preceding fascicules of this series. The editors continue, however, their regrettable practice of omitting translations of the documents. Teutonisms of expression mar the commentary, but rarely give trouble and are, moreover, hardly to be charged as a fault against authors who, for their readers' sake, have written in a language not their own.

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Apophoreta Gotoburgensia Vilelmo Lundström oblata. Gothenburg, 1936. Pp. 447; 1 plate.

When Prof. V. Lundström retired from the chair of classical philology at the University of Gothenburg, which he had held for more than thirty years, his friends and disciples honoured him with this magnificent volume. The varied contents of the book, comprising studies in Latin, Greek (classical as well as modern), Comparative Linguistics, and Roman Archaeology, faithfully reflect Prof. Lundström's many-sided interests. That these interests are somewhat out of the ordinary is evident from the imposing list of his lectures and publications which is appended at the close of the volume. The chief subject of Prof. Lundström's scientific research, however, has been Latin philology, to which nine out of the seventeen contributions of the book are devoted; of these, one properly comes under the head of comparative philology. First may be mentioned H. Hagendahl's "Rhetorica" (pp. 282-338, in Latin), perhaps the most important paper of the whole volume, rich in acute observations. It consists of two parts, "In controversias Senecae patris quaestiones" and "In declamationes Quintiliani minores," and gives, besides a series of critical notes, a rehabilitation of the excerptors of Seneca and a reduction of the value of the corrections in Cod. Toletanus. E. Widstrand in "De Vitruvii sermone parum ad regulam artis grammaticae explicato" (pp. 16-52) reasons convincingly that the "vulgarisms" of Vitruvian style are due to his lack of rhetorical education. B. Wijkström's "Clarorum uirorum facta moresque" (pp. 159-168) deals with the tendency to copy illustrious proemia and tries to show that the opening of Tacitus' *Agricola* is borrowed from Cato's *Origines*. G. Wiman, "Behöver Persiustexten ej emenderas?" (pp. 207-225), offers some unlikely new readings, while H. Armini,

"Några Anmärkningar till Copa" (pp. 271-281), suggests a strange interpretation of the little poem. R. Sobel, "En Columellakonjektur" (pp. 169-170), improves Col., II, 2, 9. G. Tingdal in "En humanisthandskrift till Cicerotal i Strängnäs domkyrkobibliotek" (pp. 194-206) describes a late Cicero MS of interest to Swedish history of learning; Anna Röding-Molin, "De codicibus aliquot Petri de Crescentiis" (pp. 186-193), deals with a series of MSS of Piero which she has studied. C. Lindsten's "Lat. (H)arena, Farina, sab. Fasena" (pp. 149-158, in Swedish) is of interest from a linguistic point of view.

Among the papers concerning Greek philology there are some very important contributions. E. Nachmansson's "Galenos' epidemikommentar" (pp. 108-148) contains valuable critical and linguistic notes on Galenos and Hippocrates. I. Düring, "De Athenaei deipnosophistarum indole atque dispositione" (pp. 226-270), defends successfully the original unity of the work, explaining many offences as caused by the author's inability to think the dialogue through logically. Hj. Frisk, "Grekiskan och det egeiska substratet" (pp. 171-185), defends the theory of a common predialectal Greek and limits the influence of the Aegaeian substrate to the vocabulary. T. Kalén's "Ett grekiskt lantbruksord" (pp. 389-404) deals with Greek *ἄγμος* and its relatives. Modern Greek is treated in S. Lindstam's "En nygrekisk parafras till Pseudo-Pythagoras' Dicta aurea" (pp. 339-345), an edition of such a paraphrase from Cod. Mus. Brit. add. 18190 (s. XVII *init.*), and in O. Lagercrantz's "Grekiska i Tunis" (pp. 1-15), which treats three small documents from the Swedish consulate in Tunis (18th century).

Roman archaeology, one of the chief interests of Prof. Lundström in later years, is represented by two important papers. A. Boëthius, "Ardeatina" (pp. 346-388, in Swedish), gives a very instructive survey of the vicissitudes of this old Latin city, based on literary sources and new archaeological evidence. H. Lyngby, "Det republikanska Roms murar i trakten av Tibern" (pp. 53-107), defends on partly new grounds the theory that the Forum Boarium was not included in the republican city-wall and that the much discussed Porta Triumphalis was a gate in that wall, connecting with the Circus Maximus.

As a whole it is a splendid volume, very well printed and rich in interesting matters. It is only to be regretted that so great a part is written in Swedish and therefore unavailable to non-Scandinavian readers.

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SISTER LUANNE MEAGHER, O. S. B. *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières*. Chicago, private edition distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries (dissertation), 1936. Pp. v + 96; 2 plates.

In 1930 Professor Charles H. Beeson published a complete facsimile of Lupus Servatus' autograph copy of Cicero's *De Oratore* (*Harleianus* 2736): *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic* (Cambridge, Mass., The Mediaeval Academy of America). An ample commentary presented a detailed picture of the methods used by one of the most zealous critics of text in the Middle Ages. Since the appearance of this book Professor Beeson has studied (without complete publication) seven other manuscripts which contain corrections or annotations by Lupus: the Paris manuscript of Cicero's *De Inventione* (*B. N.*, lat. 7774A), the Paris *codex Thuaneus* of Livy, VI-X (*B. N.*, lat. 5726), the Berne Valerius Maximus (366), the Paris codex of the Letters of Symmachus (*B. N.*, lat. 8623), the *Reginensis* (1484) of Tiberius Claudius Donatus' Commentary on Virgil, the Paris codex of Macrobius' Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* (*B. N.*, lat. 6370), and the Vienna manuscript (189) which contains the philosophical works of Cicero. He has allowed the author of the present dissertation to make full use of his photographs and notes of these manuscripts and also of the ninth century Vatican codex (*Reginensis* 597) of Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*, which is the subject of the present palaeographical and philological study.

As one would naturally expect, his pupil has done her work well. The nature of the manuscript and the division of labor among the scribes are reported in detail (though the number of leaves ruled at a time is, unfortunately, omitted). The bulk of the dissertation, however, is taken up with accurate descriptions, first, of Lupus' work as a corrector and annotator (with two plates to illustrate his method) and second, of the activity of the other correctors, whose changes are of minor importance.

Since the manuscript has been revised by Lupus more thoroughly than any other codex in which his hand has been identified and since it therefore furnishes the best example of his activities as a corrector, his work is divided by the author into three categories—technical, editorial, and philological corrections—and minutely examined. The evidence is discussed in the style familiar to students of Professor Beeson's book and carefully tabulated. One discovers that Lupus certainly had access to a codex closely related to X (*Leyden*, *Voss. Lat. F.* 112, *sæc.* x), possibly the archetype of X, and probably had access to one or more of the following: (1) Einhard's manuscript, (2) possible variants in a ninth century ancestor of N (*Florence*,

Magliabecchianus 329, saec. xv), (3) possible variants in the archetype of O (*Rome, Vat. Reg. lat.* 597, saec. ix) disregarded by the scribe of O. Though Lupus is apparently no happier in his emendations in the Gellius codex than in the other books which he edits, he practically always preserves the original reading and in consequence does not obscure the manuscript tradition. His method deserves our thanks.

A special section at the end of the dissertation lists approximately three hundred and fifty corrections of misrepresentations of the readings of *Reginensis* 597 in the standard critical texts of the *Attic Nights* by Hertz (1883-85; see also *Jahrbücher für class. Philologie*, Supplementband, XXI, 1894, pp. 1-48) and Hosius (1903). This is a service for which scholars will be grateful.

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ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON. *Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian.* (Vol. II of *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome.*) Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936. Pp. x + 732. \$4.00.

In his preface to Volume I (*Rome and Italy of the Republic*) Professor Frank stated that one of the primary aims of this series was to present the sources, and also remarked that what was especially needed for Egypt was "a good source book of the documents." Professor Johnson has been faithful to this plan: translations of 445 original documents, in full or in part—the great majority from the papyri, of course, are included in the work. Each section of the book consists of a general treatment of its subject followed by illustrative documents, nearly all of which are provided with brief introductions of their own. The general parts of the sections are excellent examples of compression; each one gives a brief and pointed summary of the present state of our knowledge on its subject. This necessary compression has not, however, led to a dogmatic presentation, for Johnson makes no attempt to disguise unsolved problems, or to answer questions which are as yet unanswerable. The selection of documents is carefully made to illustrate the topics discussed; the translations are trustworthy, though not always completely consistent in phrasing, since many of them are taken from the published collections of papyri. The inclusion of the Greek originals, most desirable in itself, would have added enormously to the size and cost of the work. The number of papyrus documents published is now so great that there could

obviously be no attempt to include all the relevant source material, but in many cases very useful lists and summaries of the published examples of a particular type of document are supplied. As no "list of lists" is to be found in the volume, a brief guide to this valuable feature has been included in this review.

Chapter I is naturally devoted to "The Land," the basis of Egyptian economic life. The first sections of the chapter are concerned with the agricultural products of the country and the dependence of Egyptian farming upon the Nile. Then come the governmental and private arrangements concerning agriculture: the different categories into which the land was divided, sales of land, leases, and mortgages. The chapter closes with sections on farm accounts, domestic animals, and mineral resources. The illustrative documents are supplemented by lists and summaries of land registers, leases, sales, and mortgages (pp. 31, 71-4, 83-105, 150-57), and of sales of live stock (pp. 230-32).

The second chapter, devoted to "The People," includes sections on the population and the census, personal property, wages, and the cost of living; and on slavery, nursing contracts, education, marriage and divorce, amusements, and burial expenses. The following lists of documents are provided: leases, sales, and mortgages of houses and miscellaneous property (pp. 257-65), loans on slaves, and their sale and manumission (pp. 279-81), contracts for nursing and for entertainment (pp. 286-7, 299-300), wage-rates (pp. 306-10), and prices of foodstuffs, beverages, clothing, and wool (pp. 310-21).

Chapter III, on "Industry and Commerce," includes treatments of weights and measures, apprenticeship, guilds, transportation, banking, and a detailed discussion of money, one of the author's special fields of interest. The chapter contains lists of mills and oil-presses (pp. 364-6), contracts of loan with *παράμνη* (pp. 452-4), and miscellaneous costs and accounts (pp. 469-75); also of documents which supply evidence on hunting and fishing (pp. 375-6), apprenticeship (pp. 389-91), and the hire of beasts of burden and draught (pp. 405-7).

Chapter IV supplies a detailed treatment of "Taxation," including customs duties, liturgies, and requisitions. Up-to-date alphabetical lists of taxes are a valuable feature; these are classified as follows: taxes in kind (pp. 507-15), taxes on garden land (pp. 515-21), taxes on trades (pp. 538-44), assessments in money (pp. 545-50), and miscellaneous taxes and fees (pp. 552-81).

The fifth and last chapter, entitled "Miscellaneous," includes treatments of public works, temple accounts, military accounts, and miscellaneous edicts and laws. Under the first heading we find a list of the *testimonia* for public works (pp. 637-8), and

under the last we have translations of such famous documents as the edict of Tiberius Julius Alexander (pp. 705-9), the *gnomon* of the *idiologos* (pp. 711-17), and Caracalla's edict on Roman citizenship (p. 717).

The volume is concluded by a classified bibliography and a brief subject index. It contains, however, no index of Greek words or of technical terms, and no classified list of the documents translated.

The comprehensiveness and value of the work have perhaps been sufficiently indicated by the account given of its contents. Professor Johnson is to be congratulated on the completion of his difficult task and on his great contribution to the study of economic history. Students who have little Greek and no papyrology can now gain a clear insight into the economic life of Roman Egypt, and, at the other extreme, professional papyrologists will use the book constantly as a work of reference.

Naturally a volume of this size and scope is open to criticism on matters of detail, and previous reviewers have noted a number of points of disagreement on topics with which they have particularly concerned themselves. Such criticisms have special point in view of the fact that a new edition will be needed after a few more years of work in the swiftly developing field of papyrology, and therefore I may as well add a comment on one minor point. In his discussion of taxation Johnson says (p. 531): "The poll-tax was called *ἐπικεφάλαιον*, *λαογραφία*, or *συντάξιμον*. The latter term was limited to the Fayum and apparently included certain minor assessments which were levied per capita, in addition to the poll-tax itself." As the total annual amount recorded in the receipts and registers for *laographia* at the rate paid by native Egyptians and for *syntaximon* is exactly the same, there seems to be no place for the "minor assessments." The evidence that the term *ἐπικεφάλαιον* was used for the poll-tax, particularly in the Arsinoite nome, seems very questionable. I believe we are now safe in assuming that *laographia* was the general term used for the poll-tax at all rates, while this tax at its highest rate of approximately 44 drachmas was frequently called *syntaximon*, especially in tax receipts, in the Fayum (*A. J. P.*, LII (1931), pp. 263-9; cf. *B. G. U.*, 1891).

One notes from the title that this volume is part of an "economic survey," not an economic history. It is not the type of work which lends itself to general conclusions in regard to the economic condition of Egypt under the Romans. Yet one does find significant remarks on the forced drafting of farm tenants (p. 78), and on the flight of peasants from the soil (pp. vi, 81, 210, 482), now known to have been a feature of the whole Roman period (cf. N. Lewis, *Journ. Egypt. Archaeol.*, XXIII (1937), pp. 63-75). Perhaps Johnson comes nearest to

a general conclusion in his remarks in the Preface (p. v): "State control of industry and commerce had developed to a high degree under the Ptolemies. They, however, spent much of their revenue within the country, and their expenditures abroad could easily be met by the favourable balance of their export trade. The tribute exacted by the Romans was a steady drain on Egyptian resources and little was given in return. Under Augustus the tribute in kind, was fourfold the amount exacted by the earlier Ptolemies," No doubt the Roman government was more efficient than that of the Ptolemies, but our economic picture of Roman Egypt suggests that this very "efficiency," applied to the exploitation of provincial labor, was one of the most important factors contributing to the decline of the Empire.

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GRACE HARRIET MACURDY. *Vassal-Queens and some Contemporary Women in the Roman Empire*. The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology, No. 22. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 148. \$3.00.

Readers of Miss Macurdy's *Hellenistic Queens* will welcome this further study in the "woman-power" of antiquity, though it labors under a handicap not infrequently the lot of sequels. The material which made the earlier volume a notable contribution not only to the study of the eternal feminine but to the history of an important period in the world's history is in this case much scantier. Some of the vassal queens were historically important, notably Teuta of Illyria, the earliest, and Zenobia of Palmyra, the latest, as well as the women of the house of Herod, and apparently also Boudicca of Britain, who is little more than a romantic heroine in the Roman sources. Others were extremely obscure, like Gepaepyris of Thrace and Iotape of Commagene. But in almost all cases, except where Josephus has preserved the contemporary sketches of the women of Judaea, drawn by Nicolaus of Damascus, it is impossible to form a satisfactory impression of the personalities of the queens and their significance in their own circles, though coin portraits, and especially the fine bust of Dynamis of Bosporus, are helpful. Miss Macurdy's gift for the characterizing phrase finds little field for expression. Beside "scornful, much-married Glaphyra," principally striking are the Roman women; Agrippina, the "sophisticated Clytemnestra," and Octavia, who "had gathered under her wing the entire brood of Mark Antony's children." It is to be hoped that Miss Macurdy will continue her studies with the women of the Caesars, where better material awaits her.

As would be inevitable under the circumstances, the author has not missed much relating to these queens; neither can she have added much to our knowledge of them. Her sound scholarship and wide knowledge are here again demonstrated, and it is only a pity that new material was not available for her to use. She has performed a service, nevertheless, in making conveniently available what is known of their careers, and in focusing attention on some of the little known kingdoms which served only as buffer states in Roman policy, but which continued in their small way the traditions of their great Hellenistic predecessors, while their ruling families served in some cases as influential agents in the Hellenization of the Julio-Claudian Emperors. This was their greatest importance, and their relations with Rome constitute the leading motive of the book.

Only one thing might have been added for the convenience of the reader. Genealogical tables would have made it easier to follow the fortunes of some of the families with a more complicated marriage history.

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W. E. WETER. *Encouragement of Literary Production in Greece from Homer to Alexander* (dissertation). Private edition, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1936. Pp. iii + 113.

The discussion of the subject falls roughly into two divisions: individual patronage, with particular emphasis on the tyrants, and encouragement, whether monetary or otherwise, provided by city states and religious festivals. Sections on Sicily (pp. 31-46) and Macedonia (pp. 46-49) give us a useful summary and discussion of literary activity in those places. The author shows a wide and thorough knowledge of Greek literature within the period she has chosen to investigate. Much of the book, however, is little more than a catalogue of Greek authors and Greek literary production.

Encouragement of Literary Production is a very broad term as understood by Miss Weter: "But stimulus to literature is not limited to individual assistance, and in a broader sense the term may include all sources of encouragement to literary activity" (p. 1). In consequence of this free conception of the subject we have, along with much that is interesting and curious, a good deal that is obvious, commonplace, and even irrelevant. One cannot say of Solon without more critical examination than we find here (p. 3), "His poetical ability enabled him to gain the island of Salamis for Athens." The conclusion that religion, with its festivals, was an important factor in the encouragement

of literature (p. 78) is not new, nor does the author bring evidence to support it that is either new or illuminating.

Theoretical aspects of the subject are seldom given more than cursory notice. Is it possible to discover, for example, who among Greek authors were dependent on individual, family or government patronage for a livelihood, or how much the form and content of literature stood at the mercy of its patrons? Did Herodotus receive ten talents from the Athenians (p. 98) because they admired literary ability or because, as Plutarch suggests, Herodotus admired Athenian ability of a very different kind? A chapter on the relation of certain Greek authors to the social, economic and political life of their times would have made a valuable addition to the thesis.

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J. A. G. VAN DER VEER. *Reiniging en Reinheid bij Plato*, with a Summary in English. Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1936. Pp. xii + 139.

This study of purification and purity in Plato is divided into seven chapters, whose subjects are as follows: I. The terminology; II. Material cleansings; III. Purity of Ideas and definition as purification; IV. Intellectual purification of the soul; V. Non-intellectual purification of the soul; VI. Purity in religion (i. e., the place of moral excellence in Plato's religion); VII. Punishment as purification.

The exegesis is on the whole superficial and confused. It is based on the definition of purification as a separation of the worse from the better, which is derived from *Soph.*, 226D. The use of "pure" in the sense of "unmixed," "free from anything foreign," is discussed at some length. Apart from this, little attention is paid to the peculiarities of usage or to the various categories of meaning. Thus Dr. van der Veer infers from *Rep.*, 406D that in Plato's medical theory surgery and cautery were cathartic measures, whereas in fact catharsis was to him as to the medical writers a discharge from within the body or a treatment designed to act internally. The handling of ceremonial purification in religion is equally unsatisfactory. Some of the faults, as they appear to me, are inevitable for anyone who bases his work on the general theories of purity now prevalent. This is the case, for instance, when *Crat.*, 396E is held to show that Plato (or the man in the street, for that matter) could look upon inspiration as a ritual defilement. To the same cause is probably due an ill-advised attempt to elucidate *Laws*, 792CD by forcing on *ἱλως* the connotation "pure." On the other hand, a closer

scrutiny of *Crat.*, 405A and *Phaedr.*, 244DE would have revealed a thorough appreciation on Plato's part of the psychological value of formal purifications and of prayer and sacrifice. Again, a desire to maintain the cult of souls is ascribed to Plato as his chief motive in retaining purification after homicide in the *Laws* and especially in requiring it where Attic practice apparently did not. None of the many objections to such a view is considered, and the crucial difficulty presented by *Laws*, 869E, purification after forgiveness by the victim, is avoided by begging the question.

The discussion of various metaphors of purity which occupies the last five chapters is uneven in quality. While the implications of some figures are brought out fully and clearly, those of others are disregarded, and Plato's comparisons of intellectual excellence or moral righteousness to health, to simplicity, and to the purity of holiness are joined together without distinction. Moreover, the practice of interpreting in terms of "reinheid" passages that contain no corresponding term more than once gives the impression that Plato maintains a figure longer and more consistently than he does.

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GIULIO BATTELLI. *Lezioni di Paleografia.* (Pont. Scuola Vaticana di Paleografia e Diplomatica.) Città del Vaticano, 1936. Pp. x + 227; 40 small facsimiles.

This excellent manual is a monument to Father Bruno Katterbach, O. F. M., under whose direction the Vatican School reached high distinction as a fruitful center of archival studies; his pupil, author of this book, maintains the scholarly tradition; in his preface, he pays well-deserved tribute to Mgr. Angelo Mercati, Prefect of the Vatican Secret Archives. The Vatican Library makes every effort to remain a chief center for bibliographical and paleographical research workers; it is therefore no surprise to find Battelli abreast of the latest theories, such as Goldschmidt's explanation of the origin of "Arabic" numerals, and familiar with Rand's and Lowe's newest publications. The historical introduction and the descriptions of the various hands are sober and judicious, and particularly authoritative for the development of writing in Italy, from the Praeneste fibula to the Renaissance. The 40 black-and-white facsimiles, each of a few lines, are apparently all taken from published sources; ample references are given, however, to easily accessible repro-

ductions on a larger scale. The whole forms a handy working manual of Latin paleography, and its indications will help the learner to prepare himself adequately for actual MS study.

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W. F. JACKSON KNIGHT. *Cumaeae Gates. A Reference of the Sixth Aeneid to the Initiation Pattern.* Oxford, Blackwell, 1936. Pp. xv + 190, with frontispiece and 14 figures. 7s. 6d.

This book attempts to explain the ultimate implications of *Aeneid* VI, 9-44 and in effect seeks to answer the question why the portal of Apollo's temple at Cumae was decorated with a representation of the Labyrinth. Knight puts together a large body of facts and inferences concerning mazes and their ritual and practical significance, and also concerning journeys to the underworld and initiations which he finds cognate. This must be commended to the attention of students of ancient religion, who will find it interesting, if distinctly uncritical. For my own part, I cannot see what it has to do with the *Sixth Aeneid*. Knight makes a connection by accepting the theory that earlier stages of culture survive in our subconscious. That may be so: even if it is, the labyrinth is only part of the representations on the temple door. They portrayed the Cretan story in a continuous fashion with no special emphasis on the labyrinth, and the whole passage is, as Norden saw, an application of the common motif whereby a digression describing works of art was introduced into a tale.

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NOTICE.

This Journal wishes to call attention to the forthcoming *Concordance of Ovid*. After publication the price (2,400 pages) will be \$20.00. Orders received before August 1, 1938 will be accepted at \$16.00.

Libraries may deduct 10% from \$16.00.

Address orders to Professor Roy J. Deferrari, Catholic University of America, Brookland, D. C.